ARTICLES
Pregnant, Uninsured, and Undocumented: Prenatal Care for Immigrant Women in South Texas, K. Jill Fleuriet ................................................ 4

Some Thoughts on Helping Inconsolable Organizations to Heal, Howard F. Stein ................................................................. 22

SPECIAL SECTION: GENOCIDE, ETHNOCIDE, AND ETHNIC CLEANSING
Peter Van Arsdale, Editor

Genocide, Ethnocide, and Ethnic Cleansing, Preface and General Introduction, Peter Van Arsdale ................................................................. 46

Genocide, Ethnocide, and Ethnic Cleansing: An Exploratory Review, Peter Van Arsdale, Mellissa Jessen, Nicole Hawthorne, Kellie Ramirez, and Cathy Smith .................... 47

COMMENTARIES on Genocide, Ethnocide, and Ethnic Cleansing: An Exploratory Review

Holodomor: Ukraine’s Secret Famine-Genocide of 1932-1933, Roxolanua B. R. Wynar ................................................................. 72

Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk, Nicole Herrera ................................................................. 78

Humanitarian Aid versus Humanitarian Intervention, Barbara Bonner ................................................................. 82

Gacaca in the Context of Reconciliation: The Case of Rwanda, Josiah Marineau ................................................................. 87

Gendercide: A Critical Examination of Gender and Sex-Selective Mass Killing, Amy D. Bhalla ................................................................. 92
2008 - 2009 Board of Directors
HIGH PLAINS SOCIETY for APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

President (outgoing) ........................................ Richard W. Stoffle
President-Elect (incoming) ................................. Kathleen A. Pickering
Past President ................................................. Kreg T. Ettenger
Secretary ....................................................... Amanda Israel
Treasurer ......................................................... Merun H. Nasser
Archivist ......................................................... Carla Littlefield
Finance Committee Chair ................................. Carla Littlefield
Journal Editor ................................................ Jean N. Scandlyn
Members-at-Large ............................................. Art Campa
                                             Barbara Hawthorn
                                             Jack Schultz
Newsletter Editor ............................................ Benjamin Jewell
Nominations and Elections Committee .......... Leni Bohren
                                             Mark Calamia
                                             Jessica Medwied-Savage
                                             Peter Van Arsdale
Publications Policy Committee Chair .......... Kreg T. Ettenger
Membership Committee Chair .................... Kathleen A. Pickering
Student Representative ............................... Kathleen Van Vlack
Email List (Listserve) Manager ..................... Reed Riner
Webmaster ...................................................... Pennie L. Magee

www.hpsfaa.org

Mission Statement of The Applied Anthropologist
The Applied Anthropologist publishes peer-reviewed articles, commentaries, brief communications, and book reviews on a wide range of topics. The journal’s focus is on cultural change and adaptation in the modern world. The journal explores how humans approach, analyze, and develop solutions to cultural, ecological, economic, and technological problems.

Subscriptions/Memberships/Back Issues
Annual subscriptions/memberships are $40 US for individuals and $75 US for institutions. Please go to our website, www.hpsfaa.org, and download the subscription/membership form. Please fill it out and send it along with your check on a U.S. bank or an international money order payable to the High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology to Dr. Merun H. Nasser, HPSfAA Treasurer, 2636 Grapewood Lane, Boulder, Colorado (CO) 80304-2406 USA; telephone 303-449-0278 and e-mail merun@worldnet.att.net. For foreign subscriptions, please add $25 US to the individual or institutional annual subscription/membership rate above for delivery of The Applied Anthropologist via global priority mail. For back issues, order through the editor at $20 US per issue. Please note that special subscription/membership rates apply for students at $25 US per year and for couples desiring a joint dual subscription/membership at $50 US per year.
Editor in Chief and Book Review Editor
Jean N. Scandlyn (Ph.D. 1993, Columbia University, Anthropology)
Departments of Anthropology and Health and Behavioral Sciences
University of Colorado Denver, Campus Box 103, P.O. Box 173364, Denver, CO 80217-3364 USA
303-352-3976 office, jscandlyn@ucdenver.edu

Associate Editors
Kreg T. Ettenger (Ph.D. 2004, Syracuse University, Anthropology)
Department of Geography-Anthropology, University of Southern Maine
300 Bailey Hall, 37 College Avenue, Gorham, ME 04038 USA
207-780-5322, ettenger@usm.maine.edu

Robert Guang Tian (Ph.D. 1996, York University, Canada, Anthropology)
Medaille College, 18 Agassiz Circle, Buffalo, NY 14214 USA
716-880-2104, robert.g.tian@medaille.edu

Peter W. Van Arsdale (Ph.D. 1975, University of Colorado at Boulder, Anthropology)
Chair, Human Rights and Social Justice Committee, Society for Applied Anthropology
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
102- G Cherrington Hall, 2201 South Gaylord Street, Denver, CO 80208 USA
303-871-3281, pvanarsd@du.edu

Copy Editor
Francesca Nicosia (B.A. 2002, DePauw University, Sociology/Anthropology & Conflict Studies;
M.A. Candidate University of Colorado Denver, Anthropology)
Department of Anthropology, University of Colorado Denver
Campus Box 103, PO Box 173364, Denver, CO 80217-3364 USA

Layout and Production Editor
Jeffrey B. Fuller (attended University of Alaska at Fairbanks, Wildlife Management, and the University of Oregon, Eugene, Fine Arts and Writing)
Crescent Moon Communications, 3071 Fulton Circle, Boulder, Colorado (CO) 80301-2291 USA
303-543-0542, j.b.fuller@comcast.net

HPSfAA Newsletter Editor
Benjamin Jewell (M.A. 2008, Colorado State University, Anthropology)
School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University
900 South Cady Mall, Room 233, Tempe, AZ 85281 USA
480-206-7651, benjamin.jewell@asu.edu
PEER REVIEWERS FOR THE APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGIST

Clare Boulanger, Ph.D.

Sharry Erzinger, Dr.P.H.

Kreg T. Ettenger, Ph.D.

Pennie L. Magee, Ph.D.

Charles M. Musiba, Ph.D.

Kathleen Pickering, Ph.D.

Richard W. Stoffle, Ph.D.

Robert Guang Tian, Ph.D.

Peter W. Van Arsdale, Ph.D.

Lawrence F. Van Horn, Ph.D.

Maxine Weisgrau, Ph.D.

EDITORS EMERITA

Peter W. Van Arsdale

Edward C. Knop

Susan Scott Stevens

Deward E. Walker, Jr.

Lawrence F. Van Horn
This issue of *The Applied Anthropologist* exemplifies both the journal's stated mission and one of the most important traditions of the High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology (HPSfAA). The two lead articles fulfill the journal's stated mission to publish articles that explore “how humans approach, analyze, and develop solutions to cultural, ecological, economic, and technological problems.” Jill Fleuriet's article provides an ethnographic study of the difficulties that undocumented immigrant women from Mexico living in Texas encounter in accessing adequate prenatal care and the social policies and attitudes toward immigrants that create barriers to care. Howard Stein's article describes how anthropologists can work with U.S. organizations that have undergone or are undergoing downsizing and other restructuring to promote healing from these traumatic events through integration.

These two articles by established scholars are followed by an article and a special section that continues the HPSfAA's long-standing tradition, as noted by Peter Van Arsdale in his preface to the special section, “that qualified students be encouraged to publish their research in peer-reviewed journals and that they be assisted by senior society members in doing so.”

The first of these articles is by Kathleen Van Vlack who received HPSfAA's Friedl and Martha Lang Student Award in Applied Anthropology for 2009. Recipients of the award present her or his paper at the annual spring meeting of the association and publish it in *The Applied Anthropologist*. Van Vlack's article analyzes the history of government and Native American interaction to improve living conditions for Native Americans by comparing the models of anthropological research of the earlier Bureau of Ethnic Research and its present form, the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology. Van Vlack, who received a Masters of Arts degree in American Indian Studies from the University of Arizona in May 2007 (see photo below), is currently working on her doctorate in American Indian Studies with a minor in applied anthropology. Her dissertation research is on cultural preservation in the Great Basin.

The issue concludes with the special section, edited by Peter Van Arsdale, which features his work and the work of former graduate students at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. The lead article was inspired by Van Arsdale's work with the Committee for Human Rights of the American Anthropological Association and that organization's 2001 draft statement on ethnic cleansing. Five graduate students working under Van Arsdale’s direction wrote articles that comment on and extend the issues and themes discussed in the lead article, applying them to related case studies and policy concerns.

As editor, I hope you find that the articles in this issue both reflect the society’s and the journal's traditions and provide new insight into the solution of human problems.
Pregnant, Uninsured, and Undocumented:  
Prenatal Care for Immigrant Women in South Texas

K. Jill Fleuriet

Abstract
Prenatal care has been shown to improve maternal and birth outcomes, reduce birth- and birth-related morbidity costs, and serve as a means to link medically needy children with health and health care resources. Yet prenatal care options for uninsured, low-income undocumented immigrant women living in the United States are insufficient and frequently inaccessible. In this paper, I use qualitative research to detail and assess U.S. prenatal care experiences among undocumented immigrant women from Mexico. I situate their experiences in the larger context of publicly supported prenatal care in the United States for undocumented immigrant women. I argue that policies targeting undocumented immigrants and low-income pregnant women are misdirected and ineffective because they stem from hegemonic political discourse rather than actual medical needs. I conclude with recommendations to amend policy in order to incorporate prenatal care preferences and expressed needs of undocumented immigrant women.

When one doesn't have the documentation . . . it's difficult to get health care in the United States. They ask for many requirements. If you don't have them, well, you have to go somewhere else. And if you have a [Medicaid] card, they ask for further identification. If you don't have papers, how are you going to have identification? It's very difficult.

– Carmen, 35 years old, immigrant woman from Mexico City, Mexico.

I think that the Americans get the best medical care, because they have the most resources. And if you’re Hispanic [from Mexico], there are times when you don’t have sufficient money to see a specialist.

– Diana, 35 years old, immigrant woman from Veracruz, Mexico.

Prenatal care has been shown to improve maternal health, child health, and birth outcomes (Chang et al. 2003; Keily and Kogan 1994; Conway and Kutinova 2006), reduce birth- and birth-related morbidity costs (Lu et al. 2000), and serve as a means to link medically needy children with health care and health-promoting resources (Kogan et al. 1998; Alexander et al. 2002). Yet prenatal care options for uninsured, low-income undocumented immigrant women living in the United States are insufficient and frequently inaccessible (Eldridge 2002; Ku and Matani 2001). In one study in Colorado (Reed et al. 2005), undocumented women who gave birth between 1998 and 1999 received significantly fewer prenatal care visits and initiated prenatal care later than all other women.

Despite the fact that recent immigrant women from Mexico have been shown to have better birth outcomes with less prenatal care than other minorities (Acevedo-Garcia et al. 2007; McGlade et al. 2004), a lack of prenatal care among immigrant women from Mexico is associated with a higher risk for low birthweight and preterm babies in the two South Texas counties where I conducted my research. Citizenship is not recorded on birth certificates, but birthplace of the mother is. According to Dr. Karl Eschbach, the state demographer of Texas, 85% of Mexico-born women of childbearing age in these counties are undocumented immigrants (personal communication, Karl Eschbach, 2009). According to natality data from 2001-2005 collected by the Texas Department of State Health Services (TDSHS 2009), Mexico-born women in these two counties were almost four times more likely to have had no prenatal care than US-born women (8.0% versus 2.1%, p<0.000). Among Mexico-born women, those who did not receive prenatal care were more likely to have low birthweight babies (8.1% versus 5.7%, p <0.000) and preterm babies (11.7% versus 9.9%, p<0.000) than Mexico-born women who
did receive prenatal care. Thus within the Mexican immigrant population in these two counties, the relationship between prenatal care and better birth outcomes persists.

It should be noted that the role of prenatal care in birth outcomes is not entirely understood, which would appear to complicate recommendations for prenatal care for immigrant women. The efficacy of formal prenatal care has certainly been questioned (Alexander and Kotelcheck 2001; McCormick and Siegel 2001). There are several reasons for conflicting research on prenatal care and birth outcomes. First, prenatal care can significantly vary in definition, including components and modes of delivery of care. To illustrate, the CenteringPregnancy model (Walker and Rising 2004) incorporates peer education and support into prenatal care. In contrast, the most common form of prenatal care is a series of individual clinical checks and limited exposure to psychosocial support resources (Novik 2004). Second, low birthweight is hypothesized to have multiple causes, some of which remain to be identified. As a result, existing prenatal care, however defined, may not be adequate in content or scope as a preventive measure. A third difficulty is the differential impact of prenatal care on birth outcomes for pregnancies that carry low or high medical risks to the mother or fetus (Conway and Deb 2004). Even in ideal clinical circumstances of managing risk, prenatal care may not be able to prevent poor birth outcomes in high risk pregnancies, thereby statistically obscuring its impact on birth outcomes in lower risk pregnancies.

Nevertheless, certain elements of prenatal care, including psychosocial interventions aimed at reducing smoking and nutritional education and more comprehensive psychosocial support, have been shown to positively impact birth outcomes (Alexander and Kotelcheck 2001; McLaughlin et al. 1989). Also, formal prenatal care has relevance for Hispanic health, extending beyond the immediate pregnancy. Hispanic children have the highest rates of little to no health care (CDC 2002); prenatal care has been found to be a positive entry point for future well-child and maternal care (Kogan et al. 1998; Alexander et al. 2002). Entry into prenatal care can improve maternal health, as well, with respect to treating obesity and reducing the likelihood of extended hospitalization after birth (Conway and Kutinova 2006). Mexican women without prenatal care are at greater risk for hyperglycemia (Hernandez-Valence and Pacheco 2002). Hyperglycemia is a major risk factor for developing diabetes that would be assessed during prenatal care. Hispanics also have increasingly high rates of Type II diabetes (NIDDK 2002). Thus prenatal care can serve as an important entry point into the health care system and means of moderating risk for immigrant women and their children.

Publicly-funded prenatal care options for low-income, undocumented immigrant women include Title V clinics, county health clinics, and community and migrant health centers. There are also charitable organizations that provide prenatal care for undocumented immigrants. These organizations are both private and not-for-profit. Despite these options, there is simply not enough prenatal care for women who are poor and uninsured (Derose et al. 2007). Second, a lack of legal residence creates specific barriers to prenatal care. These barriers include fear of immigration authorities, a lack of health insurance, and lack of knowledge on how to navigate the U.S. health care system (cited in Kullgren 2003). Lack of insurance increases morbidity and mortality risks for infants and mothers (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004; Matthews and MacDorman 2006; Institute of Medicine 2002, 2002b; Kasper 2004; Chang et al. 2003). Each of these barriers is compounded by poverty and language differences between providers and immigrants (Eldridge 2002).

However, barriers alone do not account for the insufficient and inadequate prenatal care received by undocumented immigrants. The prenatal care that is offered through public funding downplays or, at worst, ignores the three factors I studied and present in this paper that have been shown to be crucial in positive birth outcomes: prenatal care preferences, psychosocial health, and material security. Biomedical institutions, such as the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG 2008), and cross-cultural grass-roots organizations, such as the International MotherBaby Childbirth Initiative (IMBCO
agree that material security, psychosocial health, knowledge about healthy pregnancies and births and options for prenatal care, and the power to choose among these options help promote positive birth outcomes. Publicly-funded programs do not provide such choices and thus leave a critical shortfall in overall care for the pregnant undocumented immigrant woman.

In this paper, I critique the absence of these factors in publicly funded prenatal care for undocumented immigrant women using the ethnographic platform of their voices. I first present undocumented immigrant women’s experiences with U.S. prenatal care, emphasizing their preferences and the barriers they encounter. Then, I position their experiences within the larger context of U.S. prenatal care and public support for undocumented immigrant communities. I show that despite stated intentions, publicly funded prenatal care encodes cultural assumptions and values that ultimately undermine the potential impact of prenatal care to improve birth outcomes, maternal health, and future child health in undocumented immigrant communities. I conclude with recommendations on how to amend policy to incorporate a more comprehensive and flexible prenatal care model that better suits the needs and preferences of undocumented immigrant women from Mexico and, by extension, other undocumented immigrant communities in the United States.

Methods and Setting

We love living down here [in the Rio Grande Valley of South Texas] because we can go on a weekend down there [to Mexico]. I mean, here is like being there, just getting paid in dollars, you know? It is just the same thing. It's just there's an imaginary line there.

– Veronica, 20 years old, immigrant woman from Jalisco, Mexico.

According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “undocumented” or “unauthorized” immigrants are foreign-born non-citizens who are not legal residents of the U.S. (Hoefer et al. 2006:1). There are an estimated 11.6 million undocumented immigrants in the US. Of these, 6.6 million (56%) are from Mexico (Hoefer et al 2006:1). 3.9 million (35%) undocumented immigrants are adult females (Passel 2006). There are a reported 1,640,000 undocumented immigrants in Texas alone (Hoefer et al 2006:4). The southernmost border region of Texas, locally referred to as “the lower Rio Grande Valley,” has one of the highest concentrations of undocumented immigrants in Texas (Strayhorn 2006).

I conducted research in the Valley’s two most populous counties, Cameron and Hidalgo, which are also the two southernmost counties in Texas bordering Mexico. At 36.9% and 35.9%, respectively, Cameron and Hidalgo have the highest percentage of people in the U.S. below the poverty line for counties with populations of 250,000 or more people (Webster and Bishaw 2006). The Valley has a majority Hispanic population with a large Spanish-speaking component. In 2006, Cameron County’s population was 86.1% Hispanic; Hidalgo County’s population was 89.5% Hispanic (U.S. Census Bureau 2006, 2006b). Cameron has a partial designation as a Medically Underserved Area/Population, and Hidalgo has a full designation (TDSHS 2007). Formal prenatal care opportunities for undocumented women in the Valley are clinics that are publicly funded or supported by charitable organizations. Of the 130,544 babies born in Hidalgo and Cameron Counties between 2001 and 2005, 66,264 (50.8%) were born to mothers whose birthplace was Mexico (TDSHS 2009). It can be reasonably estimated that 85% (56,324) of these women were undocumented (Karl Eschbach, personal communication, 2009). Eight percent (5,219) of Mexico-born mothers received no prenatal care; 2.1% (1,360) of US-born mothers received no prenatal care (p<0.000).

By virtue of their geography, Cameron and Hidalgo counties are a major immigration destination from Mexico. Immigrants arrive to live with existing friends and relatives in communities with relatively few linguistic barriers. Information about social services is easily obtained in Spanish through Spanish television channels, radio stations, billboards, and staff at social service agencies. Isolation stems mainly from undocumented status and
poverty, both of which limit mobility and social interaction. However, language remains a barrier in health care interactions. While more health care providers speak Spanish in the Valley than elsewhere in Texas, because of a shortage of local health care professionals, Valley hospitals recruit non-Spanish speaking health care professionals from Canada and other parts of the United States.

My research was conducted with women who had managed to gain access to prenatal care, funded either through federal and/or state programs or charitable organizations. Research goals were to: 1) document low-income and immigrant women's prenatal care preferences and experiences and, 2) explore the relationship between preference, experiences, pregnancy and birth epistemologies, and structural constraints. Research proceeded in two stages. The first stage, conducted in 1996, used a survey methodology supplemented with clinic observations. I interviewed 226 low-income Mexican and Mexican American women in Cameron and Hidalgo Counties attending one of three prenatal care clinics: a private biomedical clinic, a community health center, and an alternative Catholic birthing center. My purpose was to identify preferences for prenatal care providers among low-income Hispanic women in South Texas who had accessed different kinds of formal prenatal care. While it included, but did not target, undocumented immigrant women from Mexico, the research was highly suggestive of a distinctive prenatal care experience for this group.

The second stage of my research extended from 2003 to 2005. I returned to South Texas for eight weeks to conduct ethnographic interviews, focus groups, and participant observation with undocumented immigrant women attending the community health center and the Catholic birthing center and the staff at each center. The private clinic was too expensive for this group of women to attend since they had no insurance. This phase of the research was designed to elicit narratives about: 1) pregnancy, prenatal care and birth experiences in Mexico and the United States; 2) pregnancy-related social support; and, 3) barriers to preferred prenatal care and social support due to poverty, immigration, and citizenship status. As described in Fleuriet (2009, in press), I conducted participant-observation at the Catholic birthing center for twelve non-consecutive days, principally through volunteer clerical work and preparing and joining in communal lunches with the staff. I observed prenatal care and birthing classes, patient-provider clinic interactions, waiting room interactions, and formal and informal conversations among staff and clients, in addition to attending a birth. At the community health center, I spent fourteen non-consecutive days conducting participant observation, which included informal conversations with midwives, the director, nurses, social workers, and administrative assistants, observation of a parenting class, and observations and informal conversations with women in the waiting room. I conducted interviews with clients and staff in Spanish, English, or both, depending on preference. Upon consent, interviews were recorded. Recorded interviews were transcribed by a bilingual graduate student; I regularly checked transcripts for accuracy. Transcripts were analyzed for themes and related quotations using ATLAS.ti textual analysis software. Themes were initially based on interview topics noted above but then expanded or modified to include subjects regularly raised by the interviewees. For example, the theme of prenatal care experiences in Mexico was refined to include sections on sonograms and medical technology, a comparison of lay midwives, certified nurse-midwives, and obstetrical doctors, and roles of female relatives. After initial analyses, focus groups with clients and research reports and discussions with staff were conducted to check early conclusions and interpretations of the data.

The community health center and the Catholic birthing center followed different biomedical models of prenatal care. The birthing center was a not-for-profit clinic and a working Roman Catholic convent. Its clinical staff consisted of certified nurse-midwives (CNM), nurses, and nursing assistants. Its founder, a nun and certified nurse-midwife, created the center to offer family-oriented and midwifery-centered pregnancy and birth services. A guiding principle was minimal medical intervention for low-risk pregnancies and births. Sonograms were done
off-site and only ordered when midwives suspected a condition that could harm the woman or fetus. Births were unmedicated. Another guiding principle was female empowerment through respect and education. Midwives approached clinical encounters as conversations with pregnant women, including them in the decision-making process about their care. Labor and birth were in small birthing cottages on the convent’s grounds. Midwives talked of “catching,” rather than “delivering,” babies, indicating that the authority and power in the delivery process rested with the mother-to-be. Clinical, administrative and religious staff members also participated in outreach to undocumented immigrant families and other very poor Valley families. Outreach programs included food banks, transportation, English and parenting classes, and clothing drives.

The community health center also conducted outreach, though with state and federal funding sources and with a larger and more general focus on low-income families. Its approach to pregnancy and birth was more firmly grounded in a biomedical risk model with the prenatal care provider as the primary authority. Although it started as a midwife-run clinic, the community health center had become closely associated with a regional medical center and hospital and operated under the authority of medical doctors. Prenatal care services typically included regular sonograms. Birth was required to take place in the nearby hospital. Babies were “delivered,” rather than “caught,” by doctors that arrived in the hospital’s delivery room when the women were in the final stages of labor.

Based on the clinics’ different approaches to prenatal care and birth, I expected that the women attending the birthing center or community health center would also have different ideas of their agency and the role of prenatal care providers in pregnancy and birth. In turn, I anticipated these different epistemologies would exert more influence over prenatal care decisions than structural constraints such as economic or immigration status. As it turned out, decisions were largely driven by immigration and economic status.

**Prenatal Care Preferences and Barriers among Undocumented Immigrant Women in South Texas**

Doctors in general don’t have much patience . . . [The best midwife] is one that has a good way of being. She is friendly, she makes you feel good. I have heard that other kinds of providers don’t treat you well and that, to me, is very important, you know? That they receive you with a smile, that is very important . . . For me, it’s better if the midwife is a woman. – Diana, 35 years old, immigrant woman from Veracruz, Mexico.

In the 1996 study, I expected that different clinic populations would have chosen different prenatal care provider preferences by virtue of distinctly different clinical approaches to prenatal care and birth. I documented women’s prenatal care provider preferences through surveys with 226 Hispanic women, 50% (113) of whom were immigrants from Mexico. The following results pertain only to women who were Mexican immigrants. Mexican immigrant women preferred midwives over obstetrical doctors at both the Catholic birthing center (93.8% preferred midwives) and the community health center (75.0% preferred midwives). I then statistically modeled prenatal care provider preferences, CNM or obstetrical doctor (OB/GYN), using variables known from the literature to influence choice and preference of formal prenatal care provider (see Medrano 1997 for review). These variables were: acculturation, age, attitude toward medical intervention during pregnancy, clinic of attendance, level of education, income, number of children, number of pregnancies, and payment source (see Table 1 below). Due to problematic assumptions in standard acculturation measures (Hunt et al. 2004), cultural identification was used as a proxy for acculturation and was determined for this sample by using a factor analysis of language of birthplace, primary language, language of most familiarity, language on television, place of birth, and cultural self-identification (see Medrano 1997 for factor analysis results). Attitude toward medical intervention was measured by a Likert scale (always, sometimes, or never necessary). A brief scan of Table 1 shows that acculturation (p < 0.000), type of clinic (p < 0.000) and parity (p <
significantly influenced preference of prenatal care provider. Controlling for other variables did not significantly change these correlations.

That immigrant women preferred a CNM over a OB/GYN was surprising given that 80.2% of births in Mexico in 2007 were attended by a physician (INEGI 2009). Moreover, 93.9% of pregnant women in Mexico in 2000-2003 were seen by a physician at least once during their pregnancies (Secretaría de Salud 2003: 42, 45). Of these women, 89.5% were satisfied with their care (Secretaría de Salud 2003: 45). Another interesting finding was the lack of a relationship between preference and attitudes toward medical intervention. Despite the Texas clinics’ different orientations to prenatal care and birth, there was no statistical difference in attitudes among women at the community health center, private clinic, and Catholic birthing center. As I worked with these data, it became apparent the lack of these relationships and the significance of clinic and acculturation variables were most likely a proxy profile for the political, social, and economic realities influencing prenatal care opportunities for undocumented immigrant women. Due to their poverty and lack of U.S. citizenship, these women faced more structural constraints than documented or U.S.-born Hispanic women in locating and accessing resources. I concluded that further research was needed to examine the interplay between access to reproductive health care resources and any possible cultural orientations toward prenatal care and birth and how this interplay affected undocumented women’s reproductive health care strategies, preferences, and experiences.

This prompted the second stage of my research and my subsequent focus in 2003-2005 on undocumented immigrant women. I spoke with eighteen women at the Catholic birthing center and sixteen at the community health center. Twenty-eight of these were low-income undocumented immigrants from Mexico, twenty-five (89.3%) of whom preferred midwives. The remaining three did not have a preference of prenatal care provider. Despite having access to prenatal care at the time of the interview, the majority of women had nevertheless encountered barriers in accessing them in the past. Their responses about informal and formal prenatal care experiences and preferences illustrated both cultural preferences toward gender and pregnancy-related social support and structural constraints on exercising their prenatal care preferences.

Preferences. What the undocumented immigrant women wanted more than anything else was affordable gendered support alongside regular clinical checks to ensure that their pregnancy was progressing normally. Most women preferred midwives, primarily because of their presumed female gender and the perception that women were more intuitive, and thus more supportive, about pregnancy-related changes. For example, Veronica, in her early twenties and in her third pregnancy, reflected on her prenatal care experiences at community clinics for her first two pregnancies and her current care at the Catholic birthing center:

I feel more comfortable with women doctors, maybe because I’m Mexican, but they seem more comfortable in the way they check. We relate more to them. . . . my family taught me that women are the ones that have babies. Women are the ones that know what happens. Men don’t know what it is to go through an experience like that, so women know best.

Many of the other women echoed these sentiments. Raquel, a thirty-five year old woman from Veracruz, Mexico, attending the Catholic birthing center, said simply, “I trust a woman more.” As Marissa, a twenty-five year old woman from Michoacán, Mexico, said, “Female midwives can understand you better. They know what’s happening to you. The male doctor is colder because he is a man. They can’t feel what you’re going through.” Silvia, a twenty-nine year old from Tamaulipas, Mexico, explained her preference for the midwives at the Catholic birthing center: “I feel more comfortable and trusting with a woman, a person of my same sex. I’ll ask her questions when I wouldn’t have if it had been a [male] doctor. I feel more secure that she’ll have the answers to my questions.” One thirty-three year old undocumented immigrant woman from Monterey, Mexico attending the community health center explained, “I’m embarrassed with the male doctors.”
Another woman at the community health center, Clara, a thirty-three year old immigrant woman from Monterey, Mexico, blamed her doctor’s inability to recognize that she was in labor on the fact that he was male and therefore did not respect her female intuition. She said, “I feel like the doctors don’t pay attention to you, they don’t explain that this is happening for that reason. No, they don’t talk with you. . . . It’s because they’re men. . . . The benefit of midwives is, in the first place, that they are women... They know more than the [male] doctors what you’re feeling. In my case, during my third pregnancy, I told the [male] doctor, “Doctor, I have so many contractions.” And the doctor? “No.” If you’re not giving birth right then, he won’t send you to the hospital. He checked and I wasn’t dilated, and said I still had time to go before my due date. And I told my husband still, “I already know that the baby wants to come. I feel it.” Finally, I went directly to the hospital where I saw a midwife who said, “Yes, the baby’s coming right now.” . . . and then they had to operate because my blood pressure was high and it turned out I was late to deliver. And the male doctor just didn’t understand at all.

These undocumented immigrant women’s words demonstrate the belief that they could talk more openly and ask more questions with a female provider. Female providers respect the woman’s intuition, recognize the woman’s own knowledge about her body, and incorporate these dimensions into the care rendered. Male providers, on the other hand, were thought to lack this respect, shared experience, and intuitive understanding.

The second most discussed prenatal care preference among undocumented immigrant women was a provider who offered informational and emotional support. One woman at the birthing center, Sonia, a twenty-five year-old woman from Tamaulipas, Mexico, said she wanted a provider who “attends me well, that gives me a lot of attention, and that gets after me when I don’t do the things I’m supposed to do when I’m pregnant.” Another woman at the community health center, Antonia, a thirty-three year-old immigrant woman from Valle Hermoso, Mexico, mirrored Sonia’s words, saying, “My midwife, I have a good midwife. She is very friendly, attentive, takes care of me, does the best that she can. Always, she is patient.” Laura, a twenty-five year-old immigrant woman from Morelia, Mexico, said she liked her midwife at the community health center, because “She explains things that are happening to my body.” This preference for someone who could empathize and advise appeared to be rooted in a larger sense of the importance of female social support during pregnancy. However, as Lazarus (1994) and others have noted (Davis-Floyd and Sargent 1997), most women want these things from their prenatal care provider: informational support, respect, open communication, trust, and for many in the US, sufficient biomedical expertise to diagnose high-risk pregnancies using medical technology. What was distinct among undocumented immigrant women from Mexico was a strong preference for female providers.

Barriers. In addition to gendered support from a provider, women and their providers said that structural constraints were paramount in choosing prenatal care. Midwives I spoke to at the birthing center and community health center talked about numerous barriers to care for undocumented immigrant women including transportation to and from the clinics, childcare during the visits, inability to communicate with the provider because the provider did not speak her language, and the fear that immigration authorities would use the clinics as a means to apprehend undocumented immigrants. The former director of the birthing center, a midwife for over twenty-five years in South Texas, said the most common barriers to prenatal care in the Valley are transportation, lack of cultural sensitivity and Spanish language ability among providers, and the inability for women to afford their preferred forms of prenatal care. Another midwife at the birthing center connected U.S. health care policies with the barriers, saying, “[In the United States, we say] you can’t have this because you are not documented, and no, you can’t go back to Mexico because if you go to Mexico to get this done, you can’t come back... There’s [sic] no resources when you have a woman who doesn’t have the income, who’s not documented, but she definitely needs help.”
Repeatedly, the undocumented immigrant women spoke of financial barriers to care. Cost was the first reason that they selected either the birthing center or the community health center. Subsequently, they discussed how their decisions were also influenced by the affective care and/or the material support they received through the clinic. Laura said she chose the birthing center because,

In the first place, I don’t have papers [that would help me pay] and the other clinics are very expensive. And so here, I pay as much as I can. And here, there is something for my little girl. Look at the toys that the staff has sewn for her to play with. Here, there is clothing for the babies. They give you food; make sure that you are doing well.

While economic considerations were significant for all women, some women balanced cost considerations with their perceptions of a clinic's standard of care. Several women chose to pay more for their care at the community health center rather than return to free care at county health clinics because they considered their care at the county health clinics to be substandard. Four women spoke of attending a county health clinic for prenatal care for previous pregnancies. Not one woman had a positive experience. They found the clinic unclean or the staff insulting or aloof. In the following narrative, Gabriela, a twenty-eight year-old immigrant woman from Veracruz, Mexico, explains her and her husband’s decision to travel further to pay for prenatal care at the community health center:

I took note of the care I received with my last baby, my last pregnancy . . . when I was in labor, they gave me a C-section. The stitches the doctor put in were bad. They got infected. I feel like they really did not take good care of me, the clinic was unhygienic. And my first child and my husband didn’t like it either. At the time, my husband didn’t have good work, but he told me, “We’re going to [the community health center] and figure out a way to pay for the care.” Here [at the community health center], I am well.

Rosa, a twenty-nine year old immigrant woman from Tampico, Mexico, who attended a different county health clinic, also considered the care inadequate. She thought the staff had certain negative opinions about women who got free care. These opinions, in turn, shaped the clinical and affective care she received. She said,

When I was going to [the county health clinic for my second pregnancy], they were really ugly. They were not nice, and maybe it’s because it’s free. . . . They were like, “Well, you couldn’t wait to have another baby, huh?” They were really like that. And I don’t know, I really didn't like it, and I told my husband, “I don’t want to go to that clinic anymore.” I love my baby . . . but [according to the clinic staff] you were bad for getting pregnant. So I go [to the community health center], even if we have to pay.

Tellingly, each of the barriers to care cited by undocumented immigrant women and their providers can be easily linked to current national discourses about Mexican immigrants and inadequate prenatal care. These discourses, in turn, drive public funding for prenatal care. The fear of immigration authorities can be logically connected with visible anti-Mexican immigrant sentiment in popular media and images, as well as the increased presence of Homeland Security in the U.S.-Mexico border area. The construction of the U.S.-Mexico border fence, the activities of the Minutemen militia group, and the online pay-per-view border-crossing surveillance cameras are but three more examples of public fear of immigration from Mexico. Wait time, transportation, and cost each reflect the limited vision of prenatal care that is embodied in policy. Language, personality of providers and staff, and male gender of prenatal care providers imply a prenatal care model that does little to acknowledge women’s preferences.

Situating Prenatal Care for Undocumented Immigrant Women: Optimal Prenatal Care versus Publicly Funded Prenatal Care

When I went to the hospital, they asked me for a lot of money, and here [at the Catholic birthing center], they didn’t ask for anything. And here, well, here, they don’t just set you
aside. Here, they give you hugs. They treat you for the entirety of the pregnancy. – Sonia, 25 years old, immigrant woman from Tamaulipas, Mexico.

If publicly funded prenatal care programs ostensibly cover undocumented immigrant women, why, then, are these women still encountering barriers? Why does policy hinder an undocumented immigrant woman’s ability to exercise her prenatal care preferences? Existing social science research reveals that while publicly funded programs are often designed to provide prenatal care to undocumented immigrant women, they are simultaneously and primarily an expression of underlying social discourse of immigration, citizenship, and reproductive rights. As shown below, these discourses do more to limit, rather than facilitate, access to comprehensive prenatal care.

Two types of health care policies impact prenatal care delivery to undocumented immigrant women: those aimed at undocumented immigrants and those aimed at low-income and uninsured pregnant women. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) severely restricted publicly funded services, including prenatal care, for undocumented immigrants. PRWORA stipulated that undocumented immigrants who cannot establish asylum status have no access to federal public benefits, including Medicaid and its prenatal care. The few exceptions include emergency care, immunizations, diagnosis/treatment of communicable disease, short-term emergency disaster relief, and non-specific case assistance to protect life and safety, such as soup kitchens. Thus, until 2002, the only sources of publicly funded care directly aimed at undocumented immigrants were migrant health centers, which operate under the aegis of community health centers. In 2002, the Department of Health and Human Services expanded eligibility rules so that states could decide whether the “unborn child” of an immigrant woman, who would be a U.S. citizen, was eligible for prenatal care (DHHS 2002: 61956).

Public funding for prenatal care can come from federal, state, or state-federal monies. Publicly-funded options targeting low-income and uninsured pregnant women include Title V clinics, county health clinics, and community and migrant health centers. Title V clinics are funded through state-federal programs but have been flat-funded for years. This has led to closure of clinics in Texas (Eldridge 2002). County health clinics are state-funded and serve uninsured individuals with incomes of 21 percent or less of the Federal Poverty Line, irrespective of immigration status. Community and migrant health centers are public or not-for-profit clinics located in federally-recognized Medically Underserved Areas/Populations. They are federally funded through public health federal grants (Eldridge 2002). Community and migrant health centers do not require documentation of citizenship and will cover individuals with incomes 200% or less of the Federal Poverty Line.

In general, prenatal care offered through publicly funded programs is not well-designed for a poor population with significant psychosocial stressors. Undocumented immigrant women are one of the groups most at-risk for material insecurity due to poverty and out-of-pocket costs for health/prenatal care, psychosocial stress associated with undocumented status (Sullivan and Rehm 2005) and lack of accessible health care (Eldridge 2002; Sullivan and Rehm 2005). If they have prenatal care, it is frequently fragmented and attenuated due to barriers to care (Kullgren 2003). Prenatal care funded through publicly supported programs typically consists of clinical visits and a limited number of meetings with a social worker to identify crisis situations and potential social services to help mediate poverty. This is the standard medical model of prenatal care in the United States (Novik 2004).

State and federally funded options are also not designed to provide comprehensive material resources and psychosocial intervention and support, nor do they offer more than a standard biomedical approach to pregnancy and birth. Examples of comprehensive material resources include food, clothing, transportation to and from the clinic, and additional health care for the woman and her family. Each of these has
been cited by immigrant women as important factors in prenatal care decisions (Fleuriet in press). Psychosocial intervention and support include increased risk assessment and intervention in maternal and family nutrition, health care, and social dynamics, i.e., domestic violence. For example, McLaughlin et al. (1989: 6) demonstrated that improved birth outcomes among low-income minority populations were associated with “a team of nurse-midwives, social workers, a nutritionist, paraprofessional home visitors, and a psychologist” that “focused on psychosocial support for the mothers, education about self-care, and promotion of health behaviors during pregnancy (good nutrition, avoidance of alcohol and drugs, and reduction of smoking)” and offered prenatal care support groups.

The lack of comprehensive material resources and psychosocial intervention is largely due to long-standing cultural biases against immigrants and public funding for prenatal care. Douglas (1969) and Herzfeld (1993), among others, have underscored the influence of centuries-old political and social philosophies on our expectations about public support and the production of policies regarding public support. American policies regarding public support stem from the legacy of Elizabethan Poor Laws that applied moral judgments to the poor (Dolgoff and Feldstein 2007). They set the precedent of monitoring citizens’ productive contributions and collecting taxes for welfare provision for the disabled poor, while punishing the able-bodied poor who refused to work. This legacy is combined with American narratives of individual autonomy, the Protestant work ethic, and the belief that internal, intrinsic motivation is what determines success (Herzfeld 1993). As a result, policy regarding public support was and is structured to focus upon economic productivity of “morally deserving” residents who can be monitored. Since undocumented immigrants from Mexico are difficult to monitor and are perceived as social and economic threats to American “culture” and prosperity, they are correspondingly viewed as undeserving of taxpayer-funded programs (Chavez 2001). To illustrate, in PRWORA, undocumented immigrants are denied all public support programs except in emergency care or services needed as a result of a natural disaster. Despite poverty and a lack of insurance, pregnant undocumented immigrant women were not eligible for Medicaid-covered prenatal care in PRWORA.

Public support programs are equally molded from national discourse reflective of hegemonic social, economic, and political relations. Undocumented immigrants from Mexico have historically been treated as a spare but overly burdensome workforce that threatens the American social fabric and economy (Chavez 2001). In his 2001 book on mass media images and national discourses over immigration from 1965 through 1999, Chavez found that non-Mexican immigrant groups’ images in magazines have been alternately positive, neutral, and alarmist. Yet Mexican immigrant images on magazine covers have been “overwhelmingly alarmist” (Chavez 2001:215). For example, Chavez cites cover titles from US News and World Report about Mexican immigration, including: “How Millions of Illegal Aliens Sneak into the US” in 1974; “Time Bomb in Mexico: Why there’ll be no end to the invasion of illegals” in 1977; “Illegal Aliens: Invasion out of Control?” in 1979; “The Great American Immigration Nightmare” in 1981; and “Invasion from Mexico: It Just Keeps Growing” in 1983. These titles reflect the message that Mexican immigration puts an inappropriate and excessive strain on national resources. The language in the PRWORA bears this sentiment out: “current eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable financial support agreements have proved wholly incapable of assuring the individual aliens not burden the public benefits systems” (as cited in Kullgren 2003:1630).

Chavez (2001) attributes the variable degrees of anti-immigrant sentiment to national economic trends. The economic downturns in the early 1980s and again in the 1990s correlated with an increase in anti-immigrant discourse as reflected in mass media. Reproduction is tied into the discussions, because Mexican women’s fertility is considered too high, too much of a burden on medical services (Chavez 2004), and too likely to result in future recipients of public
support. “Women as symbols are harbingers of immigrant families and communities that are capable of reproducing themselves, highlighting the distinction between the concepts of reproduction and production” (Chavez 2001:250). Mexican immigrant women thus become defined by the cultural presuppositions attached to the labels of “immigrant” and “citizen” (Chock 1994).

One example of this misplaced, gendered fear of immigrant Mexican women is the so-called “anchor baby” stories. By U.S. constitutional law, any baby born in the U.S. is a citizen. Furthermore, emergency rooms cannot deny services based on citizenship, and citizens and non-citizens alike can qualify for Emergency Medicaid to cover a portion of these emergency room costs. Public perception is that recent increases in Emergency Medicaid costs are largely due to undocumented immigrant women crossing the border with the express purpose of receiving emergency room labor and delivery services through Emergency Medicaid and having a child that becomes, at birth, a U.S. citizen (Tebo 2007). Babies are thought to become “anchors” for the women and their families to stay in the United States. Yet a child born in the United States does not legally preclude the undocumented immigrant parent from being deported (Tebo 2007). In addition, while there are no reliable or exact numbers on how many pregnant women immigrate to the United States in order to give birth in hospital emergency rooms, circumstantial data suggest very few. Less than ten percent of undocumented and documented immigrants from Mexico who have been in the United States for less than ten years have used any emergency room service, as compared to twenty percent of native-born Americans (UCLA 2005). Moreover, the majority of undocumented families do not have children (Passel 2006). Nevertheless, major media outlets perpetuate the “anchor baby” myth and reinforce public fears of a health care system overtaxed by female immigrants. An April 7, 2008 CBS Evening News story was entitled “Illegal Immigrant Birth – At Your Expense. Taxpayers Foot Bill for Roughly 300,000 Children Born Into Citizenship When Their Parents Are Illegal.” The subsequent story focuses on and uses the pejorative “anchor babies,” despite the fact that the 300,000 births are to all undocumented immigrant women, not merely those who came to the United States expressly to have a child. In addition, hospitals do not record citizenship status and so any ‘data’ about healthcare costs of noncitizens are personal inferences by administrators, at best.

Although pregnant female immigrants are considered a threat, the economic contributions of working immigrants are valued. As a result, policies that reference undocumented immigrants will either discourage use of public services, including health care, and/or provide incentives for immigrant work. For example, California's Proposition 187, passed in 1994, denied all health care, education, and public services to undocumented immigrants. Yet only months after Proposition 187 was passed, California governor Pete Wilson proposed a guest worker program that would encourage Mexicans to temporarily emigrate for wages (Chavez 2001).

Political and moral debates over reproductive rights and personhood further influence policy for publicly funded prenatal care. For example, in 2007, Texas expanded its State Children's Health Insurance Program, or SCHIP, to cover prenatal care for undocumented immigrant women. The moral and political logic behind the reform was that fetuses, by virtue of their deemed personhood, were citizens and thus deserving of benefits deriving from public support. With the SCHIP Perinatal program, prenatal care options theoretically increased for undocumented immigrant women, though prenatal care was still limited to clinical care, psychosocial intervention in crisis situations, and case management with other limited social services available to undocumented immigrants. SCHIP Perinatal was able to expand these Medicaid services to undocumented immigrants because of a PRWORA amendment that allows states to provide care for “unborn [citizen] children” of undocumented immigrants (Department of Health and Human Services 2002). While prenatal care obviously involves the health of the mother, the expansion explicitly excludes any other health care for the mother that is not recognized as having a benefit to the
“unborn child.” This amendment was very specifically designed *not* to address the health of the undocumented immigrant woman. To the contrary, the amendment was created to give health care, via prenatal care, to the “unborn children” of the women (Department of Health and Human Services 2002). Indeed, the use of the word “children” to refer to fetuses demonstrates a particular suite of cultural beliefs about the unborn, which, in turn, largely predetermines policy’s content and coverage.

The amendment’s reasoning highlights current national discourse about fetal and reproductive rights. Women’s rights activists have seen the unborn citizen justification as a slippery slope to reversing *Roe vs. Wade*, but they agree that all women deserve adequate prenatal care (Hennessy and Cliath 2004). Indeed, “the language and the writing of policy and research on policy function is a type of power. Often the primary aim of policy language is to persuade” (Agthorpe 1997:44). In an article looking at SCHIP Perinatal’s social consequences, Hennessy and Cliath note that by using “unborn children” as the key rationalization, SCHIP policymakers are also reproducing existing biases toward women:

> Social policy provisions can reproduce gender inequality by considering women worthy of social benefits as conduits for children rather than deserving benefits in their own rights ... the [SCHIP] rule change devalues women by creating a legal precedent for recognizing fetuses as separate physical and legal entities, with the potential to create an adversarial relationship between a woman and the fetus she carries (2004:1430-1).

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and Texas SCHIP make it evident that prenatal care policies for undocumented immigrants are not influenced by a singular concern to reduce health disparities and improve birth outcomes. They are embedded in hegemonic discourses that privilege citizens over undocumented immigrants and fetal health over child health and the health of adults. There has been no space allocated for hearing what the women themselves want or need in terms of prenatal care. There is an active disinterest in providing optimal prenatal care that would include outreach to promote a stable psychosocial environment and provide material resources. It is thus no surprise that barriers to optimal prenatal care are so prevalent among undocumented immigrant women whose access to prenatal care is largely controlled by these federal and state statutory policies that reflect broader issues current in American debates over immigration and abortion.

**Recommendations to Improve Existing Prenatal Care for Undocumented Immigrant Women: Reframing Policy Discussions and Operationalizing Optimal Prenatal Care**

Well, you [need to] have the persistence to come back and show us the changes [that came from these interviews]. . . . This is the second time I’ve been asked these sorts of questions. The first time was thirteen years ago. When I had my little girl, a news channel came and asked questions. It’s been a long time, and I haven’t heard anything . . . at least, I know that other people are interested in changing things. - Carmen, 35 years old, immigrant woman from Mexico City, Mexico.

Either by misguided focus or a lack of funding, most publicly funded prenatal care programs fail to fully address specific barriers to care and ignore preferences for care among undocumented immigrant women, thereby making formal prenatal care more difficult to access. Clearly, in order to improve birth and maternal health outcomes for undocumented immigrant women, we need to reframe policy discussions and actual prenatal care delivery. Any health care justification argument supports reformulation. In a health outcomes argument, prenatal care reduces the risk of maternal mortality and morbidity and improves birth outcomes and future child health (Keily and Kogan 1994; Conway and Kutinova 2006). In a cost/benefit analysis, prenatal care as a means to identify pregnancy risk significantly reduces health care costs associated with complicated labor and delivery and preventable health conditions in infants. Elimination of prenatal care for undocumented immigrants in
California, for example, was shown to increase risks for low birth weight and prematurity and significantly increase overall healthcare costs incurred by the women and their babies (Lu et al. 2000). In a human rights argument, optimal prenatal care should be the right of every pregnant woman, regardless of income, citizenship, or any other culturally constructed classification (Rylko-Bauer and Farmer 2002).

The programmatic target of publicly supported health care policy should, at the outset, be healthy mothers and babies. Funding and program components should be designed to promote optimal prenatal care to any at-risk population living in the United States. At-risk should be defined by existing evidence-based research on birth outcomes. It has been demonstrated that poor, undocumented immigrant women are some of the most at-risk women in the country (Eldridge 2002; Sullivan and Rehm 2005; Derose et al. 2007). Such basic recommendations also apply to poor and uninsured women facing similar barriers to care.

Recognizing women’s preferences in health care policy can help to successfully operationalize optimal prenatal care (Institute of Medicine 2001; Novik 2004). In the case of the women I interviewed, their preferences for gendered prenatal care and material and social support through prenatal care providers complement existing prenatal care recommendations by biomedical and cross-cultural researchers studying pregnancy and birth outcomes (Fleuriet in press; ACOG 2008; IMBCO 2008; Davis-Floyd and Sargent 1997). Other basic interventions could help women exercise their preferences regarding prenatal care.

First, women need to have information about prenatal care options and related resources, such as Healthy Start and Women with Infants and Children. Prenatal health information needs to be accessible in the community, so that the knowledge diffuses and is shared with newcomers. An existing model is offered by the promotora, or community health worker, programs. Promotoras are community women who are trained in health and health care education; they meet regularly with individual women in the neighborhood, offer meetings about health and health care issues, and serve as point-persons for outreach efforts by clinics.

Second, in addition to garnering knowledge about the U.S. health care system and public support policies, women need to have the means and autonomy to exercise their options and resources. For example, SCHIP Perinatal needs to be able to provide transportation to and from the women’s homes. SCHIP enrollment and related administrative procedures also need to be more accessible. In 2008, a social worker at a South Texas clinic said the biggest problem they had with SCHIP is that local SCHIP office staff had intentionally been reduced to encourage internet applications. Women who live in neighborhoods that lack basic infrastructure are nevertheless expected to be able to access and navigate a U.S. bureaucratic internet site to apply for SCHIP Perinatal. This makes little sense, except as an active attempt to limit women’s access to care.

Third, promotora programs should include ongoing community education about healthy pregnancies, childbirth, and children; different approaches to pregnancy and childbirth; and means of accessing resources to actualize healthy pregnancies and childbirth. For undocumented women, resources that outline and explain the U.S. health care system and rights of immigrants should also be available and accessible. Finally, the programs should build in a woman’s right to exercise her preferences. The women I interviewed and pregnancy and birth researchers agree: women should be able to choose different prenatal care approaches, such as the standard biomedical model or a birthing center midwifery model (IMBCO 2008), which is based on the Centering Pregnancy philosophy’ (Novik 2004).

These recommendations highlight the contributions from the burgeoning field of anthropology of health and health care policy. Other anthropologists, such as Singer (2005), have used ethnography and cultural critique to diagnose the myriad health, sociopolitical, and moral outcomes of policy. These critiques arise from ethnographic research in policymaking institutions (e.g., Paluzzi 2004; Rabo 1997; Towghi 2004) as well as the communities that are impacted by policies (e.g., Fassin 2007; Davis-Floyd 2004). In both research settings, policy is treated as a particular form of sociocultural
process produced by national political and economic discourse and manifested within local communities of actors (Shore and Wright 1997). As such, elements of the policymaking process and implementation, such as prioritization of certain health and health care issues or certain populations, reflect social relations. For example, Singer (2005) uses the life history of a homeless drug addict in urban Connecticut to illustrate how drug treatment programs for the poor are under-funded in large part because of the stigmatized and relatively powerless social position of poor people suffering from addiction. In this context of unequal social relations, certain communities of actors, such as the poor and politically disenfranchised, are left out of the policy-making discussions altogether. By analyzing these social relations and the impact of policy in these communities, cultural critique of policy can occur, and new voices that highlight areas for policy improvement and modification can be heard.

**Notes**

1. The author wishes to acknowledge the women who generously participated in this research as well as the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful suggestions on the manuscript. She would also like to thank Erin Finley, Catherine Nolan-Ferrell, Randy Fleuriet, and Kolleen Guy for their careful readings of the manuscript.

2. Jill Fleuriet holds a PhD in Anthropology from Stanford University. She is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Texas at San Antonio. She can be reached at the Department of Anthropology, 1 UTSA Circle, San Antonio, Texas, 78249. She may also be reached by email at jill.fleuriet@utsa.edu.

3. All names are pseudonyms.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>OB/GYN</th>
<th>CNM</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acculturation Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15.9% (10)</td>
<td>84.1% (53)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>51.4% (18)</td>
<td>48.6% (17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>100.0% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-22 years</td>
<td>21.4% (6)</td>
<td>78.6% (22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-25 years</td>
<td>27.6% (8)</td>
<td>72.4% (21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30 years</td>
<td>25.8% (8)</td>
<td>74.2% (23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-47 years</td>
<td>40.0% (10)</td>
<td>60.0% (15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitude Toward Medical Intervention During Low-Risk Pregnancy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Necessary</td>
<td>0.0 (0)</td>
<td>100.0% (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes necessary</td>
<td>30.6% (30)</td>
<td>69.4% (68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always necessary</td>
<td>100.0% (1)</td>
<td>0.0 (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clinic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community, Public</td>
<td>25.0% (12)</td>
<td>75.0% (36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community, Religious</td>
<td>6.3% (3)</td>
<td>93.8% (45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>100.0% (17)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-8th grade</td>
<td>16.7% (7)</td>
<td>83.3% (35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th-12th grade</td>
<td>39.5% (17)</td>
<td>60.5% (26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College-Postgraduate</td>
<td>28.6% (8)</td>
<td>71.4% (20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;$12,000/year</td>
<td>22.2% (16)</td>
<td>77.8% (56)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$12,001-$20,000</td>
<td>38.1% (8)</td>
<td>61.9% (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,001 and above</td>
<td>40.0% (8)</td>
<td>60.0% (12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.1% (2)</td>
<td>88.9% (16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>26.3% (10)</td>
<td>73.7% (28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.0% (6)</td>
<td>75.0% (18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 or more</td>
<td>45.2% (14)</td>
<td>54.8% (17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.5% (2)</td>
<td>89.5% (17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>27.6% (16)</td>
<td>72.4% (42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 or more</td>
<td>43.8% (14)</td>
<td>56.3% (18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Assistance for Prenatal Care</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Assistance</td>
<td>39.1% (18)</td>
<td>60.9% (28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Public Assistance</td>
<td>23.3% (14)</td>
<td>76.7% (46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Crosstabulations: Profile of Preference for OB/GYN or CNM Among Mexico-Born Respondents
4. I have opted to use “public support” instead of the word “welfare” to refer to any prenatal care that is federally or state funded. The term welfare has multiple valences, some of which are politically charged. Its ambiguity would detract from my argument, which is, in part, to highlight the political processes informing the public support. For critiques of recent reform on popularly labeled “welfare policies,” I refer the reader to Wise et al. (1999) and Morgen and Maskovsky (2003).

5. Title V clinics are clinics that are funded through federal block grants that are administered by the Office of Maternal and Child Health.

6. Research was approved by the UTSA Institutional Review Board.

7. The CenteringPregnancy model promotes empowerment of the pregnant woman through peer group care, support, education and self-assessment. It has three primary components, all of which are manifested in group settings at the Catholic birthing center: clinical assessment, psychosocial assessment and support, and education.

References Cited
Acevedo-Garia, Dolores, Soobader, Mah-J., and Lisa F. Berkman

ACOG (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists)

Agthorpe, Raymond

Alexander, Greg R., Michael D. Kogan, and Sara Nabukera

Alexander, Greg R., and M. Kotelchuck

CDC ( Centers for Disease Control)


Chavez, Leo

Chavez, Leo R.

Chock, Phyllis Peace

Conway, Karen Smith and Andrew Kutinova

Conway, Karen Smith and Partha Deb

Davis-Floyd, Robbie

Davis-Floyd, Robbie and Carolyn Sargent
Department of Health and Human Services  

Derose, Kathryn Pitkin, Escarce, José J., and Nicole Lurle  

Dolgoff, Ralph and Donald Feldstein  

Douglas, Mary  

Eldridge, Jennifer  

Fassin, Didier  

Fleuriet, K. Jill  

Fleuriet, K. Jill  
In press “La Tecnología y Las Monjitas: Constellations of Authoritative Knowledge at a Catholic Birthing Center in South Texas.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 23(3):212-234.

Hennessy, Judith and Alison Grace Cliath  

Hernandez-Valencia, M., and Carrillo Pacheco, A.  
2002  “Glucose Screening During Active Labor for the Detection of Undiagnosed Hyperglycaemia and Newborn Malformations in a Population Without Prenatal Care.” Diabetes, Obesity and Metabolism 4:132-137.

Herzfeld, Michael  

Hoefer, Michael, Rytina, Nancy, and Christopher Campbell  

Hunt, L.M., S. Schneider, and B. Comer  

IMBCO (The International MotherBaby Childbirth Organization)  

INEGI (Sistema Nacional de Información Estadística y Geografía)  

Institute of Medicine  


Kaiser Family Foundation  

Kasper, A.  

Keily, J. L., and M. D. Kogan  
Kogan, M. D., G. R. Alexander, B. W. Jack, and M. C. Allen

Ku, Leighton and Sheetal Matani

Kullgren, Jeffrey

Lazarus, Ellen

Lu, Michael C., Lin, Yvonne G., Prietoo, Neolani M., and Thomas J. Garite

Matthews, T. J. and M. F. MacDorman

McCormick, M. and J. E. Siegel

McGlade, M. S., Saha, S., and M. Dalstrom

McLaughlin, F. J., Altmeier, W. A., Sherrod, K. B., and D. T. Stern

Medrano, Jill Fleuriet

Morgen, Sandra and Jeff Maskovsky

NIDDK (National Institutes of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Disorders)

Novik, Gina

Paluzzi, Joan

Passel, Jeffrey S.

Rabo, Annika

Reed, Mary M., Westfall, John M., Bublitz, Caroline, Battaglia, Catherine, and Alexandra Fickenscher

Rylko-Bauer, Barbara and Paul Farmer
Secretaría de Salud
2003 Encuesta Nacional de Salud Reproductiva: Tabulados Básicos. Cuernavaca, Morelos: Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias, UNAM.

Shore, Cris and Susan Wright

Singer, Merrill

Strayhorn, Carole Keeton

Sullivan, Margaret and Roberta Rehm

TDSHS (Texas Department of State Health Services)
2009 2001-2005 Natality Data. Austin, TX: Center for Health Statistics, Texas Department of State Health Services.


Tebo, Margaret Graham

Towghi, Fouzeiyha

UCLA (University of California at Los Angeles)

U.S. Census Bureau


Walker, D. S. and S. S. Rising

Webster, Bruce H., Jr., and Alemayehu Bishaw

Wise, Paul, Chavkin, Wendy, and Diana Romero
Some Thoughts on Helping Inconsolable Organizations to Heal

Howard F. Stein

Abstract

This paper explores how an applied anthropologist might consult with traumatized organizations that have undergone and/or are undergoing downsizing, reengineering, restructuring, and other forms of “managed social change.” The author proposes a distinction between organizational healing by “splitting” and organizational healing by “integration.” Healing by integration is made possible by acknowledgment of loss and mourning.

Introduction

Opening vignette: The day began at Consolidated Telecommunications (CT, a multinational corporation) like any other Friday. People greeted each other, got their morning coffee, spoke of their weekend plans, and set about their usual tasks. What all but a few could not know was that earlier in the week the board of directors and upper management of CT had met and decided on a large-scale Reduction in Force (RIF), in order to make CT more productive, profitable, and competitive. It would take place at 10 AM Friday. Rumors had circulated lately that “something” was about to happen in CT, but no one knew what or when.

As if perfectly choreographed, managers from throughout the corporate site showed up at 10 AM on Friday, each with a large, empty cardboard box, at the work-sites of those designated to be fired. The managers simply notified them that their employment was terminated effective immediately, and that they were to fill this box with their personal belongings, turn over all their keys and other corporate property to the manager, be escorted by the manager to their vehicle in the parking lot, and to not return. Few words were spoken. The managers politely told the employees not to take this personally, that it was just a necessary business decision.

From the moment they were notified of their firing, the employees’ every move was carefully monitored, and the office door (if they had one) and the parking lot gate were locked behind them. Management was afraid that those who were fired might try to sabotage the computer system or steal equipment. Those being fired were notified by the manager that they would receive their final paycheck in the mail within a week. The RIF was executed so flawlessly that many of the remaining employees did not realize it was occurring as they worked. They only noticed during afternoon breaks and later that many people were no longer there and that their work areas or offices were empty.

The event became known in the vernacular as a “walk out,” named for managers “walking” the fired employees out of the building to their cars. This was the third RIF in four years. The remaining employees were resigned to their fate, grateful that no manager had shown up this time at their workstation. They kept to themselves, staying very busy, trying not to think about what had just happened and what could happen at CT. Many thought that if the managers saw them working hard, they might be spared in the next “walk out.”

This paper describes my work as an applied anthropologist with organizations that have undergone, and/or are undergoing, traumatic change (Vivian and Hormann 2002; Hormann and Vivian 2005). Since the mid-1980s, over thirty million Americans have lost their jobs or have had their roles radically changed by various forms of “managed social change” – downsizing, reductions in force, rightsizing, restructuring, reengineering, outsourcing, off-shoring, deskilling, and others. Rationalized in the language of economic necessity, these reductions in the workforce have in fact expressed both structural violence and psychological brutality.

Since the 1980’s, the triad of change-loss-
grief has been widespread in the life of United States workplace organizations. In a number of articles and books, I have described the brutal psychological realities behind the euphemisms of “managed social change” (Stein 1998, 2001, 2007) that have affected workers, managers, and leaders alike. Likewise they have demoralized both those who have been fired and those who, at least temporarily, survive. They have led to what Yiannis Gabriel has called “organizational miasma” (2005) and what I have called “insoluble organizations” (Stein 2007); that is, workplaces whose grief is boundless, even as their members are pressed to be more productive and told to be grateful that they still have a job.

In order for applied organizational anthropologists to be of help to traumatized organizations, our first task is to be able to perceive through the cultural smokescreens to recognize and label what is in fact happening – that is, what has long been shrouded in destructive euphemism. The first change is within ourselves, especially since we more than likely share the same cultural “blind spots,” organizational vulnerabilities, and defenses against them.

As an applied anthropologist doing organizational consulting, I strive to help employees and organizations to recognize, label, and work through the enormous psychological and interpersonal damage that has occurred (not to mention diminished productivity, profit, and competitiveness). Later in this paper, I offer some suggestions of how one might help organizations to heal through acknowledging and grieving the enormous losses. I first propose a distinction between organizational (and wider cultural) healing via “splitting” and organizational healing via “integration.” I then offer some ideas of how an applied anthropologist can foster integrative organizational healing.

Organizational Healing by “Splitting” and by “Integration”

At the outset, I pose some questions that will guide the discussion: What is gained and lost organizationally by splitting? Likewise, what is gained and lost by integration? Finally, how do organizations heal by splitting and integration, respectively, from their group wounds? I will explain these terms as I proceed.

In individuals and in groups such as organizations, people can unconsciously perform radical maneuvers to keep a sense of “goodness” inside “us” and expel all sense of “badness” and locate the latter in some Other or “them.” At the conscious level, an organization can build its meanings in language rooted in the psychological mechanisms of splitting and projective identification. Here, emotionally unacceptable and unwanted parts of oneself and one’s group are severed from the rest of oneself and deposited in others, which are subsequently perceptually experienced as inherent properties of the other. Organizations can attempt to heal themselves of conflict and of any feelings of vulnerability, weakness, or badness, by splitting off these characteristics from their experience (mental representation) of themselves, together with the companion defense mechanism of projective identification, which perceptually puts or injects these characteristics in others. In this way, organizations try to get rid of these unwanted aspects of themselves. The dynamic of splitting and projective identification, of keeping the good inside and extruding all the bad to the outside, is characteristic of a widespread social structural form in corporate life.

Perhaps the most familiar and ubiquitous current organizational meaning system based on splitting and projective identification is that of the corporate “silo” (Diamond, Stein, and Allcorn 2002; Diamond, Allcorn, and Stein 2004), in which members of vertically integrated workplace hierarchies view themselves as good and others (even in the same corporation) as suspect, if not bad and persecutory. Silo mentality is plagued by what Howard Schwartz called “narcissistic process and corporate decay” (1987, 1990). Schwartz has carefully linked belief in organizational perfection with slavish feeding of the hierarchy’s grandiosity, and, in turn, with organizational totalitarianism. This characterizes the emotional life in the emotionally hermetically sealed corporate silo.

For instance, one corporation with which I was familiar had many functional divisions. Its various units (if I may reify them for the sake of simplicity) experienced themselves as distinct and separate from, yet dependent upon, other units who often “dragged us down.” There was
little sense of belonging and loyalty to the wider corporation. Each unit saw itself as superior to the others, yet, in contrast with other units, deprived of important resources and perks from the central office. Envy and competition ran rife between the units. For example, sales pushed itself toward higher and higher productivity, while it felt that shipping was always getting behind. For its part, shipping resented sales’ new facility and for sales not understanding that their archaic machinery had to suffice. Sales saw research and development (R&D) as living “the easy life,” while R&D felt misunderstood by the other departments and time-pressured to produce results and new products. Each division of the corporation felt victimized by the others and superior to them in productivity and worthiness to the larger corporation. Further, each division perceived that other units were favored by management – who were located in a distant city and were alternately idealized and demonized.

A second brief vignette about silos comes from a conversation I had with a member of management of a multinational information technology designer and manufacturer. The functioning of the corporation was founded on efficient, “lean manufacturing,” Six Sigma Quality Improvement (a popular business management strategy to identify and remove causes of defects and variation), and a tight time-to-market pressure that was highly stressful for all employees. The corporation was divided both functionally and geographically worldwide. My colleague spoke of an effort begun several years ago to unify the corporation by pulling a member from each vertical unit into a special unit to collaborate for two years on a new project, and then return for reintegration to his/her original work site. This was a high visibility program sponsored by upper management.

It was management’s hope that each unit from which a person originated would be proud and enthusiastic to have their member selected for the special unit and project. It was management’s further hope and expectation that after the two years in the special unit, the individual would bring back new ideas and skills that would help his or her own unit to function better – and that the individual would be welcomed back and re-absorbed into the work group. Although this occurred to a certain extent, what surprised my colleague was the fact that units were often reluctant to let their member go off for two years into some unknown realm whose benefit to them was unclear. On the one hand, they were a little envious of the person’s special treatment; on the other hand, they often resented the extra work they would have to do in the reassigned person’s long absence. Although there was identification with the corporation as a whole, often silo-identity trumped corporate identity. Put a different way, local “vertical” loyalty competed considerably with the new corporate-wide “horizontal” ideal. “Us” tended to be the local functional unit, whereas “them” tended to be the other functional units across the continent and the world and even corporate headquarters itself. The workers chosen to be part of the company-wide project were only reluctantly reintegrated into their “own” unit: it took many months until they were treated once more as one of “us” rather than suspiciously as one of “them.”

My colleague said,

Everyone wants to think that his unit or silo is the best [the most competitive], even though all of the units share the same overall mission. “We’re in this together” competes with “We don’t need any outside help from anyone” type of isolation. There is arrogance, a feeling of being elite, better than others, and that “We should lead.” There is the problem of having a mixed mission in the organization, and each unit doesn’t want to give up control. Competition is key, at the same time that they’re supposed to work toward the same corporate goal.

Of course, in this vignette, unlike workers who are laid off or fired and sacrificed, the “chosen few” can and do return. Nonetheless, the dynamics of loss and grief, though not as extreme, still occur, since all change involves some experience of loss and an emotional response to that loss. Here the emotional response to the return of the “chosen few” is, at least for a while, to keep the returned worker(s) at emotional distance. Likewise, the returnees may long for the heady days where they were part of the corporate “great experiment,” and feel somewhat reluctant to
completely re-identify with their “own” unit.

Organizational healing by splitting is thus a process of exclusion. Alternately, when people can accept and learn from their less-than-ideal characteristics by integration, the process is inclusive. When organizational loss occurs, healing by splitting is accomplished by denying the worth of those who were sacrificed for the supposed economic health of the organization.

For instance, in downsizing, restructuring and off-shoring, organizations repeatedly attempt to solve their problems by getting rid of people who are no longer regarded as full human beings but rather objectified as “dead wood” or useless “fat” to be trimmed from the corporate body, that is, as things. One feels good about oneself and the surviving organization by viewing with contempt and mistrust those who are no longer there. One withdraws identification and compassion from them. Instead of saying something akin to “There but for the grace of God go I,” a surviving employee might say, “He/she/they must have done something to get fired.”

In unconscious collusion with the accusation, those fired often blame themselves as well. In Falling from Grace, Katherine Newman (1999) provides similar findings among corporate middle managers who personalize and individualize the experience of being fired and attribute the fault to themselves.

In organizational healing by splitting, there is little official or corporate recognition of the breadth and depth of the loss and grief (cf. Thompson 2007). In fact, the overall response from management and shareholders constitutes what Kenneth Doka (1989) called “disenfranchised grief,” loss and grief that is neither socially acknowledged as significant nor supported by others. From the workers’ viewpoint, organizational identity is a whole-person, integrative identity, and a way of life. From the viewpoint of management, managers and employees are disposable things and functions that are strictly a means to an economic and political end. “Managed social change” creates what Gay Becker (1999) called “disrupted lives,” wherein long-held expectations of a life course and coherent narrative are shattered. One loses cultural meaning when one’s anchors are cut. Personalization – self-blame – is a common way of making meaning when one is downsized.

Organizational Meaning by Splitting and Projective Identification

The human animal dwells in universes of meaning that we have created (Becker 1962; Stein 1983; Stein and Apprey 1987) – what Hallowell called a “behavioral environment” that is “culturally constituted” (1955). In workplace organizations and their wider cultures, meaning is at various times created, constructed, discovered, achieved, promoted, projected, internalized, perpetuated, modified, undermined, lost, destroyed, and revitalized. Often the loss of cultural meaning is a greater threat to life than the prospect of biological death (Becker 1962). The loss of meaning triggers feelings of annihilation as well as separation.

An often neglected dimension of organizational and wider cultural meaning is that of projective meaning or meaning-by-splitting and projective identification. Here, meaning does not originate inside oneself as a product of one’s own agency, but instead is the product of an interplay between disembodiment and re-embodiment. For instance, organizational employees, workers, managers, and executives who are treated by superiors and co-workers as mere instrumental functions, functionaries, and objects often come to embody these others’ disavowed self-contempt, and feelings of weakness, anxiety, and vulnerability. Technically speaking, through the dialectic of projective and introjective identification, the targets come to embody others’ projective meaning, which turns into their own meaning as well. That is, one can have and become someone else’s meaning, and one’s authentic meaning is cast aside. I have elsewhere (Stein 1986) discussed this process in terms of the role projective identification plays in shaping the content and experience of many social roles. Social roles can be governed as much by unconscious complementarity of role partners as by consciously negotiated roles – in workplaces and in international relations as much as in marriages and families.

Since the 1980s in the United States, the various forms of managed social change in
organizations – ranging from downsizing and reduction in force, to redundancy, rightsizing, reengineering, restructuring, deskilling, outsourcing, and managed health care – have systematically destroyed the wealth of meaning that work can have. They have constricted meaning into narrow productivity for the now-sacred financial bottom line and short term increased shareholder value (Stein 1998, 2001; Uchitelle 2006; Ehrenreich 2006; Sennett 2007). They have created millions of disposable Americans and cultivated widespread meaninglessness. As a concept, the bottom line (metaphorically, the highest good) can be seen foremost as a cultural category of meaning (as a dominant symbol of immortality [Becker 1973]) and only secondarily and derivatively as an economic concept.

In a similar fashion, Burkard Sievers (1994) has shown that the business concept of motivation (psychological motivation of workers to perform their tasks more efficiently, rooted in American Taylorism, after Frederick Winslow Taylor) to be essentially an ersatz and sham form of meaning. Motivation in this sense is, in fact, a form of degrading and straitjacketed meaning. Both workplace motivation and the various forms of managed social change constitute enforced destruction and loss of meaning. Yiannis Gabriel (2005) speaks of this as “organizational miasma,” to which I have proposed the additional concept and image of an “inconsolable organization” (Stein 2007). All these are heir to, and made possible by, splitting and violent projective identification.

In organizational healing by splitting, the destruction of organizational meaning is inseparable from the creation of meaning. When organizations and their wider cultures undergo threat to their meaning system and loss of meaning (as a metaphorical living organism), they often undertake Herculean efforts to restore or create new meaning. Workplace organizations, like larger cultures, can undergo efforts at revitalization. Corporate executives are eager to persuade shareholders and surviving employees alike that they are undertaking these repeated draconian measures such as downsizing and restructuring in order to rescue, save, and turn around the organization threatened by outside competition (ranging from other corporations to Wall Street). War and disease metaphors abound in this discourse of organizational violence. Executives speak in the language of life and death, as if the corporation is a biological organism threatened with extinction. In this menacing world, anything internal that threatens the survival and integrity of the (good) organization must be gotten rid of (the bad). In a common rescue fantasy, the corporate executive is the all-powerful surgeon who will heal and save the organization by cutting out and removing the bad parts that threaten it. Further, the charismatic CEO promises corporate greatness and excellence – usually measured by short-term profit – and engages shareholders, managers, and employees’ fantasies, ambitions, and anxieties to harness their uncritical, enthusiastic consent.

The turbulent era of the charismatic and flamboyant Joseph Nacchio as CEO of Qwest (1997-2002), a telecommunications corporation, illustrates the cruel paradox of rescuing and saving an organization through relentless destruction. In June 2000, Qwest made a hostile takeover of U.S. West, a historically customer service oriented company that had prided itself on the dedication of its operators and linemen. With great bravado, Nacchio sought to radically change the function, identity, and image of the expanded Qwest into a fiber optic telecommunications network giant. The new corporation would realize in the world his grandiosity and consuming ambition. The historic, albeit imperfect, relationship between U.S. West and the communities it served was disparaged, and the once high status of telephone workers plummeted. Members of U.S. West felt that they had been deprived of their identity and, to make matters worse, that the historical identity of U.S. West had been inverted and ridiculed as virtually worthless. Nacchio elevated Qwest by disparaging the U.S. West it absorbed. Here, organizational revitalization and healing were to be achieved through an ideological splitting into “us” (good) and “them” (bad).

Further, when organizations attempt to cure or heal themselves of their problems and
construct meaning through splitting, the group psychodynamics involved resemble that of war between ethnic, religious, and national groups. In a discussion of the psychodynamics of war, Vamik Volkan writes:

[Some] psychoanalysts have gone as far as suggesting that there are elements of “therapy” in wars (Fornari 1966; Money-Kyrle 1937). Writing in 1933, between the two world wars, the British psychoanalyst Edward Glover also saw a peculiar “curative” aspect in war. He was concerned with the sadistic and masochistic impulses expressed in armed conflict and called war “mass insanity.” His hypotheses about war seemed based on the classical psychoanalytic view that identifies an urge for restitution alongside or following the regressed state in schizophrenia. He suggests that the mass insanity associated with wars initiates a “curative process,” that the group tries to cure itself but can accomplish only pathological adaptations such as killing or destroying the land of the enemy in order to feel “good” about itself (Volkan 1998:132, emphasis in original).

One dimension of the cure-by-war is the induction of loss and death anxiety by the leader, leading to a frightened, regressed, credulous, dependent, and emotionally manipulatable constituency. In this way, what is in fact a toxic leader is seen as group healer and savior (Lipman-Blumen 2006).

War is the most extreme expression of group healing by splitting and the attempt to obliterate the object of one’s violent projective identification. Through war, one literally gets rid of, or attempts to get rid of, one’s bad internal world by physically killing the enemy. Of course, even in fierce competitions, hostile takeovers, and swift mergers, organizations do not literally spill blood. Still, symbolic annihilation is a kindred mental representation of the experience of death and loss (Stein 2004). This annihilation is in part accomplished through metaphor: e.g., surgically cutting out the supposedly bad, unprofitable parts of the organization (disease metaphor); the moniker “Neutron Jack” Welch, the ruthless CEO of General Electric, and “hostile takeovers” (military metaphors). During emotionally and economically catastrophic times in organizational life, massive splitting and projective identification can symbolically dehumanize and annihilate the distinct otherness of the Other (corporate division, firm, worker, the person fired, etc.) and replace it with renounced parts of the self. In this way, the organization attempts to heal itself, if spuriously. Magically, the “death” of the sacrificial victims purchases new “life” for the organization. Sometimes war and disease metaphors not only overlap, but fuse.

Helping Clients and Organizations to Heal by Acknowledging Loss and Grief

In the face of this juggernaut of enforced change and political violence, how can an applied, practicing anthropologist help to foster integration and not become a colluding part of the problem for which splitting and emotional distancing have thus far been the cultural cure or treatment of choice? What does it mean to practice anthropology in organizational settings where, for example, an executive describes firings as “taking out,” that is, the undisguised language of killing thousands of once valuable employees (Lardner 2007: 62)? By “trimming down to the bone,” corporate upper management creates a demoralized workforce, not the “lean, mean, fighting machine” they had imagined. What emotional integration is possible under such brutal and brutalizing circumstances?

Speaking personally, I have persevered because deep down I knew that I had discovered a terrible truth whose enforced silence I must help to break. Bearing witness – giving voice to forbidden truths – was an essential correction to endless euphemistic spins. The ability to hear and sit with the client in his or her inconsolability is prerequisite to any help that the consultant may offer.

Let me take a moment to describe the varied nature of my consulting work in which the kinds of stories explored in this paper often emerge. To begin with, I have long worked as formal and informal consultant in many of the departments and other clinical units of the health sciences center in which I have been employed for over thirty-one years. I also work as an external
consultant; I am hired by CEOs, boards of directors, conference organizers, departmental chairpersons, program directors, educators, and physicians, among others. For the most part, the topic of organizational trauma, loss, and grief emerges from the official topic or task under consideration; it is the sub-text or substratum underlying the formally stated problem that percolates up during the course of interviews and participation in organizational meetings.

Most of the time, I am formally employed or requested to do other things: e.g., to help humanize the downsizing of a hospital, to help plan a jobs fair, to participate in strategic planning, to give a lecture or presentation on psychocultural issues involved in organizational change or to facilitate an organizational retreat. Although there are palpable products from these consultations – for instance, a jobs fair or a strategic planning document – for the most part my product is a process. Often what begins as a lecture or presentation (what I am officially asked to do) evolves into a workshop that helps the group to process the feelings and thoughts about change-loss-grief that my talk triggered.

Many years ago I gave a talk on this triad of organizational change to a department of psychiatry in a health sciences center. No sooner had I finished speaking than the room quickly became an emotionally volatile workshop which erupted into grief, anger, and rage at the chairperson’s recent closing of the inpatient child psychiatry hospital unit. Ostensibly a cost-cutting measure, for many of the participants in the group, the closing felt like a betrayal. For them, it involved a loss of an identity and of a much-needed service to children and families, not only of a job and a hospital-unit.

In these workshops, I often ask questions that invite reflection and storytelling: e.g., what is it like to work here? Where are the strengths and weaknesses? The pain? What are the critical events and incidents that have shaped the way things are now in the organization? Where are the land mines? What is leadership and followership like? What are some of the organizational secrets? What are some of the sources of organizational pride and shame? If you could change something, what would it be?

The previously unstated nature of my role as informal consultant/therapist emerges in sometimes humorous ways. As part of office Christmas decorating a few years ago, several people drew a cartoon on a large piece of paper that they taped to the front of my door. The cartoon consisted of the Peanuts character Charlie Brown posing as a prospective patient standing in front of Lucy, who is behind a booth on which she had inscribed a large caption that reads: “PSYCHIATRIC HELP 5¢. THE DOCTOR IS IN.” I had long imagined that one of my informal departmental roles was the departmental shrink, that is, the counselor/consultant who helps with individuals’ and group issues, but here the role was made explicit, though in a humorous way. This underscores the fact that often my informal, unconscious role in the organization must be inferred through my own countertransference – that is, from my internal emotional response to what I am experiencing in the organization.

Paradoxical as it may sound, the first focus needs to be on the self of the consultant and not the client. Stated differently, in order to be emotionally available to the client, the consultant must have access to his or her own emotional responses. This requires that the consultant recognize and heal his or her own inner splitting, fragmentation and dissociation. Often this working through comes about not before but during the encounter with the client. That is, the anthropological consultant becomes aware of these emotional tugs through the relationship transference and countertransference with the client.

Being emotionally present and truly listening to others is not a simple matter. Certainly active listening is a fundamental skill for anthropologists. In part, one listens to the client through listening to one’s inner response to the client (Boyer 1999; Ogden 1996). The feelings that arise when you work with a client provide crucial data about the client’s anxiety and defenses against it. For instance, the consultant’s sudden wish not to hear or to flee is crucial data about the relationship, and in turn, about the client. The anthropological consultant must emotionally be able to bear the material, that is, to be able to stay emotionally connected with the client and...
not prematurely foreclose the conversation with supposedly culturally easy and familiar, if not magical, solutions – such as renewed strategic plans, mission statements, or stylized debriefing. The consultant’s dawning awareness of his or her own modes of self-protection becomes a cue to the client’s often terrifying anxiety.

With respect to organizational trauma, the defenses of splitting and projective identification are commonly employed by executives, managers, employees – survivors and those fired alike – as defenses against the pain of loss and mourning. The anthropological consultant can help the client begin the integrative healing process by giving them the opportunity to grieve by facilitating the recognition and experience of the depth and breadth of loss. This is not a mechanical process but a subtle and gradual one. By fostering a safe emotional space in which unspeakable anxiety can be experienced and memory reclaimed, the consultant creates conditions wherein forbidden stories are permitted to surface.

Is it appropriate for an applied anthropologist to be this kind of deep listener? Is this really an anthropological role – or is it more properly clinical? Does this emotional intensity and intimacy belong within applied anthropology? As a rule, applied anthropologists are more comfortable in the role of social intervention than in psychological intervention, since the former ostensibly allows greater objectivity – and emotional distance from the client or group. Further, psychological intervention is also a product of professional territory ad power dynamics, reinforced by licensure. Yet, whether the intervention is social or psychological (a spurious distinction, I think), the intersubjective relationship is always part of the narrative or project that is jointly constructed. It is part of the work to be done. To the degree that we do not have access to our own emotional response to our client, our data about ourselves and about the client (the Other) are impoverished or distorted. Ironically, to insist on a professional division of labor wherein emotional intensity and depth of relationship are allocated only to clinical roles is evidence of our splitting in the practice of anthropology!

The consultant mostly listens (which is never “just listening”) in the manner of wishing to hear what the client slowly begins to reformulate. The consultant is a compassionate witness, not a mere receptacle of information. The consultant labels, and in turn helps the client to label, experiences that had been banished. This lifts the power of secrecy, validates experience and memory, and empowers people and truthfulness in the face of deceptive euphemisms. Reality itself is affirmed, as if to acknowledge, “This really happened.” Healing narratives begin to replace destructive narratives, and authentic re-empowerment begins. The client begins to feel empowered rather than totally powerless and also begins to feel more human and less dehumanized.

The consultant-client relationship makes known a secret that most everyone already knows, but which remains mostly largely beneath consciousness and therefore language (what Bollas [1987] felicitously calls “the unthought known”). Part of the naming or labeling process consists of recognition of betrayals of loyalty and of brutality masked as good business. It helps the client to feel less isolated and less personally responsible for his or her fate. The consultant-client relationship helps put personal experience into broader psychocultural and psychopolitical context. Often the client reconstructs what had become an enforced narrative.

The consultant helps the client to rescue the experience from being banished, silenced, lost, and invalidated. Dignity emerges from imprisonment in shame, degradation, and vulnerability as self-integration replaces dissociation. The consultant honors the client’s experience and emergent emotions. The consultant’s acceptance of the client’s loss often leads to deep grief. What Doka (1989) calls “disenfranchised grief” becomes acknowledged. That is to say, in the safety of the consulting relationship, the client realizes that there is something that is worth grieving over (loss of others, loss of the self, loss of dignity). In all these ways, a more integrated self begins to emerge, one less imprisoned by culturally obligatory lies.
Acknowledgment of loss and grief in turn fosters the process of integration, internal, interpersonal, and organizational. What, then, is integration? What does it look like? How is it fostered? And how does it differ from the work of splitting? The previous section alluded to facets of this process as related to loss and mourning. An integrative work environment has a distinctive feel or interpersonal atmosphere. If splitting leads to organizational and personal fragmentation, integration leads to organizational and individual wholeness.

In integration, people experience themselves and others as worthwhile, multi-dimensional human beings. Even in supervisor/subordinate relationships, they feel respected. People treat one another as experiencing subjects rather than as purely instrumental objects to be manipulated and discarded. Management treats employees as living persons, not inanimate things. In an integrative work environment, work feels meaningful and does not require externally enforced motivation (Sievers 1994). In an integrative workplace, employees do not feel constantly on guard and defensive; instead they feel free to be creative, to be more fully themselves. The sense of aliveness that comes from integration contrasts with a sense of deadness that prevails in an environment dominated by splitting.

In integrative work circumstances, if an executive or manager must lay off people, it is done reluctantly as a last resort rather than a first and recurrent solution. And if firing occurs, it is done with compassion and sadness, rather than indifference or contempt toward those who are fired. Treated as full, feeling human beings rather than as objects, employees are prepared for the firing – and are not the targets of peremptory, surprise attacks by security guards or managers. For the survivors of layoffs, an integrative environment creates a sense of safety and security rather than one of ominous and constant threat that they might be next. There is frequent communication and updating between management and employees rather than silence and secrecy – and the accompanying feelings of conspiracy and betrayal. Employees feel included as part of a process rather than its targets.

In an integrative organizational environment beset with economic adversity, management says to employees in effect, “We have a problem,” rather than “You are the problem,” and enlists their talents and loyalty to try to devise solutions for greater productivity, cost-cutting, and profitability that will avert or reduce downsizing (Kennemer 2009). A success story of integration is one where executives, managers, and employees collaborate on solutions that increase morale and victimize no one. It is a narrative in which the past is acknowledged and mourned, in which members of the organization feel free to invest in a new future, rather than feel stuck in and haunted by the past.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have distinguished between two types of organizational and wider cultural healing: by splitting and projective identification and by integration. I have suggested that widespread organizational downsizing, reengineering, restructuring, off-shoring, and outsourcing accomplish a psychologically bogus and destructive healing through defensive processes that specifically transforms whole human beings into disposable waste. Loss is denied and grief short-circuited. Finally, in the above section I have suggested a number of approaches by which an applied anthropologist – fundamentally as a deep listener who facilitates organizational storytelling – can help both those fired and those who are survivors to be able to reclaim their humanity through recognizing the immense loss and grieving what and who have been lost.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2008 annual conference of the High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology, Denver, Colorado, April 26 2008. I wish to thank Jean Scandlyn and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable editorial suggestions in the revision of this paper. I dedicate this paper to Pennie Magee, from whom I’ve learned immeasurably about the issues discussed in this paper.
2. Howard F. Stein, Ph.D., is Professor and Special Assistant to the Chair, Department of Family and Preventive Medicine, University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma USA 73104. He may be reached by phone at 405-271-8000, extension 32211, and by e-mail at howard-stein@ouhsc.edu

References Cited

Becker, Ernest

Becker, Gay

Bollas, Christopher

Boyer, L. Bryce

Diamond, Michael A., Stein, Howard F., and Allcorn, Seth

Diamond, Michael A., Seth Allcorn, and Howard F. Stein

Doka, Kenneth J.

Enrenreich, Barbara

Fornari, Franco

Gabriel, Yiannis

Glover, Edward

Hallowell, A. Irving

Hormann, Shana, and Vivian, Pat

Kennemer, Kevin

Lardner, James

Lipman-Blumen, Jean

Money-Kyrle, Roger E.

Newman, Katherine S.

Ogden, Thomas

Schwartz, Howard S.

Schwartz, Howard S.

Sennett, Richard

Sievers, Burkard

Stein, Howard F.
Stein, Howard F.

Stein, Howard F.

Stein, Howard F.

Stein, Howard F.

Stein, Howard F.

Stein, Howard F. and Maurice Apprey

Thompson, Neil

Uchitelle, Louis

Vivian, Pat, and Hormann, Shana

Volkan, Vamik D.

Winnicott, Donald W.
Native American Consolation: Bureau of Ethnic Research and Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology Models, A Comparative Study
Kathleen Van Vlack

Abstract

Applied Anthropology has a long history of working with contemporary communities to find solutions to social, cultural, environmental, and economic problems, and many have spent their careers working on these issues with Native American communities. This essay explores how the Bureau of Ethnic Research (BER) and its contemporary form, the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology (BARA), set the standards for research conducted in Indian country through their contrastive research approaches. This paper describes the BER top-down approach of American Indian development projects and the BARA ground-up approach of the Nevada Test Site American Indian Program projects. Attention is given to how these initiatives have affected social-cultural issues and long-term research relationships with Native American communities. [Applied Anthropology, Native Americans, Methodology, Consultation]

Introduction

Applied Anthropology focuses on finding solutions for contemporary problems, and, within this framework, applied anthropologists have a long history of working on improving conditions for Native American communities. The Bureau of Ethnic Research and its contemporary form, the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology, set the standards on the types of research and how the research process should be administered as part of Native American consultation with federal and state entities. This paper describes the American Indian development projects under the direction of William Kelly and the Nevada Test Site American Indian Program projects under the direction of Richard Stoffle and examines how these projects have resulted in long-term research relationships with Native American communities. This paper also shows the progression that applied research has taken from its beginnings documenting socio-economic conditions to develop strategies for assimilation to restoring ceremonial activities by Native people and co-management practices on federal lands.

The Bureau of Ethnic Research

The Bureau of Ethnic Research (BER) was founded on July 1, 1952 to serve as an information and research center on contemporary Native American communities in the Southwest. The BER’s research initiative was centered on five principles as follows (Kelly 1953: ii):

1. The establishment of an information center for the collection and analysis of data on Southwest Indians
2. The establishment of a research program and clearing house for research by others, to supply existing material on Indian groups. Emphasis will be upon studies of the history and manner of life of the various tribes, and the gathering and analysis of current information pertinent to the solution of immediate and practical problems
3. The publication of reports on Indian culture, tribal affairs, and Indian administration
4. The establishment of an educational program designed to acquaint the people of Arizona with modern ways of life of Indian groups and their special problems in adjusting to life in white communities
5. The establishment, with the Department of Anthropology [at the University of Arizona], of a graduate student training program in ethnological research and applied anthropology.
The work of the BER was fueled by a new direction that federal Indian policy took in the 1950s wherein the U.S. government altered its relationships with its domestic-dependant partners, or federally recognized tribes. The shift was triggered by a 1943 survey conducted by the Senate, which revealed that social and economic conditions on reservations were sub-standard. Blame was placed on the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and they were sited as being at fault due to extreme mismanagement.

This caused the federal government to believe that some tribes no longer needed its protection and must be assimilated into mainstream American society, thus effectively ending the government's trusteeship of tribes and forcing Indian people to assume all responsibilities of full citizenship (Metcalf 2007). By applying one of the old platforms from the Indian Reorganization Act to Termination policy, BER Director William Kelly saw an opportunity to convert tribes from domestic dependents to corporate enterprises. To facilitate the process of shifting responsibilities from the federal government and tribes to the state governments, Kelly believed that the BER, with proper funding, could take the lead through top-down approaches and set the standard on how to conduct this research in terms of academic and practical approaches. In other words, he wanted the BER method to be the primary model throughout the entire field of anthropology. This research was intended to provide a more successful and smoother transition into Termination.

In order to set the program into action, Kelly had to recruit the assistance of partners within the university system, the business community, and the federal and state governments; therefore, the presidential committee of Indian affairs was formed. University of Arizona President Richard P. Harvil appointed a group of Arizona businessmen to advise the BER on transitional problems of easing tribes into the state system. Leading these efforts was a man named Walter Bimmson of the Valley National Bank. He, along with Kelly, believed that the tribes should move towards a privatization model, and Bimmson's bank had the financial resources to carry out this plan (BARA Oral History Project 2004).

By privatizing Indian lands and terminating the trust relationship, the United States government no longer was financially responsible to fund tribal programs, thus providing them with an opportunity to profit from taxes on new private land holdings. This call for privatization reflected a broader trend in United States policy that pushed communities away from communal and traditional systems of ownership and land management and towards capitalist driven economies.

**Indians of the Southwest**

According to Dr. Robert Hackenberg (BARA Oral History Project 2004), the Indian development plan was to follow models similar to those of the World Bank; therefore, Kelly and his colleagues established a planning base. *Indians of the Southwest* (Kelly 1953) was the first study undertaken by the BER; it documented basic information on Native American communities and the administration of Indian Affairs in Arizona. The report established baseline census data because this information was simply lacking from BIA files. The baseline data was critical for implementing development projects on tribal lands because it gave researchers an understanding of where they needed to focus privatization and development efforts (BARA Oral History Project 2004). The BER team designed and implemented an instrument to collect critical census data in a way that made sense to Indian communities; however, BER consultation was designed to fulfill a specific agenda that did not necessarily have the tribes’ best or desired interests at hand.

The *Indians of the Southwest* report collected data in eighteen Indian reservations in Arizona who were under the jurisdiction of nine BIA agencies. BER researchers looked at the following categories: (1) Tribal Government, (2) Tribal Resources, (3) Tribal Income, (4) Family Income, (5) BIA, (6) Education, (7) Land and Water Rights, (8) Health, (9) Tribal Enterprises, (10) Tribal Budgets, (11) Placement, (12) Credit, (13) Social and Economic Development, (14) Welfare, and (15) Livestock Association. These categories were chosen based on accessible data (Kelly 1953). Data for all the categories were not available for each tribe, so the report reflects the
kinds of information that were attainable. In the preface, Kelly acknowledged the shortfall of this study. He noted that at the time of the report there were insufficient discussions on cultural and social factors that provided context for the statistics. Kelly also stated that the report lacked medical data because at the time the Phoenix area BIA office was in the process of implementing a system to track Indian health. What is most striking is the omission of a discussion of the history of Indian-White disputes. Kelly wrote that there were other documents that described this issue in great detail such as the Indian Claims Commission reports. Given the nature of the BER study, a summary of conflict might have helped contextualize the issues better. This report was the first of many that provided baseline data for the formulation of termination projects.

The plan for Indian development and adjustment was fully set into motion when Steward Udall was elected to Congress. Udall served as the representative to southern Arizona and had close ties to the University of Arizona and William Kelly. When Udall became a member of the congressional Indian Affairs committee, the BER was provided free range to set the development plan into motion.

**Colorado River Reservation Termination Project**

Once the baseline data were collected, Kelly and the BER team piloted their development plans. They chose the Colorado River Indian Tribes reservation because it had large tracts of land located along the shores of the Colorado River that were prime for large-scale industrial agriculture. The goal was to turn the tribe into a large agribusiness firm in western Arizona with the provision that the tribe accepts more people from the Hopi and Navajo reservations. The BER team presented this package to the Colorado River Indian Tribes, and it was soundly voted down multiple times. The BER team did not see the shortfall of imposing this proposal on this particular tribe. The tribe was a conglomeration of Mojave, Chemehuevi, Hopi, and Navajo people. Two of these four ethnic groups do not have ancestral ties to this region and this was compounded by the cultural conflicts between the Mojave and Chemehuevi, and the Hopi and Navajo.

With this rejection, BER anthropologists and their financial backers moved on to other areas of interest. In the early 1960s, Kelly ended the Indian development program and refocused the Bureau to examine Indian health issues. The Indian health projects built upon the baseline data collected during the previous adjustment studies, and the National Cancer Institute provided funding for studies focused on acculturation and the epidemiological transition among the Tohono O’Odham (Papago), Gila River, Salt River, Colorado River Indian, and Navajo tribes (BARA Oral History Project 2005).

**Shifts in Federal Policy**

In the late 1960s and 1970s, a shift occurred in relation to federal Indian policy as the Termination Era had finally ended and the era of self-determination began. Self-determination policies were aimed at reversing actions taken under Termination. The new policies pushed for a greater application of tribal governments and Native American culture. Congress passed a series of laws in support of this new direction in U.S.-Indian relationships: the Indian Self-Determination Act, the Indian Child Welfare Act, and the Health Care Improvement Act. The intended purpose of these laws was to improve the quality of life for people on reservations without deconstructing tribal governments (Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams 2004).

During this time, two additional pieces of legislation were passed that redefined how research with Native communities would be conducted. These laws placed federal agencies and tribes into working relationships. The first act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was passed in 1970. NEPA is:

> ... a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation (Public Law 91-190; 83 Stat. 852).
Under NEPA, federal agencies must consider environmental impacts of any planned action on federal lands such as road, pipeline, power line, and dam construction. All projects are required to meet NEPA guidelines when a federal agency provides any portion of the financing for the project. The NEPA process is a three-step process that begins with the Environmental Assessment (EA). An EA examines potential environmental impacts of the proposed action such as unavoidable adverse impacts, alternatives such as “no action required,” the relationships between short-term use and long-term sustainability, irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources, and secondary and/or cumulative effects of implementing the proposed action. The EA process also determines if a larger study is needed to address potential impacts. If a larger study is deemed necessary, then an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be issued. An EIS is similar to the EA except the EIS is generally a larger document and much more detailed. In terms of Native American communities, NEPA created a system that requires federal agencies to consider the cultural environment in addition to the physical environment, thus initiating government-to-government consultation between tribes and federal agencies (Stapp and Burney 2002).

American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA). The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, or AIRFA, was signed into law on August 11 1978 (Public Law 95-341; 92 Stat. 469) and it specifically states that American Indian people have First Amendment of the United States Constitution rights to have access to lands and natural resources that are essential in conducting their traditional religious activities. AIRFA clearly asserts that Indian people have these rights even if these lands and natural resources are located beyond the boundaries of a tribal reservation. Under AIRFA, federal agencies are required to “evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with native traditional religious leaders in order to determine appropriate changes necessary to protect and preserve Native American religious cultural rights and practices,” (Public Law 95-341; 92 Stat. 469).

In 1994, the United States Congress amended AIRFA (U.S.C. 103D- Report 103-675). These amendments expanded sacred site and ceremonial object protections by including provisions to protect items associated with substances (plants and animals) that are needed for the practice of Native American religious rites and ceremonies. Additionally, executive Orders 13007 and 13175 were signed into law, which further directly addressed sacred sites protection policies, and Native American consultation requirements.

NEPA and AIRFA created a situation where positive relationships between tribes and federal agencies could be formed. This approach allowed for partnerships to be built from the ground up as opposed to the old top down model. This new approach caused a change in the way the Bureau interacted with Native American communities.

**Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology**

In 1982, BER changed its name to the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology (BARA) and vastly expanded its research and training mission. Presently BARA faculty have organized around six different programs. For each program, there exists a set of research activities consistent with the BARA mission, as well as corresponding academic courses and student participation that contribute to BARA’s commitment to applied training, in keeping with the standards set forth by the BER in the 1950s.

The Cultural Resources Studies program has continued the tradition started by the BER in monitoring the welfare and well-being of Native American groups in Arizona and also focusing on the preservation of Native American cultures and languages through fostering partnerships with tribes and enabling Native peoples to take control of the research process. An important part of this research program is its continued commitment to developing cultural resource theory within the field of applied anthropology and the continued push for the creation of meaningful and productive partnerships between Native American tribes and federal agencies.

BARA researchers have argued for the use of cultural landscapes as a form of best cultural
resource management practices. Cultural landscape theory has roots in cultural anthropology and geography and is used to explain how people connect themselves to the world around them. BARA researchers maintain that this concept not only helps non-Indian people understand relationships Native people have with places around them but also explains how places are culturally linked. From a Native American perspective, cultural resources are bound together in broad categories based upon function, interdependency, and proximity rather than physical characteristics. In order to understand a place and the meaning associated with it, interpretation is not necessarily about what is found at the site but rather where it is located in reference to other places. Through understanding these relationships, resources and locations can properly be managed.

One of BARA’s most consistently funded and supported research projects on cultural resources is the Nevada Test Site American Indian Program. This program originally was started at the University of Michigan at the Institute for Social Research under the direction of Richard Stoffle. When Stoffle came to the University of Arizona and BARA in 1991, he transferred his research program with him, and it has been in existence for over 20 years. It has been one of the longest funded research programs in BARA to date.

**Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement**

The current American Indian consultation program on the Nevada Test Site was the outgrowth of the Yucca Mountain High Level Nuclear Waste Repository Environmental Impact Statement. In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in which three sites were selected as possible repository sites to store high-level nuclear waste (or spent fuel rods from nuclear power generators). Initial environmental and structural suitability studies of the other potential sites at Deaf Smith, Texas, and the salt domes of Richton, Mississippi were stopped in favor of pursuing analysis of Yucca Mountain (Rosa and Short 2004). This decision was based on a widely shared national perception that the southern Nevada desert was a mostly dry wasteland where there were no population centers or people who cared about Yucca Mountain. The site was also selected based on a belief that the geology of the area would remain stable for nine thousand years as specified by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

When Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, they established unique criteria for involving people, communities, and American Indian tribes in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIS) process. The concept of “affected tribes” emerged from the requirement that the footprint of the High Level Waste site would have to touch lands owned by a tribe, community, or person. Some could argue that this was an intended action to limit tribal involvement in the EIS process. This criterion consequently excluded all Indian tribes across the country from being considered in the EIS process because Indian people had lost control over most of their traditional lands and often had been forcibly removed to isolated reservations. Despite not owning traditional lands, Indian tribes remained culturally affiliated with and concerned about issues impacting their aboriginal lands (Stoffle, Arnold, and Van Vlack 2009).

When the draft EIS was published in 1986 an outcry emerged from the various American Indian tribes who were culturally affiliated with Yucca Mountain because they had not been included in the assessment process. The Department of Energy acknowledged this problem of their EIS process and requested arguments for involving tribes. After preparing unsuccessful arguments based on the NEPA-driven social impact assessment and National Historic Preservation laws and guidelines, a successful argument was made based on the AIRFA² (Stoffle and Evans 1987, 1992). This argument brought sixteen tribes and their cultural knowledge of Yucca Mountain to the EIS process (Stoffle et al. 1990) and began a formal Department of Energy American Indian Program for the Yucca Mountain Project and more broadly on the Nevada Test Site that continues today (Stoffle, Zedeño, and Halmo 2001).
Cultural Affiliation and the Nevada Test Site

As required by law, cultural affiliation needed to be established before the American Indian participation in the EIS process began at Yucca Mountain. Cultural affiliation is used to determine which ethnic groups and tribes are culturally connected to the lands and resources within a certain federal agency’s jurisdiction. Federal agencies use the term “cultural affiliation” in various ways for different purposes. At the broadest level it means a portion of land that has become culturally important (culturally central) to an American Indian ethnic group. Connections between the Indian people and the land may have been established before Europeans arrived (pre-1492), while Europeans were occupying and claiming the land (pre-1848), or during the historic period from 1849 afterwards. The National Park Service follows a narrow definition of cultural affiliation that was established in their 2001 management policies:

Cultural Affiliation – means that there is a relationship of shared group identity which can be reasonably traced historically or prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group. See “Evaluation and Categorization” 5.1.3.2; and “Ethnographic Resources” in the Cultural Resource Management Handbook.

When beginning the consultation process with American Indian people, it is also important that aboriginal title is noted. Aboriginal title is land possessed by a particular tribe or ethnic group until the United States government acquired title to it (Sutton 1985).

In the initial phase of the Yucca Mountain Project Native American study, it was determined that three Native American ethnic groups were culturally affiliated with the Nevada Test Site lands and resources (Stoffle 1987). These ethnic groups are: Owens Valley Paiute, Western Shoshone, and Southern Paiute; this equates to seventeen tribes and Indian organizations (five Owens Valley Paiute tribes, four Western Shoshone Tribes, seven Southern Paiute tribes, and the Las Vegas Indian Center).

Consolidated Group of Tribes and Organizations

The seventeen cultural affiliated tribes and Indian organizations formed the Consolidated Group of Tribes and Organizations (CGTO), which serves as the intermediary between the tribes and the Nevada Test Site/Department of Energy. The CGTO was formed out of the desire to speak with one voice because the tribes believed there was more power in unity than in multiple voices when it came to management and consultation. Each tribe has two representatives who attend the annual meetings and report back to their respective tribal governments. Within the CTGO, there are numerous subgroups that convene at various times when necessary to assess projects, create proposals, and make decisions. Subgroups include the American Indian Writers Subgroup, the NAGPRA subgroup, and the Rock Art Subgroup (Stoffle, Zedeño, and Halmo 2001).

Regulatory and Historical Background of Consultation on the Nevada Test Site

The American Indian Program on the Nevada Test Site has a long history of working within the regulatory and three-tiered system of the consultation process. These levels serve to guide how tribes engage in the identification and assessment of resources on public lands and define the range of an agency’s roles in that process. The first level of guidance is based upon the historic and cultural context of a specific group of Indian people and their aboriginal lands. Indian people believe they were placed on their lands by their Creator and in turn were given stewardship responsibilities. Indian people have divine mandates, which drive them to protect and tend to their lands and resources. When the United States took possession of all Indian lands in 1849, aboriginal title was legally extinguished, and the Indian Claims Commission later reduced land possessions further. Despite the massive reduction in traditional territory, the stewardship obligation felt by the Indian people cannot be extinguished. These lands are closely connected to a people’s historic memory, and they carry it within them for many generations (Stoffle et al. 2005).

The second level of guidance is part of the United States government regulatory framework.
Tribal governments have a long-standing legal and political relationship with the United States and its federal agencies. Treaties and agreements have established the foundation for government-to-government relationship between the tribes and the government bodies. The legal environment has created the requirement of consultation with affiliated tribes based on this relationship. Federal agencies legally are required to consult with tribal governments under the directive of Executive Order 13175 (November 6, 2000), *Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments*. It also enhances other regulations like the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978) and Executive Order 13007 (Protection of American Indian Sacred Sites). These regulations serve as further guidance to agencies as to their relationships with American Indian Tribes. This model has been adopted and used successfully by many governmental entities such as the Department of Defense-Nellis Air Force, the U.S. Forest Service, Desert National Wildlife Refuge Complex of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Federal Highways Administration (Stoffle et al. 2005).

The third level of guidance is built from the relationship between the tribes and a specific federal agency. In order to fulfill consultation requirements, it is essential that Indian people become partners in the process. In the book, *American Indians and the Nevada Test Site*, consultation is used to “describe a process by which American Indian peoples with aboriginal or historic ties to public lands are identified and brought into discussions about cultural resources in those lands,” (Stoffle, Zedeño, and Halmo 2001: 22). Consultation is also a term that has broader legal standing and is recognized by the United States, Canada, and much of the western world. Consultation can be conducted in many ways, but successful consultation is based upon meaningful interactions such as site visits, meetings, and face-to-face interactions with agency representatives and Indian people (Stoffle 2000).

**Nevada Test Site American Indian Government-to-Government Consultation**

Initial CGTO-Department of Energy consultations through ethnographic studies began in 1987, and these studies focused on lands that were potentially impacted by the Yucca Mountain Project (Stoffle, Zedeño, and Halmo 2001). These consultations were expanded as the American Indian program shifted focus to the broader reaches of the Nevada Test Site (Pippin 1991). The CGTO began to make recommendations as part of their ethnographic studies (Stoffle, Olmsted, and Evans 1988; Stoffle, Evans, and Harsbarger 1989; Stoffle et al. 1989) and at the annual consultation meetings for future studies and tribal involvement.

After a decade of consultation a set of guidelines and protocols were established and formally approved by the consulting tribal governments. These guidelines were published in the 1996 EIS (American Indian Writers Subgroup 1996: C-1). These same guidelines were reaffirmed during the five-year and ten year EIS review studies (Arnold et al. 2002; Arnold et al. 2007). Since the completion of the 1996 EIS, the Department of Energy has closely followed these recommended guidelines for compliance activities. Department of Energy policy has allowed for direct Native American involvement so their concerns can be addressed in specially prepared studies and reports. Specific federal laws require American Indian tribal governments to be participants in the decision-making process and to provide recommendations on common interests. Some key aspects need to be discussed to understand the Native American consultation process on the Nevada Test Site and how the tribal perspectives are important players in all levels of research.

**Time.** Among tribal governments and the CGTO, there has been a major concern of being included in the debate and discussions of future projects conducted on the Nevada Test Site, therefore, there is a need to involve them from the outset. The CGTO established and has consistently argued the position that the Indian people must be involved in the early planning stages of proposed development or restoration projects on the Nevada Test Site and relevant off-site locations, as defined in the 1996 EIS (American Indian Writers Subgroup 1996). The CGTO also maintained the position that Indian people be involved in the early planning stages
level even if the project is being proposed by another federal agency, a state agency, or a private corporation.

During the decades of consulting with the Department of Energy, the CGTO has established different levels of appropriate consultation effort for projects being proposed. In general, the scale of potential ground disturbance is a major factor in determining level of effort and the cultural significance of the area potentially impacted by a project is another deciding factor. Level of effort refers to the size of the Native American ethnographic study and there are three types of Native American Ethnographic studies on the Nevada Test Site (Table 1). The first level of study is a small scale study and it only involves members of the American Indian Writers Subgroup. This group contains one person from three culturally affiliated ethnic groups, one Indian organization (the Las Vegas Indian Center), and the subgroup chairperson. This level has frequently been used for rapid cultural assessments where time is a hindering variable. The second level of study is a mid-scale assessment and it involves four cultural experts from the three ethnic groups and one Indian organization. This type of study is usually conducted when project funding and site access are problematic. The third level of study is a full-scale assessment. This large study involves two members from each of the seventeen affiliated tribes and organizations. Large-scale assessments are usually conducted when the resources being studied require people with highly specialized knowledge on specific resources such as rock art and ethnobotany.

CGTO involvement during project planning stages allows tribal representatives to assess potential proposal impacts to American Indian cultural resources and recommend appropriate scale of study needed during the annual program meeting. There are times between annual meetings when project proposals need to be considered and thus it is the responsibility of the American Indian Writers Subgroup to recommend project scale. In the event that a project involves new potential impacts or a new area not previously studied, the CGTO requires that the Writers Subgroup be incorporated into scoping trips to these areas, and the trip results should be submitted in writing by the Writers Subgroup to the entire CGTO.

Variables. American Indian people lived in and used the lands of the Nevada Test Site for thousands of years during which they developed attachments to and used many natural elements in both physical and spiritual ways. Because of this long attachment, the CGTO has concerns for a wide range of natural and cultural resources. During the twenty-two years of consultation with members of the BARA team, the CGTO has defined a number of human and natural variables that need to be considered during consultation. The CGTO officially recommended these variables in Appendix G of the 1996 EIS (American Indian Writers Subgroup 1996).

Ethnoarchaeology: The interpretation of the physical artifacts produced by their Indian Ancestors.

Ethnobotany: The identification and interpretation of the plants used by Indian people.

Ethnozoology: The identification and interpretation of the animals used by Indian people.
**Rock Art**: The identification and interpretation of traditional Indian paintings and rock peckings.

**Traditional Cultural Properties**: The identification and interpretation of places that are culturally central.

**Ethnogeography**: The identification and interpretation of soil, rocks, water, and air.

**Cultural Landscapes**: The identification and interpretation of spatial units that are culturally and geographically linked areas for American Indian people.

This list has been agreed upon by all culturally affiliated tribes and organizations of the CGTO. During annual meetings, the CGTO decides which of these variables need to be studied when new projects are discussed.

**BARA Research Methodology**

The current BARA research methodology for tribal consultation has been developed and refined over a period of thirty years and during this period, members of the BARA team developed a strong research partnership with many tribes such as the Numic-speaking tribes of the Colorado Plateau and Great Basin. This partnership has directly influenced how BARA researchers approach projects involving Indian people and tribes. Current BARA research involves the use of mixed methods (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; Beebe 2001) and triangulation (Campbell and Fisk 1959). The mixed methods approach involves collecting qualitative and quantitative data, and, where there is convergence, confidence in the findings grows considerably (Jick 1979).

As part of the mixed methods approach, seven survey instruments have developed that have been used at various times during the past twenty years. All survey instruments used by our research team have been developed with the assistance of official tribal representatives, and these forms have been approved by participating tribal governments. Many of these instruments, such as the Site Form, Rock Art Form, and Cultural Landscapes Form, have been administered to Indian people during at least ten different projects since 1997. This equated to over one thousand interviews with Indian people.

The confidence in these findings derives from an overall triangulation of comparable findings from any of the seven instruments and oral histories. The triangulation of data involves comparing responses generated with different instruments. When two or more instruments provide the same answer to a research question then the confidence in the accuracy of the answer is increased. Confidence in the accuracy of responses also increases to the extent that most interviewees provide the same answer.

**Summary of BARA Survey Instruments**

The following is a brief discussion of the seven survey instruments used by the BARA research team. The brief paragraphs explain the purpose behind each survey instrument and the types of information they seek to ascertain.

**Site Form**. The Site Interview form is place-specific and is used to record site use history and types of ethnographic resources associated with site use including water, plants, animals, minerals, landforms, and archaeological remains. With this form, the ethnographer can elicit detailed information on material, behavioral, and spiritual connections among resource types, and between each resource and a place. It was used initially in Zion National Park and Pipe Spring National Monument Study (Stoffle et al. 1997). The “Zion form” has since been successfully applied in numerous federally funded projects that involved tribes in the West and Midwest regions of the United States.

**Ethnoarchaeology-Rock Art Form**. The second type of form is called the Rock Art Interview. It is used in the event that the Site Interview is too general, and more fine-grained analysis is feasible and useful for a study. The Rock Art form is one of a set of focused interview forms that have been developed. Other fine-grained forms have been developed for plants, animals, and sacred sites. Each was developed with the aid of Indian people (Zedeño et al. 1998).

**Cultural Landscapes Form**. The BARA team designed the Cultural Landscape Form, with input from agencies who needed to have a way to manage much larger areas as integrated cultural
phenomena and with Indian people whose culture is organized in terms of such big areas. The landscape form frames place and resource-specific information in a broader regional and more abstract cultural context. With this form, the BARA team investigates origin and migration traditions, ethnic group settlement and land use history, and specific use patterns of the natural topography. Data on trail systems, including travel across land and through water, and ceremonial trails associated with songs, drum circles, dreaming, pilgrimages, and individual quests, also are crucial to unraveling complex cultural connections between places and resources.

Cultural Landscapes-Pilgrimage Connections Form. The interconnectedness of places is very important for understanding how Indian people view the landscape. This key element presents an opportunity to see specifically how ceremonial sites are connected to each other. To explore this issue in detail, a form was developed to provide Indian people with an opportunity to see if places already visited and evaluated by them are connected. Once Indian people establish that the places are connected they are then asked to draw the perceived pilgrimage trails, or Puha Paths, a vision-quester would travel to the ceremonial destination site.

Ethnobotany Form. The BARA team developed the Ethnobotany form to gather specific information in regards to uses, meanings, and appropriate interdependence of traditional people and the plants. The BARA team first developed this form during the Yucca Mountain Ethnobotany Study in 1989 (Stoffle et al. 1989). The form has been modified and adapted to use in other areas across the United States (Stoffle et al. 1994; Stoffle et al. 1997; Toupal et al. 2004).

Ethnozoology Form. During many of the early studies, Indian people shared with members of the BARA research team the meaning of specific animals and their importance to the people and the environment around them. During the Pahute and Rainer Mesa Cultural Resource Study (Stoffle et al 1994), they developed a form that specifically targeted animal species. The Ethnozoology form is similar to the ethnobotany form. The purpose of this form is to gather information regarding the cultural significance of individual animal species in terms of their roles in stories, songs, ceremonies, and how they were used traditionally for food, clothing, shelter, and medicine

Traditional Cultural Properties Form. The Traditional Cultural Properties form was designed and first used in 2004 during the Water Bottle Canyon Traditional Cultural Property Study on the Nevada Test Site (Stoffle, Van Vlack, Arnold 2005). The questions were designed to ask Indian people about their thoughts in regards to nominating Water Bottle Canyon to the National Register of Historic Places. The form also gave Indian people an opportunity to define the traditional cultural property boundaries as they saw necessary. This, in turn, provided the agency with a visual representation of the Indian people’s recommendations. This form has been adapted and used on other Native American studies. It was used most recently in 2005 during the Timber Mountain Caldera Landscape Study on the Nevada Test Site (Stoffle et al 2006).

Timber Mountain Caldera Study

In recent studies on the Nevada Test Site, the BARA team has been able to link together their earlier ethnographic research with new data obtained through new survey instruments such as the Cultural Landscapes Pilgrimage Connections Form and the Traditional Cultural Properties Form. In 2005, the AIWS recommended a formal ethnographic study to understand the cultural landscapes of the Timber Mountain Caldera. This study was designed to present ethnographic findings from fieldwork completed in 2005, but the report builds upon previous American Indian interviews conducted in the area since the Yucca Mountain Project. Tiering is the term used to describe the process of building on previous relevant research and is required by regulation under the National Environmental Policy Act. In this case tiering was appropriate because so much more is known about the Timber Mountain Caldera because of past project findings.

Formal ethnographic interviews have been conducted since 1987 that are directly related to the cultural meaning of the Timber Mountain Caldera (Stoffle et al. 2005). Interviews were conducted with official cultural representatives of the culturally affiliated tribes. These interviews
provide direct understanding about the cultural meaning of the Timber Mountain Caldera area to Paiute and Shoshone people.

The ultimate goal of this study was to nominate places and pilgrimage trails to the National Register of Historic Places as Traditional Cultural Properties to protect and preserve these sites from future development on the Nevada Test Site. The ethnographic research conducted on the Timber Mountain Caldera has provided useful information in trying to understand the cultural centrality of volcanic places to Numic-speaking peoples in southern Nevada.

Conclusions
When looking at the BER and the BARA Nevada Test Site American Indian program, a few conclusions can be drawn. Each research program established long-term research and consultation programs with Native American tribes and each has worked towards improving living conditions in some way for the Indian communities involved. The BER studies highlighted disparities in Indian communities in terms of opportunities and services available. Kelly and his team believed that they could facilitate ways to correct these problems through a top-down approach and working within the complexities of Termination and development policies and practices. This research attempted to dictate the course of action that needed to be taken by the tribes and pushed for privatization.

The BER’s approach contrasts with how research is being done at BARA today. Richard Stoffle and his team have followed a similar path in pushing for long-term research; however, the Nevada Test Site work has helped the CGTO and the tribes to gain power and directly impact management decisions through the recognition of self-determination policies such as AIRFA and NEPA. The long-term consultation led to the creation of meaningful partnerships between BARA and the tribes; it has followed a more grass roots approach. Resulting from this collaborative effort, the Indian people directly participated in project design and implementation during the EIS process (American Indian Writers Subgroup 1996; Arnold et al. 2007). For example, they have produced their own essays that have been included in agency management documents.

Also, because of the BARA program, Indian people took part in a project that gave them an opportunity to visit a ceremonial place at night to begin the process of spiritual restoration and tribal management (Stoffle, Van Vlack, and Arnold 2005).

The BER and BARA’s commitment to Native communities will have lasting impacts on applied anthropology for years to come. These programs have set the standards on how research should be conducted—through building long-term partnerships and assessing the needs of the given communities. Each program has trained many students who have used their skills and knowledge in academic, federal, and tribal settings.

Notes
1. Ms. Van Vlack is doctoral student in the American Indian Studies program and a graduate research assistant at the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology at the University of Arizona. She holds a B.A. in anthropology and an M.A. in American Indian Studies from the University of Arizona. She may be reached by mail at The Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology, 1009 East South Campus Drive, Emil Haury/Anthropology Building Room 316, Tucson, AZ 85721, by telephone at 520-621-2462 and by e-mail at kvanvlack@email.arizona.edu.

2. To date the Nevada Test Site program is the only AIRFA driven consultation program in the United States.

3. While a separate Yucca Mountain Project consultation continued, BARA researchers are no longer involved.

References Cited
AIRFA

American Indian Writers Subgroup, Consolidated Group of Tribes and Organizations
Arnold, Richard, Jerry Charles, Betty Cornelius, Maurice Frank-Churchill, Gaylene Moose

Arnold, Richard, Jerry Charles, Lee Chavez, Betty Cornelius, Maurice Frank-Churchill, Gerald Kane, and Lalovi Miller

BARA Oral History Project
2004 Interview with Robert Hackenberg.
2005 Interview with Robert Hackenberg.

Beebe, J.

Campbell, A., and D. Fiske

EO 13007

EO 13175
2000 Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments. Ex. Ord. No. 13175, Nov. 6, 2000, 65 F.R. 67249

Getches, David H., Charles F. Wilkinson, and Robert A. Williams

Jick, T. J.

Kelly, William H.

Metcalf, R. Warren
2007 Termination’s Legacy. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

NAGPRA

NEPA

NHPA

Pippin, Lonnie C.

Rosa, E., and J. Short

Stapp, Darby C., and Michael S. Burney
2002 Tribal Cultural Resource Management: The Full Circle to Stewardship. Walnut Creek, California: Altamira Press.

Stoffle, Richard W.

Stoffle, Richard W., Richard W. Arnold, and Kathleen Van Vlack
Stoffle, Richard W., Diane E. Austin, David B. Halmo, and Arthur M. Phillips  

Stoffle, Richard W., and Michael J. Evans  

Stoffle, Richard W., David B. Halmo, Molly C. Dufort, and Brian Fulfrost  

Stoffle, Richard W., Michael J. Evans, David B. Halmo, Wesley E. Niles, and Joan T. O’Farrell  

Stoffle, Richard W., Michael J. Evans, and Camilia L. Harshbarger  

Stoffle, Richard W., David B. Halmo, John E. Olmsted, and Michael J. Evans  

Stoffle, Richard W., Kathleen A. Van Vlack, and Richard W. Arnold  

Stoffle, Richard W., Maria Nieves Zedeño, and David B. Halmo, editors  

Stoffle, Richard W., Maria Nieves Zedeño, Richard W. Arnold, Kathleen A. Van Vlack, Mance E. Buttram, Heather Fauland, and Aja Y. Martinez  

Sutton, Imre, editor  

Tashakkori, A., and C. Teddlie  
Special Section
Genocide, Ethnocide, and Ethnic Cleansing
Preface and General Introduction
Peter Van Arsdale

The lead article on genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing was inspired by comments made by members of the Committee for Human Rights (CFHR) of the American Anthropological Association nearly a decade ago, with the present research – in the form of a literature and case-specific review – commencing in early 2006 and carrying through late 2008. While not conducted under the auspices of the current CFHR (of which the senior author is a member), the committee’s influence still has been significant. The research also was inspired by the AAA’s 2001 draft statement on ethnic cleansing. While not an official “statement of principles” of the CFHR, or of the Human Rights and Social Justice Committee of the Society for Applied Anthropology (which the senior author chairs), it is intended to represent key issues of concern to applied and cultural anthropologists. It is by no means all encompassing, but rather is exploratory and selectively representative of key themes.

Four of the five authors of the lead article were graduate students at the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies (now the Josef Korbel School of International Studies) when the work commenced in 2006. Their involvement was in response to a long-standing tradition of the High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology, namely, that qualified students be encouraged to publish their research in peer-reviewed journals and that they be assisted by senior society members in doing so. Continuing with this tradition, once the initial manuscript had been drafted, five additional students from the school also were recruited in 2008. All had been students of mine; all had demonstrated exemplary analytical skills in the classroom in the field of human rights and/or humanitarian assistance. Commentaries were solicited from each, building on points either extensively detailed or briefly noted in the lead article. As will become evident, these commentaries add a great deal to the discussion.

Roxolana Wynar addresses the still not-well-known genocide that emerged in her family’s homeland of Ukraine in the early 1930s. Under Stalin an artificial famine – the Holodomor – was induced, that led to the deaths and/or forcible displacements of several million people. Nicole Herrera addresses issues associated with the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted in 1948. Subsequent accountability and enforcement, including roles played by the United States, are of special concern. Barbara Bonner tackles the issue of humanitarian aid versus humanitarian intervention in times of extreme crisis examining the 1988 genocide of Kurds in northern Iraq. Josiah Marineau analyzes certain human rights implications of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 in which processes of victimization and initial denial are shown to have been complemented by emergent (but imperfect) processes of reconciliation under gacaca courts. Amy Bhalla writes about one of the newer themes in need of analysis in this field, that involving sex-selective mass killing and gendercide. Understandings of power, subordination, and inequality – in the broader context of social relations – are shown to be essential.
Genocide, Ethnocide, and Ethnic Cleansing: An Exploratory Review

Peter Van Arsdale, Mellissa Jessen, Nicole Hawthorne, Kellie Ramirez, and Cathy Smith

Abstract

This article is exploratory in nature. It takes a cross-cultural, case-based approach in outlining factors associated with the processes of genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing. The works of anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, human rights analysts, and others are cited. Within the category of genocide, the Iraq/Kurdistan and Rwanda cases are featured. Within the category of ethnocide, the Cambodian case is presented. Within the category of ethnic cleansing, the cases of Palestine/Israel and Bosnia are covered. Processes of particular interest to anthropologists, both cultural and applied, include intrusion, denial, bystanding, victimization, expulsion, intervention, and reconciliation. That of perpetration remains the most obvious. One assertion is that definitive theories of genocide are lacking; on the other hand, helpful analytic frameworks are shown to exist. “Warning signs,” “touchstones,” and “lessons learned” are highlighted. The role of the state is discussed. This article is not a “how to stop genocide” or “how to redefine genocide” treatise, but is intended to highlight five of the most important cases of the twentieth century and also to provide suggestions – explicit or implicit – as to how anthropologists can continue to contribute to the field. [genocide, ethnocide, ethnic cleansing, human rights, humanitarian assistance, Kurdistan, Rwanda, Palestine, Bosnia, Cambodia]

I. Introduction

Genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing are perhaps the most horrific activities practiced by humans. Although the mass slaughter of neighboring groups also has been documented among chimpanzees (Judson 2007), no other advanced species systematically attempts to destroy complete groups of its own kind. It is the paradox of destruction envisioned within the broader scheme of survival that makes this issue so difficult to analyze.

This document is intended to summarize recent work on the topic, drawing attention to issues of special interest to anthropologists (especially those working in the area of human rights). As noted in the “Preface,” it was inspired by comments made by members of the AAA’s Committee for Human Rights (CfHR) nearly a decade ago. The literature review for the present article was initiated in 2006. Some of the authors’ own on-site work during the past decade also is incorporated.

A cross-cultural, case-based approach is employed, framed by an introduction that features some of the latest multidisciplinary thinking in the field and by a concluding section that features themes of particular interest to cultural anthropologists. Both intellectual and emotive points are raised. The literature reviewed leads to the assertion that deeper understandings of the processes of intrusion, denial, bystanding, victimization, expulsion, intervention, and reconciliation – in addition to perpetration – all can benefit substantially from anthropological insights. These processes are cross-referenced as the five primary cases are presented herein. However, although some suggestions are provided, this is not a “how to stop genocide” document. It also is not a “how to redefine the term genocide” document, despite the complementary analyses of the terms ethnocide and ethnic cleansing which are included.

As will be inferred, as the article’s conclusions are drawn, key opportunities present themselves regarding how better to advocate on behalf of those whose rights have been abused. Anthropologists are generally well-placed to engage an array of applied research skills and contact networks, including those involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), although generally less well-placed to engage transnationally important policy change mechanisms. Further contributions can be made by anthropologists in the context of genocide regarding, e.g., the secondary impacts on families of victims; in the context of ethnocide regarding, e.g., cultural and religious disappearance; and in the context of
ethnic cleansing regarding, e.g., bystanding as atrocities unfold. Basic ethnographic insights remain essential.

A number of resources have been consulted as this research has proceeded. Of particular importance have been Ben Kiernan’s new masterwork, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (2007), Samantha Power’s “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (2002), and Dinah Shelton’s edited work, Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (three volumes, 2005). This document is intended to complement and expand upon the recent article by the present authors, “Death and Denial,” which appeared in the October 2007 edition of Anthropology News.

Laying the Groundwork

In this document, cases selected for inclusion involve Rwanda, Cambodia, Iraq/Kurdistan, Bosnia, and Palestine/Israel. These case studies allow consideration of genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing, while recognizing the overlap among these concepts. The authors wrestled with which cases to include and which to exclude. Consideration was given to the atrocities in Ukraine under Stalin, spanning over two decades, when several million people died through forcible displacement, starvation, and murder. The total number of persons who were sent to concentration camps and other arms of the Gulag numbered nearly 18 million, with some 4.5 million never returning. The decade of the 1930s was the pinnacle in terms of ominous activity, but 1952 the pinnacle in terms of numbers in camps (Applebaum 2003:92-93). Consideration also was given to the scorched earth campaigns in Guatemala. From 1960 to 1996, the country was engaged in a civil conflict involving the military and a disparate group of guerrilla fighters that killed as many as 200,000 people and resulted in the disappearances of as many as 45,000 more (Sanford 2003:34). The current situation in Darfur, termed by Gérard Prunier (2005) an “ambiguous genocide,” inspired much of the thought behind the current document, but the genocide there is not a focus of this article. (The senior author, who has worked there, still is analyzing data.) Ultimately, the reasons for including cases were based upon a combination of the authors’ previous secondary research, visits to, or first-hand work in, some of the areas, and the diversity of factors the cases represent.

The term genocide emerged in the 1940s as the Nazi regime proceeded with its war campaign. As Ben Kiernan (2007:10) notes, the Polish Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin coined the term, putting in into print in 1944 in his Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. The purposeful, planned nature of mass killings for political purposes was addressed. Other scholars and respondents have offered complementary definitions:

a. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn:
Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator (1990:4).

b. Allison Des Forges:
At the start of genocide, there is a cause, a reason, and people who find it worthwhile. The cause does not drift around there by accident; it’s even fine-tuned by the intimidators: The desire to win the game for good [transcribed from a respondent in Rwanda] (1999:1).

c. Article 2 of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:
In 1948 (as entered into force in 1951), genocide was defined as action with the intent to “destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.” The actions specified:

1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
This is noteworthy timing-wise, as Robert Albro (2008) points out, in that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also was created in 1948. The two documents were drafted simultaneously and, to some extent, interactively. Members of each drafting committee were attuned to discussions being held by the other. While consideration was given to “national, ethnic, racial, or religious” groups by both committees, Lemkin’s original construct – which could well have accommodated “cultural genocide” – was weakened. Even today, “cultural disappearance” through forced assimilation, as likely has occurred among certain tribal groups, e.g., in Ethiopia, Burma, and Brazil, is not central to the discussion of genocide.

From these definitions, useful adaptations have evolved. For example, U.N. Security Council resolutions, such as No. 955 (adopted November 8 1994, with regard to the Rwandan crisis) built directly on Article 2. While reiterating points (a) through (e) and promulgating the decision to establish an international tribunal, it went on to note that punishable activities include genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide (Shelton 2005:1271).

Useful variations also have evolved from these definitions. For example, sociologist Leo Kuper refers to “genocidal massacres.” These comprise “shorter, limited episodes of killing directed at a specific local or regional community, targeted because of its membership in a larger group. Genocidal massacres often serve as object lessons for other members of the group” (Kiernan 2007:13), while for some perpetrators they serve as a kind of “test” to see how much they can get away with. Under the 1948 Convention, genocide itself may be partial, and usually is. The 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia would be an example. The Gujarat attacks of 2002 in India would be another.

As Albro (2008) stresses, the term “genocide” seemingly expands and contracts. Yet, the diverse definitions are useful as “platforms” for further analyses. Of particular importance are the analytic frameworks that subsequently have arisen. Although the term “theory” is used by some authors to encompass one or more of these, the opinion expressed herein is that definitive theories still are lacking. Four differing analytic frameworks have been selected; all are useful. None are contradictory, one to another.

1. Ben Kiernan (2007) integrates his expertise in history, politics, and sociology as he develops an eclectic yet useful analytic framework. He covers a remarkable number of events in space and time. For him, it is less about “event” and more about “process.” For example, he stresses that as many as twelve million indigenous people may have been killed, died of imported diseases, or been forcibly enslaved by the Spanish in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America in the brief half-century following the arrival of Columbus (2007:77). Less well known, in Southeast Asia in 1470 as many as 60,000 Chams were killed by the Vietnamese (Dai Vet) army. Some 30,000 prisoners subsequently were taken. Other campaigns in the region included forced starvation (2007:109-110). In the 1580s, the English army in Ireland may have reduced the Irish population by as much as 30 percent, while laying waste to the land and destroying a number of towns. Much of the indigenous culture, in a process of ethnocide, was destroyed (2007:203). Reflecting certain patterns of the ancient world, Kiernan sees modern genocide demonstrating “four telltale characteristics...that regularly [have] occurred from the fifteenth century to the twenty-first: the preoccupation of perpetrators with race, antiquity, agriculture, and expansion” (2007:605). Utopianism, complemented by fetishes of purity and contamination, underpin many of the cases he illustrates.

2. Jane Springer (2006:41-43) suggests that, to the extent to which theories of genocide exist or tentatively can be identified, they fall under three broad headings. All attempt to address the question “Why?” The first type is resource-related. A government or other influential group wants its members, usually represented by settlers, to take over the land of the (usually indigenous) people already living there. This was seen in the “villagization” scheme of the Derg regime in Ethiopia during the 1980s. The second type is threat-related. As in the case of Rwanda, an ethnic threat was perceived by the Hutu population as they considered the Tutsi...
population. The threat often peaks as central control diminishes. The third type is utopian-related, a theme also prominent in Kiernan’s work. As under Pol Pot in Cambodia, a “cleansing” is seen as necessary to bring about a desired future. Although leaders like Pol Pot and his colleague Nuon Chea indeed might be perceived as evil, Springer stresses that an “evil man” theory is not useful. Demonization yields few substantive results, on-site, for a population in turmoil. In contrast, perspectives involving the interplay of sociological, political, and economic conditions are useful. Her analytic framework for understanding genocide encompasses an operational definition, background and history, anatomy of the event, response to the event, and, based on a comparative synthesis, suggestions for preventing future events.

3. Samantha Power (2002) believes that the twentieth-century genocides that stand out most ominously are the Serbs’ eradication of non-Serbs, the Ottoman slaughter of Armenians, the Nazi holocaust, the “killing fields” of Cambodia, Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror against northern Iraq’s Kurds, and the Hutu extermination of Tutsis. Her framework analyzes each event point/counterpoint to what outside actors, especially the U.S., did or (most often) did not do. In a sense, she presents a “knowledge – blame – inaction” paradigm, emphasizing the roles and responsibilities of external actors with power. “[All major] U.S. policy responses to genocide were astonishingly similar across time, geography, ideology, and geopolitical balance” (2002:xvi). Key actors in a genocidal situation are victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. While not referring to an “evil man” theory, Power does use the term evil in relation to genocide. She stresses that it takes imagination to wrestle with evil (2002:xvii).

4. Zach Dubinsky (2005), incorporating the work of Linda Melvern (2004), presents an analytic framework that suggests “lessons to be learned.” Relying particularly upon Rwanda, he summarizes five. First, the world can ignore genocide. Second, sometimes there are no heroes. Third, the worst orgies are planned. Fourth, the hardest targets are soft targets. In Rwanda, much of the genocidal coordination was carried out over public radio. As many as 100,000 people, mostly civilians, conducted the killings using only machetes and other simple tools. Fifth, inhumane actions reflect the perpetrators’ stereotyping of the targeted group (e.g., Tutsi as “cockroaches”) and the bystanders’ ideological rigidity (e.g., the U.S. awaiting “further confirming information”).

**Warning Signs**

Three of the four authors just cited emphasize warning signs as they consider impending genocides, ethnocides, or ethnic cleansings. This is one of the most important and straight-forward analytic approaches, because it portends a chance to intervene and assist those at-risk. As John Heidenrich (2001) notes, one of the first to propose genocide-specific early warning systems – in the early 1980s – was Israel Charny. Although frequently ignored by outsiders, early warning signs can be obvious, as in the case of Rwanda, where NGO personnel had clear clues through public address announcements days before the killing began.

The U.N. Office of the Special Advisor is among those attempting to obtain information on warning signs. The office’s “responsibility to protect” protocol indicates that efforts to obtain within-system signs must be complemented by extraordinary efforts to obtain warning signs of impending genocide from farther afield. Therefore, it is helpful when civil society organizations transmit to the office warning signs of growing ethnic unrest, displays of group hatred, discrimination, or the ethnic, racial, national or religious dimension of human rights violations. Although it is difficult to provide an exhaustive list of warning signs indicating the impending development of genocide, the elements listed are indicative of situations requiring careful monitoring. This list is drawn from, and inspired by, the existing literature on genocide activities and prevention, as well as from the practices of the Office of the Special Adviser in recent years.

**The existence of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group(s) at risk:** Warning signs can be (a) a pattern of discrimination with the purpose or effect of impairing the enjoyment of certain human rights; (b) exclusionary ideologies that
purport to justify discrimination; (c) specific identification of groups and their association with a specific political identity or opinion (including possible compulsory identification or registering of group membership in a way that could potentially lead to the group being targeted in the future); and (d) demonization of groups in political or social discourse.

Violations of human rights and humanitarian law, which may become massive or serious: These violations can include (a) armed conflict in which violations of international humanitarian law disproportionately affect a specific group (e.g., intentional massacre of unarmed civilians, civilian targeting during military campaigns, one-sided physical brutality); (b) violations of civil and political rights affecting a specific group (e.g., murder, particularly directed against community leaders; torture, mutilation, rape and sexual violence; abduction; forcible population movement/ethnic cleansing; expropriation, destruction of property, and looting; lack of freedom of speech/press/assembly/religious expression); (c) violations of economic, social and cultural rights (e.g., destruction of subsistence food supply, denial of water or medical attention, human-made famine, redirection of aid supplies); (d) instances of discrimination (e.g., access to work and resources, political marginalization, restricted movement, education); and (e) a climate of impunity in which these events unfold.

Additional warning signs: Also to be considered are (a) a lack of institutional framework for citizens to seek justice, redress and demand accountability; (b) concentration of power (economic/political) in one or a few groups to the detriment of others; (c) existence of and support to militias that could carry out attacks against groups by proxy; (d) perceived or real external support to groups that could become targets due to being seen as “collaborators” with external enemies; (e) withdrawal of rights associated with citizenship from specific groups; (f) hate speech, incitement to violence, or humiliation of a group in the media; and (g) forced relocations, segregation, isolation, or concentration of a group. Certain of these warning signs “overlap” with those listed earlier.

A history of genocide or discrimination: A history of violence against a group may presage renewed episodes of repression or counter-movements against prior oppressors. Important elements that may indicate the weight of past experience are (a) a history of vilification or dehumanization of a group; (b) the use of symbols, flags or markings to conjure previous abuse; (c) denial of past atrocities and genocides; and (d) celebration of instances of perceived or actual abuse of a group.

This list of warning signs is by no means exhaustive. Taken independently, each of the warning signs noted above may be of concern, but not necessarily indicative of a genocidal situation. The predictive value of these factors is most often a function of their interplay and aggregate in a given situation. Nonetheless, when a number of these warning signs are present, the Special Adviser is alerted so as to monitor the situation and give consideration to specific preventive measures.

II. Genocide: Case Studies

Iraq/Kurdistan. Synthesizing from among the definitions and analytic frameworks presented in the preceding section, the atrocities that impacted the Kurds can best be termed genocide. The Kurdish genocide generally refers to the murderous campaigns, including chemical attacks, known as Anfal (“The Spoils of War”) that took place in Iraq between February 23 and September 6 1988, although the Ba’athist government targeted Kurdish villages long before this time (Jones 2004). Approximately 3,000 villages were destroyed and 180,000 persons killed, including a large proportion of civilians. Nearly 1.5 million Kurds became refugees (Yildiz 2004: 25). Much of this horror stemmed from a policy of “Arabization.” “Ethnic cleansing [also] was a central aspect of Saddam’s Anfal campaigns against the Kurds. Moving the Kurdish population out of the area around the oil fields and repopulating those areas with Sunni Arabs occurred relentlessly during this time frame” (Kelly 2007: 241). As will be detailed below, the genocide of the Kurds included chemical attacks against entire villages, killing mostly civilians, the concentration of men,
women and children in concentration camps and mass, execution-style killings of mostly men but also women, children, and the elderly. All of these constitute acts of genocide, as previously defined — they aimed to destroy the Kurds as a people. Among the processes of special interest to anthropologists, following comments in the introduction to this article, are denial and victimization.

Power describes what happened to the Kurds as an ethnic-based genocide under the cover of a counter-insurgency campaign (2002:172). Thus, it might also be termed an ethnocide. However, scholars like Shaw refute this differentiation, calling it “superfluous to use a special term for the destruction of ethnic groups, when these are one of the principal types understood as targets of genocide” (Shaw 2007:65). Human Rights Watch/Middle East Watch reports show how at times only military-aged men and boys were targeted for mass executions, leaning towards the term “gendercide;” however, during other parts of the Anfal campaigns women and children were also targeted (Jones 2002). For this term, Shaw also has a sharp response: “That genocide is gendered…is an important insight. However, through this violence, the perpetrators usually intend to destroy not gender groups, but ethnic, national, and other groups that they have defined as enemies” (Shaw 2007:69). It is clear that many “-cides” are relevant to the Kurdish case, but few dispute that the aim was to destroy any semblance of Kurdish life from the northern, Kurdish region of Iraq. Hussein was in fact ultimately charged with crimes of genocide for what happened to the Kurds. Research on the Kurdish genocide stresses the intertwining relationship between genocide and the backdrop of war, as in many other instances of ethnic cleansing and ethnocide. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians “informally allied with Iraqi Kurds in the north – handily providing Hussein the excuse he needed to eradicate the Kurds as traitors” (Kelly 2007:236). By labeling them traitors and saboteurs, Hussein tried to legitimate their killing. In order to prove genocide, intent must be weighed thoroughly, and the Kurds had to have been targeted as Kurds, not simply as political traitors (Yildiz 2004:236).

Unfortunately, as in most genocides, the rest of the world did little to help the Kurds while they were being attacked with poison gas and shot dead by the thousands. Nobody documents this tragic and dangerous silence as extensively as Power (2002). Because of the war between Iran and Iraq, sides were chosen and most of the Western world, most notably the United States, sided with Iraq, leaving little room for criticism. In fact, the U.S. was aiding Iraq in many ways, including economically. The late Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island tried to speak up and intervene, creating a sanctions package against Hussein’s government, but most of the administration saw the matter as an “internal affair” (p. 173) and denied its importance. Power stresses that the U.S. government was anything but ignorant of the situation. Quoting a State Department office director for Iran and Iraq: “We knew that something dreadful was going on. We knew [Ali Hassan] al-Majid was running the show. We knew [Ali Hassan] al-Majid was running the show. We had the satellite overhead that showed the villages razed…widespread destruction and bulldozing of Kurdish villages, mass forced displacement of Kurds…” (p. 186).

Not only did the United States know, it chose to do nothing, seemingly putting its political and economic interests above the lives of innocents. “[I]t appears that U.S. and British intelligence agencies did indeed have a fairly clear idea of what was happening [but] clearly realized that forthright public condemnation would be bad for business and kept silent” (Yildiz 2004:32). Power comments extensively on the silence of the U.S. when reports – received via refugees in Turkey and other surrounding areas – concluded that Iraq was using chemical weapons on the Kurds. This inaction provided a *carte blanche* to those in power, knowing they could proceed with relative impunity, facing few consequences.

Finally, when a refugee crisis began to unfold, with hundreds of thousands of Kurds fleeing across the borders to Turkey and other surrounding countries, the United States and its allies took initiative. On August 16, 1991, “Operation Provide Comfort” was launched. This was four years after the Anfal campaign, which opened up a “safe haven” for Kurds in northern Iraq (Power 2002:241). More a response to the refugee problem than to genocide, it did allow many Kurds to regain some semblance of hope.
Recently, forensic anthropologists and archaeologists – building on the helpful work of Human Rights Watch and other investigative teams – have more systematically surveyed and begun excavating some of the mass graves associated with the Anfal campaigns. Susan Malin-Boyce and Sonny Trimble are but two of many dedicated analysts who have worked on this, in their case since 2005 in the Hajara Desert in Iraq’s Muthanna Province (Pringle 2009).

Before his execution, Saddam Hussein was on trial for genocide, among other war crimes and crimes against humanity, along with al-Majid, or “Chemical Ali,” under the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (Yildiz 2004:131). Many other members of the Ba’athist regime in charge during the Anfal campaign remain to be tried, but al-Majid and Hussein were the only two to be specifically targeted for crimes of genocide (Kelly 2007:237). Considering the current security situation in Iraq, coupled with an uneven judicial structure, the success of the trials remains questionable.

Rwanda. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 led to the deaths of over 800,000, primarily Tutsi, people. The killing was systematic and state-sponsored, or, state-condoned. Among the processes of special interest to anthropologists are denial and reconciliation. The former is illustrated in the initial inaction of the international community, including the United States; the latter (discussed in the accompanying commentary by Josiah Marineau) is illustrated in the community-based gacaca courts, which still are processing cases.

The Hutu powerbase established themselves as the most efficient genocidal killers in history while primarily using simple weapons. The main means of warfare involved the use of grenades, bows and arrows, and machetes. The government compiled lists of Tutsis to kill by taking advantage of their highly structured government system; radio broadcasts compelled people to act. Administratively, the country was divided into five provinces, which were in turn divided into thirty districts, which were in turn divided into secteurs, which were in turn divided into cellules, which were in turn divided into Nyumbakumi. In Swahili, Nyumbakumi translates literally to mean “ten houses,” the smallest level to which governmental oversight pertains. This provided the government with a well established and straightforward means of documenting the location of every Tutsi.

As one respondent said, “The message from the top was passed down to the local village chiefs, the conseillers. The conseillers had lists of Tutsis who should be killed. They simply organized their constituents....The leaders of the party and the leaders of the militia rounded up all the men in the village. We were told that we had a mission. We were given a list of people to kill. If we met someone on the list, they would be killed” (Berkeley 2001:3). Genocides can be characterized – abstracted in a sense – by “touchstones.” These are events, often relatively small in scale but long remembered, indicative of the broader array of ominous happenings. In Rwanda, such a touchstone “unfolded” in Ntarama, a small village within the Nyamata district of Kigali province. In Ntarama there is a small church where roughly five thousand Tutsis gathered for protection. On April 15th, 1994, the interahamwe (i.e., genocidaires) gathered around the church building, smashed holes through the walls, and then launched grenades into the building, killing the majority of those inside. It is assumed, as was common, that the interahamwe then went through the church building with machetes making sure that no one was able to survive. Later, in order to mark the devastation, Rwandans decided to leave the bodies of all those who died in this church. Today, the skeletal remains have been rearranged, but the memorial remains, a site that one of the present authors visited. For the tenth anniversary of the massacre, in 2004, banners were hung which read, in Kinyarwandan (in rough translation), “If you had known me, and had truly known yourselves, you wouldn’t have killed me.”

Lessons and Outcomes

Many Rwandans thought that there was no one to help. The lesson of the bystander became painfully obvious.
It sometimes touched us painfully that they awaited death in silence. Evenings, we would ask over and over, “Why no protest from these people who are about to leave? Why do they not beg for mercy?” The organizers claimed that the Tutsis felt guilty for the sin of being Tutsi. Some interahamwe kept saying they felt responsible for the misfortunes they had brought upon us. Well, I knew that was not true. The Tutsis were not asking for anything in those fatal moments because they no longer believed in words. They had no more faith in crying out, like frightened animals, for example, howling to be heard above the mortal blows. An overpowering sorrow was carrying those people away. They felt so abandoned they did not even open their mouths (John Léopold quoted in Hatzfeld 2005:234).

Lessons learned, on the one hand, seem profound. Gripping books like that by Philip Gourevitch (1998) and Roméo Dallaire (2003) detail “process” as events transpired and “product” as the massacre concluded, respectively. On the other hand, the lessons seem to exist only in the abstract when the current situation in Darfur is considered. That Rwandan President Paul Kagame demonstrates subtle yet persuasive abilities to effect change, aided by former U.S. President Bill Clinton and other leaders, offers a positive outcome. A wide-ranging process of reconciliation (although yielding mixed results) is occurring through the community-run gacaca courts, and for some has enabled another positive outcome: reconciliation among perpetrators and their victims’ families.

III. Ethnic Cleansing: Case Studies

As Kiernan (2007:16) stresses, ethnic cleansing is a concept that overlaps with the concepts of genocide and genocidal massacre. Its applicability to particular settings and events is more widely debated, and more widely disputed, than is the concept of genocide. To view particular events as ethnic cleansing it is important to examine several definitions of the term. The term originated in the Balkans, likely Croatia or Bosnia (ciscenje, cleansing), as early as the immediate post-World War II period, and was couched in the language of the perpetrators directed against their perceived enemies – who needed to be cleansed from the territory (Van Arsdale 2006:72; Shaw 2007:49). In response to the events in the Balkans U.N. Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki suggested ethnic cleansing to be “the elimination by the ethnic group exerting control over a given territory of members of other ethnic groups” (Shaw 2007:50). A 1993 Committee of Experts described it as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force and intimidation to remove persons of a given group from the area” (Shaw 2007:50). The AAA’s Committee for Human Rights (2001) noted that ethnic cleansing likely is not what happens during the course of “normal” warfare where the conflict is not primarily ethnic or where enslavement (as opposed to elimination of the ethnic group or its culture) predominates. Forcible economic removal of a group also does not constitute ethnic cleansing. Ilan Pappe, an outspoken Israeli “new historian,” cites Drazen’s definition as “a well defined policy of a particular group of persons to systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin…. [It] involves violence and is very often connected with military operations…from discrimination to extermination, and entails violations of human rights and international humanitarian law....” (2006:1).

Palestine/Israel. Cases involving ethnic cleansing are among the most contentious being analyzed by academics and activists alike. None is more controversial than that involving Palestine and Israel. This is one reason this situation is included here. Processes of expulsion and intrusion, of special interest to anthropologists owing to their understandings of migration and forcible displacement, are identified briefly.

“Very little is said about what Zionism entailed for non-Jews who happened to have encountered it...” (Said 2000:15). While the embers continue to spark in the Middle East and the modern state of Israel remains
undeniably at continuous risk, the question of ethnic cleansing here refers to the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, the resultant war, and the creation of a huge number of Palestinian refugees. Israeli historian Benny Morris, part of a growing cadre in Israel called the “new historians,” encapsulates the issue in very simple terms: How did hundreds of thousands of people become refugees in 1948 (Morris 2004:2)? From the Jewish perspective, a homeland was needed, especially after experiencing the worst form of anti-Semitism to take place in history during the Holocaust. But, as recognized by Said and many other Palestinians, “What we will discover is that everything positive from the Zionist standpoint looked absolutely negative from the perspective of the native Arab Palestinians” (Said 2000:31). One way of understanding the events that led to a Jewish state but a major Palestinian exodus is to view them, according to Pappe, within a paradigm of ethnic cleansing beyond just war. In fact, the Hebrew word for exodus, tihur, actually translates more closely to cleaning or purifying (Shaw 2007:59).

Evidence of ethnic cleansing in Palestine/Israel is suggested by the fact that within just a few months, in the benchmark year of 1948, after the State of Israel was proclaimed, the demographic profile of the land changed from being majority-dominated Palestinian to Jewish. In order to create a Jewish homeland, ruled by and populated by Jews, it was necessary in the eyes of early Zionist leaders to de-Arabize the land. Generations-old Palestinian villages were destroyed or renamed and re-populated by Jewish immigrants and refugees. Expulsions impacted thousands. What some have described as a genocidal massacre, aimed at ethnic cleansing, took place at Deir Yassin. Jewish forces killed several hundred men, women and children, most of whom were innocent civilians and non-combatants (Shipler 2002:20). It should be stressed that many historians claim it was an aberration of Jewish policy, committed by Jewish terrorist groups without the sanction of the Yishuv or Haganah, and thus was not indicative of policy. After an initial bout of random, indiscriminate shootings, several villagers were rounded up and shot execution style (Pappe 2006:90). While Deir Yassin was not the only massacre by Jewish forces, including the Haganah, it was not the sole cause of Palestinian flight. As word got around many other villages evacuated in fear of similar atrocities (Morris 2004:125). In recent years, some official responsibility has been admitted by the Israeli government. The Palestinian narrative indicates a number of other “Deir Yassins” also occurred.

Beyond the expulsion and exodus of the Palestinians, there remained a second part to the possible ethnic cleansing within Palestine/Israel. Even before the war came to an end, many Palestinian refugees wished to return to their lands and homes, and thus, Israel began a strenuous effort to prevent this from happening. The homogenous Jewish state envisioned by Jewish leaders would not be undermined by the acceptance of refugee returns (Morris 2004:312). U.N. Resolution 194, which allowed Palestinian refugees the right of return or just compensation, was not adhered to by the Jewish state (Pappe 2006:188). At that time, while many Israeli Jews strongly emphasized that the cause of the refugee crisis was rooted in the war and Arab propaganda, they saw part of the solution to their unease in the existence of a large “pacified Arab minority,” implicitly countering substantial refugee returns. Certain guidelines were laid out to ensure this. These included destruction of property formerly inhabited by Arabs, prevention of land cultivation, large-scale Jewish settlement in the “empty” areas, and legislation explicitly prohibiting return (Morris 2004:313). These are forms of intrusion.

During the period November 1947 through July 1949, the main exodus of the Palestinians took place (Morris 2004:6). It was not just for reasons of war and generalized insecurity that many of these people fled, but rather for reasons also questioned by Said and Pappe: “How was the Zionist movement to turn Palestine into a ‘Jewish’ state if the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants were Arabs?” (Morris 2004:40). Morris argues that “the logic of a transfer solution to the ‘Arab problem’ remained
ineluctable; without some sort of massive displacement of Arabs from the area of the Jewish state-to-be, there could be no viable Jewish state” (Shaw 2007:58-59). Over 500 Arab villages were depopulated of Arabs and two-thirds of the Palestinian population (approximately 800,000) had been driven out by late 1948, a benchmark year as previously noted (Said 2004:345). Most “new historians” refer to Tichot Dalet or Plan D, which evolved from a Haganah military strategy linked to a decision effecting the fate of the Palestinians. The rapid creation of hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs means, to some analysts, that ethnic cleansing was clearly underway.

**Bosnia.** Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia involved more than the extermination of a group of people (a form of genocide); it was an effort to eradicate members of a sub-culture through mass murder, forcible displacement, and subjugation. For example, a “touchstone” occurred as Serbs conquered the Muslim majority-populated town of Zvornik during the 1992–1995 war. Besides “cleansing” the area of Muslims, Serbs spoke of renaming the town “Zvonik,” the proper Serb name. Besides their renaming campaign, Serb forces managed to destroy hundreds of mosques, here and elsewhere. In the Krajina region alone, roughly nine hundred mosques had been demolished by the winter of 1994 (Rieff 1995:97). In the summer of 1992, Serb forces attempted to deport the entire Muslim community of Kozluk to Hungary. Eighteen hundred Muslims spent four days on an eighteen-car train, but were denied entrance into Hungary upon arrival at the border. They were later sent to Palic, a camp for Muslims.

According to a spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Serb forces commonly utilized deportation tactics against Muslim communities (Gutman 1993:50-51; Van Arsdale 2006:73-77). Impregnation by rape was a systematic tactic of the Bosnian war. As a form of psychological warfare, some women were forced to carry the offspring of their enemy. When a raped woman conceived a “Serbian” child, she lost a part of her ethnic and cultural identity. The woman was left to deal with the shame, and in many cases her husband or family had to deal with the guilt of being unable to seek retribution. In addition, during house raids and in detention camps, troops forced family members to sexually abuse each other. Between 1992-1995, it is estimated that 20,000 women were sexually assaulted or raped (Farr 2005:174).

“To have been raped as part of the policy of genocidal rape, and to be allowed to survive, is meant to represent a destiny scarcely referable to that of being killed after the rapes; it is tantamount to having been marked so thoroughly – on body and mind – by one’s victimization” (Vetlesen 2005:197).

The conditions at concentration camps were unbearable and inhumane. People were allotted one meal a day, which was often
infested with worms. Many suffered from dysentery because of the lack of potable water. It is recorded that some detainees lost up to 50 kilograms during their detainment. In the Omarska camp, southeast of Prijedor, prisoners were divided into three groups: the elite, which included doctors, businessmen, teachers, lawyers, clergy, et al.; prisoners of war; and prisoners classified as harmless to the Serb population. There were two torture and execution chambers at Omarska, the white house and the red house. Torture methods including flogging with pick-handles and iron bars, often aiming at the head, spine, kidneys, and genitals (Wesselingh 2005:53). Torture is ubiquitous to the experiences of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and ethnocide.

Raphael Lemkin, the scholar whose work was noted earlier, indicated that genocide has two distinctive phases. The first phase includes the “destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group” and the second phase, “the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” (Vetlesen 2005:155). By the summer of 1992, many areas throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina were under siege by the Yugoslav/Serbian army (Lovrenovic 2001:196). Their forces bombarded cities and towns throughout Bosnia, terrorizing the population. The occupying army controlled civilian life: Food was scarce; people had little, if any, money to buy necessities; and if fortunate enough, electricity, water and gas were rationed. In cities such as Sarajevo and Mostar, innocent civilians were confined to their apartments by daily shelling and patrolling snipers. Degrading captivity and imprisonment became widespread warfare tactics until the occupying soldiers mandated measures for the disposal and exile of some members of opposing ethnic groups.

During a typical siege, those who remained in bombarded towns were left with scarce and meager supplies, which eventually ran out. As one survivor recalls: “We were at the edge of our endurance, pushing back limits that the day before we had considered as final. We woke up miserable, in cold rooms with window-panes made out of plastic bags in windows covered by split logs protecting us against shell shrapnel. We woke up exhausted and lice-ridden, without the desire and most often without even the strength to move, without families, alone and abandoned, humiliated, our past violated and our future slaughtered, our present defeated and defeating” (Suljagic 2005: 87).

Intervention is a process of more recent interest to anthropologists, especially in light of post-1990 instances of military-civilian cooperation as aid is being delivered to displaced populations. The case of Bosnia suggests that intervention sometimes best can be understood as its obverse, non-intervention, is considered. The July 1995 massacre of Muslims at Srebrenica correlates with the non-intervention of U.N.-sponsored Dutch peacekeepers who were based in this so-called “safe haven.” Some analysts believe that a forceful response to early Serb provocations might have averted the tragedy. Useful discussions of humanitarian intervention subsequently ensued (Van Arsdale 2006), helping shape present considerations of military roles in such crises.

Lessons and Outcomes

Palestine/Israel. One lesson of the Palestine/Israeli case is the importance of narrative considered in the context of denial. There is the Palestinian narrative and the Israeli narrative (each with variations). As more military documents are unveiled it is becoming apparent that, perhaps, the Palestinian narrative is relatively accurate. From an administrative viewpoint, Israel functions in part through denial. The “new historians,” like Benny Morris, have introduced a shift in the traditional Israeli creation narrative. This shift ranges from acceptance that the creation of Israel caused a great deal of suffering for the Palestinians, to a view illuminated by Ilan Pappe, that there was a designed plan of ethnic cleansing on the part of some early Israeli leaders. Until the mid-1990s this topic was considered taboo – off limits – for re-evaluation. Now that additional military documents are available for public scrutiny, however, academics have taken the opportunity to “go back to 1948”
and deconstruct certain claims. Some have advocated for the insertion of the term “Al Nakhba” (“The Catastrophe”) into Israeli secondary school text books. Although their viewpoints and theses vary, the “new historians” all share one perspective in common: Israel is responsible for much of the Palestinian suffering and the refugee problem.

**Bosnia.** As bystanders to the atrocities in Bosnia, the international community accepted the genocidal notion of “collective identity counts for everything and individual identity for nothing,” as outlined by Arne Johan Vetlesen, author of *Evil and Human Agency* (2005:155). Despite limited economic interest, the United States had no immediate *casus belli*. Furthermore, the U.S. was hesitant to intervene in what was seemingly an ethnic war, particularly in light of the Rwandan failure. A failure to examine the root causes of the conflict led Western powers to respond with ineffective solutions. For example, an arms embargo mandated by the United Nations in September of 1991 was never lifted, which restricted the Bosnian Croat defense. This left the well-equipped Serbian forces to easily overwhelm the country (Malcolm 1994:242-243). The rising concerns over genocide prompted the West to send in United Nations peacekeeping officers; however, due to their limited mandate, U.N. forces were powerless to prevent the genocide, serving merely as witnesses to the continuing violence. In fact, some were eventually taken as hostages by the Serb army to ward off air strikes (Soeters 2005).

Regardless of the Western governments’ increased role during the concluding months of combat, their intervention strategies lacked substance. The tactics developed by the West to halt further carnage were inadequate. Furthermore, several policies actually exacerbated the situation for the participating republics. In order to control the genocidal violence, international representatives moved Bosnian refugees to camps outside of Bosnia and created safe havens for Muslim communities remaining in the country.

As noted above for Srebrenica, U.N. peacekeeping forces were charged with guarding the designated areas. However, their rules of engagement strictly mandated counterforce only when the U.N. forces themselves were attacked, not those under their protection. These ineffective steps did little to mitigate the ongoing violence and, in fact, the situation escalated. The strategic placement of U.N. peacekeepers did not impede the Serb military agenda. The majority of peacekeepers were placed in areas designated and controlled by Croats and Bosniacs. Consequently, heavily armed conflict was elevated to high levels of brutality (Malcolm 1994:241-247).

When international communities acknowledged the emergence of separate sovereign states, particularly Croatia and Slovenia, the intrastate conflict escalated into interstate war. Moreover, the recognition of new states and the open discussion of ethnic groups’ needs by the international community contributed to a divisive discourse. During the final stages of the war, international forces did intervene effectively, but only after violence again had peaked (Lobell and Mauceri 2004).

**IV. Ethnocide: Case Study**

According to the Northwest Center for Holocaust, Genocide, and Ethnocide Education at Western Washington University, the term ethnocide was first used by Raphael Lemkin in the book noted earlier, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944), as an alternative to the term genocide to “refer to the physical, biological, and cultural dimensions of genocide.” However, it was the French ethnographer Pierre Clastres who defined ethnocide as “the systematic destruction of the thought and way of life of people different from those which carry out the destruction” (Northwest Center 2007:1). According to Clastres’ definition, ethnocide can occur without the intent to completely destroy a specific group of people. Ethnocide and genocide can take place concurrently. Although the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not mention the term ethnocide, two genocidal measures – imposing practices intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring
children to another group – can also be present in ethnocide, since both contribute to the destruction of a particular way of life by severing the bonds of family.

**Cambodia.** Events in Cambodia at the hands of the communist Khmer Rouge regime serve as an example of planned ethnocide being implemented along with genocide. Expulsion, intrusion, and reconciliation are three processes of importance to anthropologists that briefly are illustrated.

In April of 1975 the Khmer Rouge invaded the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh after defeating the Lon Nol government (backed by the United States) in a protracted five-year civil war. After years of violence stemming from the civil war and the presence of U.S. military (due to its war with Vietnam), the new Communist regime was welcome. One Cambodian survivor, Teeda Butt Mam, who was fifteen when the Khmer Rouge came to power remembers that she was “overwhelmed with joy” that the war had finally ended and that it did not matter who the victor was (between the Khmer Rouge revolutionaries and the Lon Nol government) just so long as peace was reinstated in her homeland (Pran 1997). Little did she know, that what was to follow would prove to be a horrific and terrifying reign of genocide and ethnocide. During the course of the Khmer Rouge reign, an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians would die by execution, malnutrition, or overwork (Tully 2005). Post 1979, the name Cambodia would become synonymous with mass death as evidence of the infamous “killing fields” (so named by the late Dith Pran) and “re-education” centers were uncovered.

Pol Pot’s vision for Cambodia was to create a “utopian” society with one culture. In order to create this utopia, those cultural values and traditions which threatened his vision were to be eradicated. The shift to a new society began immediately upon his takeover. Among the actions with “ethnocidal intent” were expulsion and evacuation of most people from all larger towns; abolition of markets; defrocking all Buddhist monks; and establishing high-level cooperatives throughout the country, with communal eating featured (Tully 2005; Kiernan 2007). Each one of these actions contributed to ethnocide as the perpetrators forcibly shifted the Cambodian population from one way of life to another.

Details on the systematic murder and re-education of the educated and artistic population further exemplify ethnocide. (It should be noted that re-education is a type of intrusion.) These individuals serve as culture bearers in a given community. Teachers share the collective history; artists share the collective cultural aesthetic. Sophiline Cheam Shapiro, a child survivor of the Cambodian horror who was forced into labor, recalls being taught special songs of the Khmer Rouge. Filled with propaganda favoring the communist regime, these songs were to replace any others previously celebrated by the Cambodian community. Shapiro remembers that the music sung by the Khmer Rouge celebrated the countryside and hard labor while denigrating the value of passion. One song, *Angka Dar Qotdam* (The Great Angka; Angka is the name given to the Khmer Rouge politburo) demonstrated how the Khmer Rouge regime intruded a new way of life in which a child’s family was no longer their mother and father, but rather, the Great Angka. Lyrics included, “We children love Angka limitlessly…. Before the revolution, children were poor and lived like animals…. Now Angka brings us good health, strength.” However, a true survivor, Sophiline returned to Phnom Penh in 1979 and enrolled in the reopened School of Fine Arts, where she later joined the faculty. In this way, she contributed to reconciliation. She moved to the United States and continued to teach Cambodian classical dance (Pran 1997).

Members of the opposition as well as the academic community were rounded up and either sent to prisons for “reeducation” or killed on the spot. Children were separated from their families and instructed to now consider Angka their family while forced into hard labor (Pran 1997). One survivor, Ouk Villa, tells of how his father was sent to be “reeducated,” his mother was sent to dig canals, and his sisters were sent to the mobile youth group. Ouk Villa was forced into a child group center where he was made to carry manure to the rice fields. He noted that children were kicked and pulled by the unit leaders, never receiving a substantive education (Pran 1997).
Lessons and Outcomes

Since the Holocaust and the births of the terms genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing, the world has had a track record of being slow to react. The genocide and ethnocide in Cambodia is no exception. In her book, *A Problem from Hell* (2002), Samantha Power addresses the lack of action by the United States when faced with the tragedies of Cambodians. Preliminary information was available to the Western world as early as June 1973, when Kenneth Quinn, a U.S. Foreign Service officer, reported on the systematic burning of Cambodian villages. Quinn then conducted further firsthand research into the situation. In February 1974 he submitted a report to Washington comparing the mounting Khmer Rouge programs with the Nazi regime (Power 2002). This type of comparison would prove to be a common tactic by American activists who sought intervention in Cambodia. The U.S. chose not to become involved until President Jimmy Carter finally made a plea to Amnesty International to conduct an investigation of human rights abuses there. Many scholars and activists believed the American government had a responsibility to respond to the atrocities in Cambodia, especially in light of the role it had played in creating an environment conducive to the rise of the totalitarian Khmer Rouge regime.

Through 2007, surviving Khmer Rouge, including Nuon Chea (“brother number two”), continued to deny any wrongdoing in the mass murder and ethnocide in Cambodia (Van Arsdale et al. 2007). While this comes as no surprise, the long-term denial of the existence of genocide in Cambodia by western superpowers presented a particular problem to those promoting long-term assistance in post-genocide healing. It was not until July, 1990, that the United States implemented a new policy to vote against the Khmer Rouge coalition at the United Nations (Power 2002). Despite the scale of regime-perpetrated death, the U.S. opposed the use of the term genocide in describing the situation in Cambodia during the 1991 Paris peace accords negotiation (which had the intention of bringing peace between Viet Nam and the Khmer Rouge coalition). At the time of the accords, Cambodia was no longer isolated to the international community, and in fact many visitors had already seen the aftermath of the genocide at places like the brutal Tuol Sleng (S-21) prison and in the “killing fields” directly.

V. The State’s Role

The highest authorities corrupted a war based on grudges piled up since the Tutsi kings and turned it into a genocide. We were overwhelmed. We found ourselves faced with a done deal we had to get done, if I may put it that way. When the [Rwandan] genocide came from Kigali, taking us by surprise, I never flinched. I thought, If the authorities opted for this choice, there’s no reason to sidestep the issue. (Joseph-Désiré Bitero quoted in Hatzfeld 2005: 177).

State actors played significant roles in the implementation of genocide, ethnocide and ethnic cleansing as illustrated in these five cases. One major theme that encompasses each case is the overwhelming power and control of totalitarian (and often corrupt) regimes to ignite and execute plans that forced thousands to flee, suffer in their homelands, or become victims of massive atrocities.

“New People” vs. “Old People” and Forced Migration. A strategy of the Khmer Rouge in eradicating a specific way of life was to “reorganize” the Cambodian population into categories of “new” and “old” people. New people were those not living in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas prior to April 1975. Old people were those who had been living in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas during the civil war. Others who were defined as new were those who were regarded as the enemy: members of the old regime, the educated, Vietnamese, Muslim, Cham, Buddhist monks, and other “bourgeois elements” (Hinton 2005). Many new people were living in the urban areas of Cambodia, which were considered hotbeds of counterrevolutionary forces (Tully 2005). Thus the forced migration of city dwellers from Phnom Penh was seen as necessary to preventing resistance as well as part of the
process for changing Cambodian lifeways. The “new” people had fewer rights than the “old” people and were stripped of their humanity. Survivor Teeda Butt Mam stresses that after being subjected to horrid conditions of forced labor and inadequate food, clothing, and medical care, as well as the constant fear of being disappeared or sent to be “re-educated,” she lost her sense of self. She recalls, “We not only lost our identities, but we lost our pride, our senses, our religion, our loved ones, our souls, ourselves” (Pran, 1997). This same sentiment is echoed by Hinton in his book, *Why Did They Kill?* He notes that new people were considered less than human and were treated as such. Long work hours, starvation rations, and lack of freedom erased their humanity (Hinton 2005). The dehumanization of a specific group by the state is a typical tactic in genocide to lessen the perceived moral implications of mass murder for the perpetrators. In the case of Cambodia, the dehumanization tactic was also useful in forcing the eradication of particular cultural practices, contributing to ethnocide.

*The Ram Plan.* The so-called 1991 Ram Plan reflected a strategy utilized by Serbian authorities to carry out an ethnic cleansing of Bosniacs in Yugoslavia. Created under General Blagoje Adzic and executed by President Slobodan Milosevic, the Ram Plan stated:

> Our analysis of the behavior of the Muslim communities demonstrates that the morale, will and bellicose nature of their groups can be undermined only if we aim our action at the point where the religious and social structure is most fragile. We refer to the women, especially adolescents, and to the children... we have determined that the coordination between decisive interventions and a well-planned information campaign can provoke the spontaneous flight of many communities (Vetlesen 2005:189).

In addition to the Ram Plan, that same year Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman met in Karadordevo to discuss the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They concluded that Bosnia needed to be divided in order to prevent further warfare in the region (Glenny 1992:149).

State-sponsored propaganda played a vital role in supporting ethnic bigotry. Incentives were offered to solicit national support. Those who did not comply with national authority were threatened with the possibility of a draft. During the early stages of the war, propaganda promoted economic nationalism; however, within months, this was transformed into political nationalism, and in turn, ethnic cleansing. The Serbian media propagated the term ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian war to enhance the development of “Greater Serbia.” The term “had militaristic connotations that were expedient for nationalist efforts to claim territory within a society made increasingly paranoid by propaganda that equated ethnic difference with potential violence” (Flint 2005:182). According to Michael Sells, author of *The Bridge Betrayed*, “the charge of genocide became a signal to begin genocide” (Vetlesen 2005:151). Concurrent with an imminent Serbian-led massacre, the media would broadcast new accusations of anti-Serbian activities by Muslims and Croats. This justified the premeditated aggression of Serbian forces as retaliatory self-defense.

The struggle for power following the fall of nationalism in the Balkans exacerbated ethnic cleansing in the region. Serbian elites sought to demobilize the population and expel those who were calling for reform in government. In addition, Serbia sought ultimate supremacy with a new state centralized around Belgrade, the capital. Milosevic convinced the general public they were fighting evil enemies: Muslim fundamentalists and Croatian Ustasha fighters, the latter of whom “had served under Hitler.” This tactic fostered fear as well as utilized “Serbophobia” in order to depict Serbs as victims, not aggressors (Vetlesen 2005:178).

In the case of Croatia, the ruling elite wanted to maintain autonomy and avoid any radical movement toward democracy. As a result, a gruesome attempt to maintain absolute power in the hands of the extremists and conservative elites in Croatia and Serbia began. Franjo Tudjman ordered attacks on regions of ethnically diverse Croats and Muslims in order to clear areas for “homogenous Croats” in Herzegovina. The ultimate goal was to separate Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly, Serbian guerrillas were
sent into multi-ethnic areas to execute massive killings for the creation of a homogenous Serbian republic in Bosnia.

**Decree No. 160 - Revolutionary Command Council.** Unlike Cambodia, Rwanda, or Bosnia, the genocide of the Kurds was not characterized by a “neighbor-against-neighbor” scenario. The attempt to destroy Kurdish life and culture was directed from the very top echelons of the Iraqi government. It was Ali Hassan al-Majid who was given free reign by his cousin Saddam Hussein over the Northern Bureau administrative region (which included Iraqi Kurdistan) by Decree No. 160 of the “Revolutionary Command Council” in 1987 (Yildiz 2004:25). The primary goal was to “solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs” (Power 2002:171). The Iraqi army, under the command of Hussein and al-Majid, was responsible for the major destruction of the Kurdish areas. Middle East Watch does note that the government had received cooperation from many regional and local units, including pro-Iraq Kurdish forces (Gendercide Watch 1988). There was little public incitement against the Kurds and few average, unarmed Iraqis played a role in the killings.

Middle East Watch notes the clear path to destruction by the state by using an illustration of ethnic cleansing/genocide produced by Hilberg, in which the following steps are taken: Definition, concentration and annihilation (Middle East Watch 1993:8). The Ba’athist regime carried out each step in perfect sequence. The Kurds were first defined as traitors and then prohibited from remaining in their villages. “[All] those who still lived and farmed in the Kurdish mountains would be considered as active enemies of the state by virtue of nothing more than their ethnicity and physical presence in their ancestral homeland” (1993:50). The next step-concentration-was soon to follow. The presence of concentration camps such as Topwaza and the conditions described inside, dispel any notion that Anfal was just a counter-insurgency campaign (1993:209). Middle East Watch describes the brutal imagery:

Men and women were segregated on the spot as soon as the trucks had rolled to a halt in the base’s large central courtyard or parade ground. The process was brutal ... A little later, the men were further divided by age, small children were kept with their mothers, and the elderly and infirm were shunted off to separate quarters. Men and teenage boys considered to be of an age to use a weapon were herded together (1993:209).

Other camps, such as Tikrit, Dibs (the women’s camp), and Nugra Salman (for the elderly), manifested similar horrors:

In all camps, prisoners of both sexes and all ages were regularly beaten and rations were pitiful to the extent that some, especially the elderly and the young, died of starvation. Mothers were separated from children. Many were taken away, blindfolded and handcuffed, never to be seen by their relatives again (Yildiz 2004:29).

The final step, destruction, included mass murders and chemical attacks. Recent forensic investigations both before and after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq have unearthed several mass graves containing the bodies of victims demonstrating “firing squad-type” killing (Kelly 2007:240). Middle East Watch has several documented cases of mass executions, not only of men and boys but of women and children too, particularly in the area of Germian, a portion of Iraqi Kurdistan (Yildiz 2004:29; Jones 2004). Estimates from mass grave discoveries made in 2003 suggest about 300,000 victims from 263 mass graves, with one grave alone containing approximately 2,000 bodies (Yildiz 2004:131).

Most notable about the Kurdish genocide, a point often cited, is the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi government on its own citizens. Although Hussein also targeted other groups, the Kurds were particularly targeted. The most infamous case (out of at least 40), itself often viewed as separate from the Anfal campaigns, is the attack on the town of Halabja, known as the Kurdish Hiroshima (Power 2002:189). Eye-witness reports mention unspeakable horrors of bodies being incinerated, eyes changing color, people dropping dead in hysterical fits. An estimated 4,000 to 7,000 people were killed (Yildiz 2004:28). All of the chemical attacks on Kurdish villages were committed under the
command and support of Hussein and al-Majid, who (as previously noted) became known as “Chemical Ali” (Human Rights Watch 2006).

**Plan D.** The main bodies that oversaw the military and political activities of Israel early on were the Yishuv (Jewish government or “agency”) and the Haganah (Israeli army branch). There is ongoing debate over whether the Yishuv pre-planned the massive depopulation of Arabs from the new state. Most of the research on the major evacuations and expulsions of the Palestinians focuses on Plan D. Referring to this plan, Pappe describes the clear guidelines for Haganah military operations, which went beyond mere defensive strategies:

> These operations can be carried out in the following manner: either by destroying villages (by setting fire to them, by blowing them up, and by planting mines in their debris) and especially of those population centers which are difficult to control continuously; or by mounting combing and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the villages, conducting a search inside them. In the case of resistance, the armed forces must be wiped out and the population expelled outside the borders of the state (Pappe 2006:39).

Morris (2004) concludes in his research on the Palestinian refugee crisis that there was no clear-cut consensus on expulsion or “ethnic cleansing,” and that even Plan D did not outline a strategy for this. Rather, “transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism – because it sought to transform a land which was ‘Arab’ into a ‘Jewish’ state and a Jewish state could not have arisen without a major displacement of the Arab population” (Shaw 2007:59). From this perspective, threats by the surrounding Arab countries and the outbreak of war proved the “perfect alibi” for clearing space for more Jews. Pappe is more critical of the actions of the Haganah and the various results of the war, arguing:

> There may well be a master plan, but most of the troops engaged in ethnic cleansing do not need direct orders: they know beforehand what is expected of them. Massacres accompany the operations, but where they occur they are not part of a genocidal plan: they are a key tactic to accelerate the flight of the population earmarked for expulsion. Later on, the expelled are then erased from the country’s official and popular history and excised from its collective memory (Pappe 2006:3).

Pappe explicitly lays the responsibility at the feet of David Ben-Gurion and Yosef Weitz, a member of the settlement committee (Pappe 2006:23). In behind-the-scene meetings and discussions, many Jewish leaders supported – in some manifestation – the expulsion or transfer of the Palestinians. Ben-Gurion stated, “I support compulsory transfer. I don’t see in it anything immoral” (Morris 2004:50). It was not until after key battles in April, according to Morris, that he then “explicitly sanctioned the expulsion of Arabs from a whole area of Palestine...” (Morris 2004:240).

Avraham Ussishkin, who spoke at the Twentieth Zionist Congress, argued that: “We cannot start the Jewish state with...half the population being Arab.... Such a state cannot survive even half an hour. It [i.e., transfer] is the most moral thing to do... I am ready to come and defend...it before the Almighty” (Morris 2004:50). Many leaders supported the idea that Arabs should move voluntarily and be assisted by the Yishuv in doing so, but if resistance arose, they should be compelled or even forced to leave (Morris 2004:47). Transfer was seen by many as a humane response and participants in the Peel Commission, which established guidelines for a Jewish state, referred to the precedent of the Greco-Turkish transfers during the 1920s, which they deemed successful (Morris 2004:47). Yosef Weitz listed specific numbers for the ideal solution: “The Jewish state would not be able to exist with a large Arab minority. It must not amount to more than 12-15 percent of the total population.” He envisioned large-scale Jewish immigration as a way to ensure this ethnic landscape (Morris 2004:69). Further, some Jewish leaders favored “economically strangulating” the urban Arabs by destroying their infrastructure and livelihoods, including roads and ports (Morris 2004:67).
VI. Individual and Aggregate Responses: Victims, Survivors, Bystanders

Iraq/Kurdistan. “By the time the genocidal frenzy ended, 90% of Kurdish villages, and over twenty small towns and cities, had been wiped off the map. The countryside was riddled with fifteen million landmines, intended to make agriculture and husbandry impossible. A million and a half Kurdish peasants had been interned in camps.... About 10% of the total Kurdish population of Iraq had perished” (Jones 2004:325). The numbers of Anfal victims (including Halabja) were, at minimum, in the tens of thousands. Most sources mention the particular targeting of male Kurds and even go as far to say that the main purpose of the Anfal campaigns was to kill all military-age men in the Kurdish region (Jones 2004:321), a kind of gendercide. However, given the destruction caused by indiscriminate chemical attacks, concentration camps, mass killings of women and children, and forced depopulation, it also can be surmised that the purpose was to eliminate Kurdish life and culture totally. For the survivors, even after the campaigns were completed, an amnesty was granted, and refugees were allowed to return to certain areas in Iraqi Kurdistan (Yildiz 2004:30), the genocide cannot be forgotten. Thousands of women still have no knowledge of the whereabouts of their husbands, sons, or fathers. Issues of closure and proper burial according to Kurdish cultural norms are still being dealt with, almost twenty years later. The Special Rapporteur on Iraq stated: “The Anfal Operations constituted genocide type activities which did in fact result in the extermination of a part of this population and which continue to have an impact on the lives of the people as a whole” (Yildiz 2004:135).

Palestine/Israel. During the war of 1948, many Jews also died as a result of military operations and massacres. However, as Edward Said (2004, 2000) points out, the greatest injustice was done to the Palestinians for they lost most of their land and became refugees or IDPs, many remaining as such to this day. The creation of the state of Israel was tragic for the Palestinians. To say this is not to diminish the importance of having a homeland for the Jews. It means that the foundational stories and myths of Israel, as with many nations, must be reconciled with the victims of its glory, the victims of its creation. When understanding the great loss of the Palestinians it makes little sense to only listen to the political rhetoric of Israeli leaders but to also listen to the narratives of the victims. The “new historians,” such as Morris and Pappe, although differing in their approaches and levels of criticism, all seek to deconstruct history and undo certain myths. While the official story in Israeli text books describes the Arabs as fleeing on their own accord, it is becoming more apparent and even acceptable in mainstream Israel that many were indeed expelled by force (Pappe 2006:xv).

As genocide scholar Naimark says: “People do not leave their homes on their own...they resist” (Shaw 2007:53). Some claim that “the whole world was a bystander,” but within the region itself, many Palestinians themselves argue that other Arab countries did very little to help. Initially, most Jews within the region did not speak out because they were refugees themselves, fleeing pogroms, the Holocaust, or anti-Semitism in other Middle Eastern and European countries; their own sense of victimization was substantial. Many, who might have been sympathetic, knew little of the Palestinians plight until the 1970s or 1980s. The Yishuv initially had overwhelming support from the Western world, while by contrast the Palestinians had little support from the Western or Arab worlds; several Arab countries were hoping to claim certain areas for themselves (Morris 2004:34). Still reeling from the horrors of the Holocaust, much of the world saw no problem with the creation of a homeland for the Jews.

Rwanda. For many global citizens, the Rwandan genocide has become the international bellwether of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The tension between internal participation and external response largely defined this. Allison Des Forges presents a narrative dealing with the issue of popular participation in the Rwandan crisis:
But the people [genocide] tempters are the ones that just happen to live there. And I was there, at home, when the temptation came calling. I’m not saying I was forced by Satan and the like. Through greed and obedience I found the cause worthwhile, and I ran down to the marshes…. Simple people cannot resist a temptation like that, not without biblical rescue, not on the hills, anyway. Why? Because of the beautiful words of complete success. They win you over. Afterward the temptation cannot go to prison, so they imprison the people. And the temptation can certainly show up just as dreadful further along (1999:1).

Bill Berkeley quotes a person named Isadore, who had stared at him with tired, quizzical eyes: “I was very much surprised,” he said. “Looking at my neighbors, I thought they were friends. I was very much surprised that they were among the people who came to try to kill us” (Berkeley 2001:3).

**Bosnia.** In the case of Bosnia, perpetrators and victims were never strangers, but rather, neighbors, classmates, and comrades; there was a certain sense of “physical as well as psychic proximity” (Vetlesen 2005:190). In ethnically mixed towns and villages, Serb forces would enter, attack, and retreat to a Serb house. They would force the male of the house to shoot his Muslim neighbor. If he refused, they would kill him. They would repeat this tactic until a Serbian man carried out the act. This powerful strategy left empty flats, cars and other useful appliances to the remaining Serbian residents. Focused on their newly acquired goods, some Bosnian Serbs saw ethnic cleansing as beneficial, or at least were able to ignore the brutality with which these goods had been acquired (Vetlesen 2005:192-193).

**VII. A Moral Imperative**

The existence of a moral imperative, mandating action on behalf of the marginalized and abused, has been covered in detail by Van Arsdale (2006:182-190). Some would argue that there is a “moral imperative to continue the struggle against the denial of the crime” of genocide, ethnocide, or ethnic cleansing (Pappe 2006:xv). In the case of Palestine/Israel, the birth of the State of Israel carries with it two competing narratives: that of the winners, the Israelis, and that of the losers, the Palestinians. It is often said that the winners of wars are those who write the history books, and in Israel this has been the reality for many decades. Until recently, the idea that hundreds of thousands of people became stateless and homeless due to the acts of the early Jewish government and the Haganah was denied, suppressed, or ignored.

This now is changing. In the introductory chapter to his book, Pappe stresses the necessity of understanding these foundational myths and listening to the narrative of “the Other” in order to resolve the current combustible crisis in the Middle East. Edward Said suggests the following:

Might it not make sense for a group of respected historians and intellectuals, composed equally of Palestinians and Israelis, to hold a series of meetings to try to agree to a modicum of truth about this conflict, to see whether the known sources can guide the two sides to agree on a body of facts – who took what from whom, who did what to whom, and so on – which in turn might reveal a way out of the present impasse? (2004:349).

Usually, even after genocide is identified, as previously with Bosnia or currently with Darfur, a moral imperative to intervene is initially disregarded by the international community. Carl Dahlman, who has conducted research on Bosnia related to refugee return and reconstruction, commented on the insufficient response of the international community: “If genocide, clearly identified, is insufficient to trigger a humanitarian intervention, then all ‘lesser’ wrongs, including crimes against humanity, will never be met with substantive force, and this will signal to those regimes that make a policy of atrocities that no one will stop them” (Flint 2005:192). The international community could have prevented the conflict’s escalation had it been willing to respond sooner to undeniable atrocities. The horrors of Srebrenica that left nearly
8,000 Muslim men and boys dead likely could have been averted had warning signs been acted upon.

David Rieff, a journalist and author of Slaughterhouse (1995), claims: “Bosnia was and always will be a just cause. It should have been the West’s cause. To have intervened on the side of Bosnia would have been self-defense, not charity” (Reiff 2005:10). Bosnia represented a true multi-cultural state with a blending of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Prior to the war, Bosnian Serbs lived scattered across 95 percent of the land, Bosniacs 94.5 percent of the land, and Bosnian Croats 70 percent (Mahmutcehajic 2003:78).

The international community must be willing to take action when genocide and crimes against humanity are indisputable. If not, as Dahlman emphasizes above, humankind is justifying the unlawful acts of malicious regimes. Under the tenet of “never again,” Bosnians, Kurds, Rwandans, Cambodians, and Palestinians deserved a rapid response from the international community, either in the form of humanitarian aid or humanitarian intervention.

The Politics of Genocide

Congressman Hank Johnson (D – Georgia) was interviewed on National Public Radio on October 17 2007. His remarks provide as much insight into the conundrum that is genocide as any journal article, authoritative book, or video documentary. He originally had supported a U.S. House resolution formally condemning the indisputable Armenian genocide at the hands of the Turks some 90 years ago, but – along with a number of other congressmen – had changed his mind and decided to withdraw his support. His reasons had little to do with the factual circumstances of this particular genocide, which he believes did take place, but a great deal to do with politics. In his comments he emphasized security concerns. He stressed the need to extricate American military personnel safely from Iraq, linking this with U.S. security in the Middle East/S.W. Asian region, linking this in turn with the support being demonstrated by Turkey (a key ally). He cited communications he recently had had with Americans of Turkish decent who live in his district (while admitting to not having had any with Americans of Armenian decent). His tones were measured, his thoughtfulness apparent.

Also on October 17th, the Turkish parliament voted to authorize cross-border military attacks in northern Iraq against Kurdish separatist rebels. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also supportive of this resolution, pledged not to order immediate strikes. Parliamentarians expressed frustration that the United States and Iraq had not fulfilled promises to curb the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (the PKK), which some have classified as a terrorist organization.

A few days earlier, the U.S. House had begun debating a non-binding measure introduced by the House Foreign Relations Committee. It had voted to condemn as genocide the mass killings of Armenians in Turkey during World War I. (A similar stance had previously been taken by some French parliamentarians.) However, by October 18th, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi had come under increasing pressure from members of her Democratic caucus not to bring the resolution to a vote. While the resolution’s original supporters were not ready to concede defeat, the measure gradually lost momentum. The specter of realpolitik had emerged. In a sense, “the indisputable” had become “the disputable.”

VIII. The Role of Culture

It is dangerous and inaccurate to say that one particular culture is more prone to engaging in genocide, or that one particular culture bears the markers of genocidal tendencies. What is significant in looking at the role of culture in genocide is how members of that culture might change “the look” of the genocide or the specifics of how it is implemented. In the case of Cambodia, particular cultural practices and beliefs might have contributed to the way in which the genocide was carried out. Anthropologist Alexander Laban Hinton wrestles with these ideas in his book, Why Did They Kill? (2005) One instance includes the practice of disproportionate revenge, or “A head for an eye” in Cambodia. In short, this is a practice of exacting revenge on someone for a
wrong doing that does not match the wrongdoing committed. An example can be found in the manner in which the Khmer Rouge used class warfare and the Cambodian understanding of disproportionate revenge to indoctrinate Khmer youth into their movement. The use of propaganda found in songs and such sayings as, “To dig up grass, one must also dig up the roots” and the use of reclassification of individuals into new and old people (read “us vs. them,” creating “the Other”) contributed to the Khmer Rouge’s success at using “everyday, average” Cambodians to commit genocide (Hinton 2005).

An example of the practice of disproportionate revenge being used by the Khmer Rouge is told in the story of Neari, a survivor of the Cambodian genocide interviewed by Hinton. Neari’s father, mother, and three siblings were killed by the Khmer Rouge. Neari retold the story of her father’s death. He had been a teacher prior to the revolution who was “very strict…and would frequently hit his students in order to make them learn.” One particular student, Hean, was “lazy and disobedient and was beaten often.” Neari later learned that this same student executed her father, saying: “When you were my teacher, you beat me and made me hurt. Now, I will repay your ‘good’ deed in turn. I will kill and discard you, so that you can no longer be such a mean teacher” (Hinton 2005). The Khmer Rouge used the cultural practice of disproportionate revenge to encourage those like Hean, who felt they had been wronged, to carry out the genocide.

Are there cultures that are more disposed to commit genocide or genocidal acts? A less critical reading of the work of Daniel Goldhagen, author of *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* (1996), would suggest that there are. The role that everyday Germans played in the Holocaust is considered as a correlate of German culture. He implies that a kind of cultural determinism may exist. A convergence of perceived past or present injustice, disadvantageous resource access, discriminatory attitudes, and a leader’s supremacist ideology – reflecting “a culture” – therefore yields a targeted response: Genocide.

A more critical reading of Goldhagen’s work, considered in point-counterpoint fashion with that of Hinton (2005) and Power (2002), would suggest something very different. What, in fact, are central to the explanation are institutional factors shaped by dysfunctional state systems. Perceived threat by “the Other” is transformed through emergent policy into state-sanctioned, brutal action. Individual leaders (the arbiters/perpetrators of genocide) play to their opponents’ weaknesses and to their own desires to enhance oppressive power. Therefore, in the broadest sense, genocidal activity is about dysfunctional state systems, imbalanced power relationships, and oppressive institutions. It is not “about culture” or “about evil leaders.”

If culture can be defined as a group’s shared imagery of its past, present, and future; a shared (and often idealized) set of values; and a commonly accepted set of clustered behaviors, then “cultural interpretations” of genocide are possible: reflecting on a desired future, refining values contributing to social integrity, and altering unacceptable behaviors. The reification of “culture” is therefore avoided through careful anthropological analysis. Similarly, the reification of “genocide,” by the media and everyday public, is overcome by careful anthropological analysis. Demagogic ideologies and inaccurately portrayed histories can be dispelled; the charge of genocide need not equate with the act of genocide. This is where the discipline can make one of its strongest contributions.

The issue of “cultural disappearance” was noted early in this document. It is another arena where anthropologists can make substantial and innovative contributions as both researchers and advocates. State-sponsored programs of forced assimilation, as have occurred historically in the U.S. with Native Americans, or forced “villagization,” as have occurred more recently in Ethiopia with non-Amharic peoples, can result in the disappearance of core cultures. Systematic empirical documentation of these processes based upon on-site fieldwork and subsequent advocacy based upon the data obtained, build upon anthropology’s strengths.

The preoccupation of perpetrators of genocide with race, antiquity, agriculture, and expansion (following Kiernan 2007) was noted in the introduction, but not explored herein.
Despite criticisms leveled against these categories by the historian William McNeill (2008), they clearly also provide fertile ground for cultural anthropologists. For example, Liisa Malkki’s (1995) work on Hutu refugees in Tanzania probed the first two. Van Arsdale’s current work on Darfur is probing the second two, agriculture and expansion.

As the AAA’s draft statement on ethnic cleansing (2001) affirmed, a well-rounded concern with “things cultural” is beneficial as these issues are considered. Situating them cross-culturally is essential. Differing values can be debated, diversity in light of factionalization can be considered, and causes of ominous and horrific practices can be addressed. The legacies of colonialism, impacts of globalization, and roles of the military (especially in interaction with civilians) are central. Anthropologists are increasingly well-positioned to analyze human rights abuses and to advocate on behalf of those whose rights have been violated. As the AAA statement notes, there is no “magic theory.” There is, simply, an opportunity to contribute to a pragmatic humanitarianism.

“The cure and prevention of the crime of genocide must lie, at least in part, in the diagnosis of its recurring causes and symptoms” (Kiernan 2007:606).

Notes

1. The authors are indebted to Dr. Robert Albro, of American University’s School of International Service, and Dr. Arthur Gilbert, of the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies, for their critical readings of an earlier draft of this manuscript. Most of their suggestions were utilized; all were appreciated.

2. Peter Van Arsdale is Senior Lecturer at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He chairs the board of the Center for Cultural Dynamics based in Centennial, Colorado, and (in a consulting capacity) works as Senior Researcher with the firm eCrossCulture based in Boulder, Colorado. He earned his Ph.D. in Applied Cultural Anthropology from the University of Colorado at Boulder in 1975. He can be reached by mail at 7321 East Long Avenue, Centennial, CO 80112, by e-mail at pvanarsd@du.edu, and by telephone at 303-770-1612.

3. Mellissa Jessen is Assistant Director of the Jan and Bud Richter Center for Community Engagement and Service-Learning at California State University, Fresno. She holds an M.A. in International Human Rights from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (2007). She can be reached by mail at 2555 E. San Ramon Avenue M/S SB 120, Fresno, CA 93740-8034, by e-mail at mjessen@csufresno.edu, and by telephone at 559-278-6986.

4. Nicole Hawthorne is an Associate at RBI Strategies and Research, a political consulting firm in Denver, Colorado. She holds an M.A. in International Human Rights with a Specialization in Security from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (2009). She can be reached by mail at 1900 Grant Street, Suite 1170, Denver, CO 80203, by e-mail at niki@rbistrategies.com, and by telephone at 303-832-2444.

5. Kellie Ramirez is a part-time Assistant Education Coordinator for Lutheran Family Services of Colorado’s Refugee and Asylee Programs, based in Denver. She holds an M.A. in International Human Rights with a Certificate in Humanitarian Assistance from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (2008). She can be reached by mail at 3470 South Poplar Street #210, Denver, CO 80224, by e-mail at la_queli@hotmail.com, and by telephone at 402-730-2358.

6. Cathy Smith holds an M.A. in International Human Rights with a Certificate in Humanitarian Assistance from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (2008). During the summer of 2007, she directed field research addressing human rights violations committed by Israeli security forces against Palestinian political detainees while interning with Wi’am: Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center in the West Bank. She can be reached by mail at 221 Adrian Court, Lansdale, PA 19446, by e-mail at cathyleesmith@gmail.com, and by telephone at 215-429-9867.
References Cited and Consulted

AAA

AAA

Applebaum, Anne

Berkeley, Bill

Chalk, Frank and Kurt Jonassohn

Dallaire, Roméo

Des Forges, Allison

Dubinsky, Zach

Farr, Kathryn

Flint, Colin, editor

Gendercide Watch

Glenny, Misha

Goldhagen, Daniel J.

Gourevitch, Philip
1998 We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Gutman, Roy

Hatzfeld, Jean

Heidenrich, John G.

Hinton, Alexander Laban

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch

Ishay, Micheline

Jones, Adam

Judson, Olivia

Kelly, Michael J.

Kiernan, Ben


Scherrer, Christian P.  

Shaw, Martin  

Shelton, Dinah L., editor  

Shipler, David K.  

Soeters, Joseph  

Springer, Jane  

Suljagic, Emir  

Tebbs, Jan, editor  

Tully, John  

Van Arsdale, Peter W.  

Van Arsdale, Peter, Mellissa Jessen, Nicole Hawthorne, Kellie Ramirez, and Cathy Smith  

Vetlesen, Arne Johan  

Wesselingh, Isabelle, and Arnaud Vaulerin  

Yildiz, Kerim  
Holodomor: Ukraine’s Secret Famine-Genocide of 1932-1933
Roxolana B. R. Wynar

Introduction
The man-made artificial famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine known as Holodomor (“murder by starvation”) that extinguished millions of innocent lives, is one of the worst—yet remarkably lesser known—crimes against humanity. It was planned and masterminded by Josef Stalin and methodically committed against the Ukrainian people by the government of the Soviet Union; yet it was so cleverly concealed that the world was mostly unaware that a great famine raged in the villages of the country long known as Europe’s “Bread Basket.” It is mentioned briefly in the lead article by Van Arsdale et al. in this issue.

Over the last seventy-five years, Soviet authorities and Western apologists have continued to promulgate lies to ensure that the memory and evidence of this genocide would be suppressed. However, especially after Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, official documents and statistics have emerged, photos uncovered, testimonies of survivors recorded, books written, and films made. The irreparable cultural harm and irreplaceable human lives will hopefully not be forgotten, and this great tragedy will be recorded in history as genocide.

As suggested in the lead article, Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides a key definition to which historians and scholars look when considering the Armenian massacre, the Jewish Holocaust, and more recent atrocities such as the one in Rwanda. It is important that scholars also reference this definition when discussing the Ukrainian Holodomor, and, in fact, many are starting to do so. Article II, which defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group…” is particularly relevant to the Ukrainian tragedy (Hunczak 2007:18-19). Clause “c” of this article emphasizes that “genocide is a policy of deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” Historian Taras Hunczak argues that Josef Stalin, the brutal dictator of the Soviet Union, and his followers both in Moscow and in Ukraine did just that; they built their empire on the “bones of millions of innocent victims,” while the world seemingly was watching but certainly doing nothing (Hunczak 2007:18-19).

Reasons Behind Stalin’s Man-Made Artificial Famine
The period of 1932-1933 was a terrible time in Central and Eastern Ukraine, for the artificial famine exterminated millions of Ukrainians. This tragedy is unfathomable socio-economically, because it occurred (as previously noted) in the “Bread Basket of Europe” with its rich and fertile black soil, which produced bountiful wheat harvests, as well as crops such as sugar beets, vegetables, and fruits. Ukraine once fed much of Western Europe and even parts of the United States. In addition to its legendary soil, Ukraine also has enormous metal and mineral resources in Krivy Rih and the valley of the Donets River. These rich natural resources have always made it the envy of its neighbors, and so Ukraine has suffered a tragic fate of oppression throughout its history at the hands of various resource-hungry invaders and conquerors (Haliy 1963:3, 5).

This particular famine “was not caused by a natural disaster as a flood or drought, nor by any historic cataclysm, such as war, but was deliberately planned and methodically carried out by the Communist Government in Moscow, which was not at war, but enjoying a period of peace. The catastrophe happened not in some remote, little known part of the world, but in a European country [the size of France]” (Haliy 1963:5). Although there were other famines that took the lives of many Ukrainian people, this artificially induced disaster was the most costly in human life. At its height, Ukrainians were dying at a rate of 25,000 people per day, which translates to 1,000 lives lost per hour or seventeen per minute. One in three children perished in this atrocity. In the meantime, the
Soviet regime sold 1.73 million tons of grain to the Western markets—nearly a quarter of a ton of grain for every Ukrainian who starved to death.

Stalin was an extremely paranoid leader, and this famine was part of his “Stalinist Revolution from Above.” This was an ominous experiment that orchestrated paranoia about both internal and external enemies so that shortcomings of his government could be blamed on certain groups of “class enemies,” such as the farmers or peasants. Stalinism was in some ways similar to Nazism; it tried to portray the world as a conflict between different types of people, and the elimination of some was considered a crucial first step towards achieving a new and better state of affairs (Mace 2004:95).

Some scholars, such as Henry Huttenbach, think that the Holodomor has to be seen in the broader spectrum of extreme state violence in the Soviet Union, of which Ukraine was an unwilling part. Huttenbach argues that starting in 1928, Stalin tried to uphold a dual strategy: (1) to further strengthen his undisputed, personal dictatorial power and (2) to mold the Soviet Union into a strong military power and a centralized and “modern” industrial and economic force (Huttenbach 2007:11). In order for this strategy to succeed, massive violence was needed to ensure cooperation, as there were many sources of opposition to Stalin’s vision of a “revolutionary society.” Among those in opposition were Ukrainians, who wanted to be free from Russian domination.

Stalin’s Systematic Elimination of Two Opposing Ukrainian Forces

Stalin wanted to “melt” Ukraine (and all of the other occupied territories) into a common, so-called Soviet, but essentially Russian pot. However, there were two forces that blocked Moscow’s “melting pot” goal for Ukraine: (1) the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which formed the Ukrainian statehood and preserved Ukrainian culture and (2) the Ukrainian peasantry—with centuries-old traditions of individual farming and private ownership, a strong force that upheld those principles in numerous revolts, long after the occupation of Ukraine by the Muscovites (Russians). Therefore, to make Ukraine “cooperate” with Stalin’s visions meant to annihilate these two forces.

First, the systematic elimination of these forces began with massive purges of the Ukrainian cultural and spiritual elite, including bishops, priests and religious clergy, and with the prohibition of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Byzantine-Catholic faiths (the two dominant religions in the country). Second, Stalin tried to obliterate the intelligentsia through sweeping arrests, executions, and exile to slave labor camps in Siberia, from which there was no return. Such was the fate of Ukraine’s cultural leaders—the scholars, artists, poets and writers of the 1930s. This was also the fate of Ukrainian political leaders and economists (Halij 1963:7). Third, Stalin’s aim—an example of ethnocide, as defined by Van Arsdale et al.—was to quash the Ukrainian spirit by killing off its intellectuals and enforcing “Russification” in every aspect of life, through prohibition of the Ukrainian language, press and religion, as well as bans on literature, arts, and traditional customs. He also ordered the destruction of many ancient Ukrainian churches and monasteries, historical monuments, libraries, valuable manuscripts and books, icons, and other treasures.

The next step was to eliminate the Ukrainian farmers (seliany, not technically “peasants”), considered the “heart of Ukraine,” who were too independent for Stalin’s liking. Terming it “socialism in one country,” Stalin initiated a war on the Ukrainian villages in the countryside. Then, he introduced a brutal policy of collective agriculture, which was to replace individual farming, thus depriving the farmers of their private land, livestock, horses and wagons, and the right to plant and grow their own crops. The traditional means of family support were eradicated. Farmers were forced to work in large groups on “state-owned property” with the fruits of their toil going to the government. The objective was obvious—Stalin wanted to make individual farmers hostages of the Communist regime, expecting, in his own words, “to establish a system whereby the collective farmers would deliver, under penalty, to the state and the cooperative organizations, the entirety of their marketable grain” (Hunczak 2007:13-14).

The farmers were classified into different categories: well-to-do farmers, who were labeled as kulaks (kurkuli in Ukrainian), middle farmers,
and poor farmers and laborers. If one were labeled a kulak, he or she was doomed. The first wave of the more prosperous farmers/kulaks was wiped out in the years between 1917 and 1921. The period of 1921-1922 brought the New Economic Policy (NEP), when the farmers were given some freedom to operate the land. Thus, a new group of “kulaks” emerged as a result of this, because the “poor peasant (farmer) who worked hard became richer, so he became a kulak” (Conquest 1986:5). Therefore, in the years 1929-1932, Stalin implemented a program of “de-kulakization,” which translated into the arrests of millions of farmers who were labeled as being somehow “involved in anti-Soviet activity” or were just “more affluent.” These people were executed or sent in large numbers to labor camps in Siberia (Conquest 1986:6). After this, there were no more kulaks and so the Soviets invented the category of “sub-kulak,” which could be applied to any farmer.

The policy of collectivization was officially announced in November of 1929. Individual farmers were forced to surrender their livestock and farming equipment to the collective farms, which then became the property of the state (Hunczak 2007:14). Nearly 62,000 farms were confiscated by the Communists between January and March of 1930. In response to collectivization, farmers rebelled in most regions of Ukraine. They began to strike, revolt, destroy their crops and slaughter their cattle (Conquest 1986:5), but the farmers were no match for the brutal army and the secret police who were sent against them (Hunczak 2007:14). Those farmers who protested were often executed on the spot, while others were sent to concentration camps. Still others and their families were exiled to Siberia, where they were left with little shelter or food. Most did not survive, whereas some were just ordered to leave their districts. More than one million Ukrainian farmers were arrested in the early 1930s and about 850,000 were deported in freight trains to the Russian far north—many never reached their destination (Hunczak 2007:14). Thus began the process of forcing “collectivization” on the people. “According to one report, the homes of the middle, and even poor farmers, were destroyed in the darkness of night and the farmers were forced, at gunpoint, to join collective farms. Confiscated property was often stolen by urban party activists, while the militia roamed the village streets arresting anyone in sight” (Hunczak 2007:14).

Later, following the Ukrainian farmers’ revolts, Stalin sent military forces to一次性-and-for-all break the resistance of those still left. All land, cattle, harvests, and machinery were to be confiscated and become the property of the state. Thus was precipitated a gruesome artificial famine like none ever seen before (Halid 1963:8). This famine was exacerbated by Stalinist draconian requisition quotas imposed on Ukraine, forcing the devastated villages of the countryside to deliver millions of tons of grain to the state. Approximately 12,000 Special Forces were sent to the villages to collect the “hidden” food reserves when the farmers could not meet the quotas (Hunczak 2007:14-15). These Special Forces went from village to village confiscating all available food and grain, then locking it up in storage where it rotted and wasted away. Thus, millions of Ukrainians started perishing from a slow and torturous death, a death by starvation. Viacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich were in charge of enforcing Stalin’s policy of grain procurement. These two men made their way through the plundered villages and gave directions on how to rob the starving population. Their orders were effectively executed by local collaborators who, “together with the members of the special brigade and party activists, went from house to house, searching for hidden grain and other food—even taking the last loaf of bread that was on the table. As a result, already in 1932 people were dying of hunger” (Hunczak 2007:15).

The famine-genocide raging in Ukraine reached its peak in 1933 in the ethnic Ukrainian region of the Northern Caucasus, known as Kuban, and in the ethnic Ukrainian part of the lower Volga River valley. Because there was no bread, starving people ate their pets, rats, leaves, tree bark and garbage from the well-provisioned kitchens of the party members (a further indication that this famine was deliberately
targeting Ukrainian farmers). Also, during this period of severe famine, the Soviet regime expanded the system of hard currency stores known as the *torgsin*. In exchange for food, these stores helped extract the last valuables remaining in the countryside. In order to survive, people brought their most treasured possessions: intricately embroidered Ukrainian costumes, family heirlooms, jewelry, photographs, china, pottery, carved wood furniture, gold and silver items in exchange for loaves of bread. Often, a gold tooth, a small piece of jewelry, or a silver or gold coin meant the difference between life and death when that person could effect an exchange for food (Mace 2004:102). This is still another indication that this artificial famine was purposefully crafted to destroy the Ukrainian farmers through genocide and—by robbing as many valuables and heirlooms as possible—through ethnocide.

Further proof is seen in the paradoxical antithesis of forced migration, i.e., forcible retrenchment in one’s homeland. Whereas forced migration has been used elsewhere, e.g., in Ethiopia in the 1980s, in Ukraine the Communists forced the people in the hardest-hit famine regions to remain and die of starvation. These farmers were not allowed to leave their villages in search of food elsewhere. New passports were created without which villagers had no authority to go to cities, but these documents were not given to the people in the villages. Like serfs of the nineteenth century, they were hostages of modern times on their own land. Many tried to flee to other parts of the Soviet Union, but Stalin prevented this from happening. The Soviet police created checkpoints along the railroad lines to prevent starving Ukrainians from entering Russia, where there was bread, and to stop anyone from Russia from bringing food into Ukraine. This led to an economic blockade of the entire Soviet Ukraine (Mace 2004:75).

On January 22 1933, Stalin officially issued a directive the goal of which was to prevent a farmer exodus from Ukraine, particularly banning people from the predominantly Ukrainian Kuban region from entering Russia and Belarus. As a result of this edict, according to the Russian scholar N.A. Ivnitsky, 219,460 individuals were arrested and 186,588 sent back to their starving villages (Hunczak 2007:16). Therefore, it can be concluded that in one sense the entire Soviet Ukraine was placed on a *de facto* economic blacklist in order to teach the Ukrainians, as William Henry Chamberlain put it, “a lesson by the grim method of starvation” (Mace 2004:79).

The Ukrainian tragedy of 1932-1933 has been documented in detail by numerous authors and recognized by many governments in the years since, including the United States Congress, as an intentional policy of genocide by the Kremlin against the Ukrainian people. Some scholars, nevertheless, continue to refer to this famine-genocide as the “Soviet Famine.” If this were really the case, and if the famine really affected the entire Soviet Union, then why did Stalin release his decree of 1933 closing the borders of Russia and Belarus only to Ukrainians? Would not his decree mean that the food situation was much better in those two republics? (Hunczak 2007:9). Was this not a way to keep Ukrainians trapped in Ukraine, in the strictly famine-affected areas, so they would continue to die of starvation?

Finally, to add insult to injury, in the last stages of the artificial famine, millions of ethnic Russians were sent into Ukraine to “re-populate” the destroyed villages. They were even given special rations so that they would survive and not die alongside the local population (Mace 2004:80). This confirms that this famine was a genocide that exclusively targeted Ukrainians. Unfortunately, there are no complete official Soviet figures available on the loss in human lives caused by this famine (Cairns 1989:xvii). According to Cairns, it is known that males suffered the most, especially in the age cohorts of 20-29, 50-59, and 60 and older. However, when cohort population losses were shown as a percentage of the total mortality, the age groups that had the greatest losses were those spanning 15-19, 20-29, and 40-49 (Cairns 1989:xix). Therefore, it can be inferred that several million Ukrainians starved to death and several million more suffered from extreme malnutrition.
Conclusion

This commentary has provided details demonstrating that what came to be called the Holomodor was Stalin’s systematic plan to terminate ethnic Ukrainians in Eastern and Central Europe and re-populate these lands with ethnic Russians. A definite case of genocide, it caused irreparable cultural harm and the loss of millions of lives in the “Bread Basket of Europe.” There also have been identity shifts in these parts of Ukraine; anthropologists continue to consider the implications. According to recent demographic analyses, Ukraine’s total population is nearly forty-six million, of whom 77.8% are ethnic Ukrainians (the majority of whom live in Western Ukraine, in areas unaffected by the 1932-1933 Holodomor) and 17.3% are ethnic Russians. The demographic profile also indicates that 67% of the population speaks Ukrainian—the official language of Ukraine—while 24% of the population speaks Russian. This points to the fact that not just ethnic Russians speak Russian in Ukraine; some ethnic Ukrainians, mixed Ukrainians, and other minorities living in Ukraine also speak Russian, one indicator of a shift in identity. It can be inferred that there are Russian-speaking Ukrainians who relate more to Russian culture than to Ukrainian, as well as Ukrainian-speaking Russians (although a much smaller number) who relate more to Ukrainian culture than to Russian. Statistics compiled on religious affiliation support this, since 50.4% of Ukrainians follow the Ukrainian Orthodox religion under the Kyiv Patriarch, while 26.1% of people in Ukraine follow the Ukrainian Orthodox religion under the Moscow Patriarch, and 8.0% of Ukrainians follow the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. These are the three dominant religions of Ukraine.

Therefore, because of the massive extermination of ethnic Ukrainians in Eastern and Central Ukraine through the Holodmor, and with the re-population of these lands by ethnic Russians, it is no mystery as to why there are so many controversies in contemporary Ukraine revolving around Ukrainian-Russian relations. For instance, many ethnic Ukrainians want complete independence from Russia and to join the European Union and NATO; conversely, many mixed Ukrainians or ethnic Russians living in Ukraine want stronger connections with Russia, including making Russian the second official language of Ukraine. In all cases, however, it is hoped that the recognition of the tragedy of the Holodomor as genocide (as well as the revelation of other atrocities that occurred during the Soviet regime) will help improve cross-ethnic understandings in Ukraine.

Notes

1. Roxolana B. R. Wynar is a graduate of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (2008). Her M.A. is in International Studies with a concentration in Human Rights and Security. She is currently the Administrative Assistant for three non-profit organizations (Emmaus Centre, “Faith and Light,” and L’Arche-Kovcheh) at the Ukrainian Catholic University that support the rights of special needs persons in Ukraine. She can be reached by e-mail at rwynar@gmail.com.

2. The XV Party Congress in December 1927 “declared war” on the kulaks and took steps to “restrict the development of capitalism in the countryside peasant farming toward socialism.” To pursue these policies courts were empowered to confiscate grain surpluses from kulaks who refused to sell them at fixed low prices, exempt the poor peasants from the land tax and place twenty-five percent of the grain confiscated from the kulaks into the hands of the poor. Instructions were also issued for an increase in the number of sovkhozy and kolkhozy through the consolidation of small-scale holdings (Cairns 1989:viii-ix).

3. The name was an abbreviation for the Russian phrase, torgovlia’s inostrantsami (trade with foreigners), because only foreigners had the right to possess precious metals and convertible currency (Mace 2004:102).
References Cited

Cairns, Andrew

CIA

Conquest, Robert

Haliy, Mykola
1963 *Organized Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933.* Chicago: Ukrainian Research and Information Institute, Inc.

Hunczak, Taras

Huttenbach, Henry R.

Mace, James E.
Introduction

Upon its promulgation, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention) became a groundbreaking document in which the act of genocide was more clearly defined. The process of authoring this key human rights document arose concurrently with the process leading to the authoring of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Both documents were written with the aim of recognizing not only human rights issues but providing protection for those at-risk. While both documents have raised awareness of human rights issues, the Genocide Convention has failed to consistently achieve either of its main objectives referred to in its formal title: the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Along with the startling numbers of human lives that have been brutally taken as a result of genocide during the past sixty years, there have been surges in the numbers of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and asylum seekers. Van Arsdale et al. in this issue begin their article by stressing: “Genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing are perhaps the most horrific activities practiced by humans.” Without a plan for consistent implementation of, and accountability for, actions taken by those who have ratified the Genocide Convention, the battle to end genocide will continue – without a foreseeable end.

Background

As Van Arsdale et al. noted in this issue, a major historical influence in the field was the Polish Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin, whose lifelong commitment to the creation and designation of the term “genocide” and his contribution toward the fight for genocide prevention have had long-term effects on world policy. Senator William Proxmire is carrying on his approach in the U.S. after his death. As Samantha Power describes it, “Lemkin had hunted for a term that would describe assaults on all aspects of nationhood – physical, biological, political, social, economic, and religious” (2002:40). Lemkin’s designation of the term, combined with his determination to prohibit the act of genocide, ultimately led to the creation of the United Nations Genocide Convention, which was adopted in 1948, gaining entry into force in 1951 (Ishay 1997:492-493). This important document has currently been ratified by 140 states, including the United States (Wikipedia 2009).

Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention are of particular importance as a result of their specifications regarding the crime of genocide. Article II specifies what those states that have ratified the Genocide Convention are responsible for preventing:

...any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Ishay 1997:492).

Article III goes on to clearly state the various scenarios regarding genocide that warrant punishment: “The following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiring to commit Genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit Genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; [and] (e) Complicity in genocide” (Ishay 1997:492). Although the definition of what constitutes genocide is made very clear in the Convention, it obviously has yet to prevent genocide from plaguing our world. In the latter part of the twentieth century the world witnessed genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, and we continue to sit back and watch as genocides ensue in Sudan and Congo. Scharf and Draffin (2008: 40) affirm: “While there have been
significant advances in prosecuting the crime of genocide in recent years, there has been much less progress on the Genocide Convention's other main goal – prevention."

A major fault of the Genocide Convention is that no clear-cut method for accountability or enforcement exists. Although the document unmistakably defines genocide and cites details related to prevention and punishment, there is no tangible system in place that mandates genocide to be deemed a punishable offense – to be acted on definitively – by those who have ratified the Genocide Convention. This, circuitously, allows a sidestepping in the response to these major human rights abuses, while claiming that "the issue is being seriously considered." An examination of instances in which genocide has been permitted reveals the obvious; human rights are not at the top of the agenda in terms of most nations' foreign policies. In the case of the United States, national security and economics consistently take precedence over human rights, despite the universal concern the crime of genocide engenders.

Rwanda

The annihilation of the Tutsi by the Hutu in 1994 in Rwanda was an instance when the United States' national interest took precedence over the protection of the rights of others and of the fulfillment of commitments implied by ratifying the Genocide Convention. As Van Arsdale et al. suggest, by 1994 the United States had ratified the Convention, yet stood back and literally watched as the Hutu ruthlessly murdered approximately 800,000 Tutsi in less than three months. Some reports claim that the United States was unaware of what was actually taking place in Rwanda; however, there is ample evidence of warnings of the violence that was unfolding. The U.S. government did send in enough troops to extract its citizens who were in Rwanda and deemed at high risk, thus demonstrating its recognition of violence, but this was the extent of the "intervention." Even early on, thousands of Tutsi lives were being taken. Although certain warning signs were clear, the United States and many other nations avoided fulfilling their transnational responsibilities by not formally recognizing the events as genocide as they occurred. In the case of Rwanda, the United States' hierarchy of priorities was clear: economic interests and national security trumped human rights. The cries of the Tutsi were ignored.

Furthermore, another indicator – the creation of refugees as a result of the genocide – did not precipitate definitive action early on either. Consequently, many Rwandan refugees fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania in the mid-1990s (Whitaker 2003). The secondary ramifications of genocide are clear; not only are lives lost as a direct consequence of the killing spree, they are severely disrupted by flight as refugees.

Reasons for Intervention

When it comes to the act of genocide, many are in favor of the United States taking a more active role in intervention. As one considers the United States' record of intervention (or lack thereof), an important issue is the role of the bystander, a point reinforced by Van Arsdale et al. In her essay “Raising the Cost of Genocide,” Samantha Power (2003:457-458) poses the question “. . . why do decent men and women who firmly believe genocide should never again be permitted allow it to happen?” Power goes on to note that “. . . silence [is surely interpreted by some] as consent or even support.” As the United States stood by and watched as genocide took place in Rwanda, a serious statement was made about the value of a life. As a leader in the world, it is imperative for the United States to satisfy the commitment that it made by ratifying the Genocide Convention. It cannot be a bystander. Intervention is needed to protect the lives of others, regardless of whether the action will benefit the United States.

The United States not only has a Convention-ascribed mandate to prevent genocide, but a moral obligation to protect those whose lives are at risk. As James Turner Johnson (1999:75-76) weighs just cause in relation to intervention, he confirms the aforementioned: “What is most fundamental in this conception of just cause is that it justifies the use of force not out of self-interest but for the sake of others: those who are
in need of defense or who have suffered wrongs needing to be righted.” Johnson elaborates, “The moral justification for intervention . . . is grounded in a concern for justice focused on setting right wrongs done to others who are not able to prevent such injustices on their own.” Although the Genocide Convention as a document is powerful in terms of the clarifications and designations it makes, it seemingly is hollow if its implied solutions are inconsistently implemented and enforced.

Suggestions for Change

From a United States perspective, in order for the ideals of the Genocide Convention to be carried out, the priorities of the government’s foreign policy agenda must be altered. Rather than security and economics consistently superseding human rights, there must emerge a deeper commitment to addressing human rights issues on a stricter ethical and moral basis. Although unlikely to occur, a disaggregation of human rights concerns from security and economic concerns would be ideal. It is fair to say that government officials will weigh the pros and cons of a controversial situation, trying to decide if the United States’ interests will benefit by intervening; however, when it comes to addressing the extermination of the lives of others, the United States must take a stand. A powerful example would be set by consistently honoring the commitment made in the country’s earlier ratification of the Genocide Convention, thus encouraging other states to honor their commitments as well. The United States must cease its pattern of picking and choosing when to intervene.

If the United States, along with the rest of the nations that have ratified the Genocide Convention, would choose to work toward putting differences aside and toward addressing, fighting – and ultimately preventing – genocide in a combined effort, the world would benefit in integral fashion. Not only would the lives and interests of citizens be better secured, there would also be a decline in the numbers of refugees, IDPs, and asylum seekers created by genocide. Stricter enforcement of the aims and calls made through the Genocide Convention would greatly improve the ability of developing states to enhance rights protections. In closing, there is whole-hearted agreement with Van Arsdale et al. (2007:26) when they remind us that the phrase “‘Genocide Never Again’ [has] to start to mean something...if not, we are implicitly desecrating the memories of past genocide victims, as well as making it unlikely that future perpetrators will feel deterred from committing such acts.”

Notes

1. Nicole Herrera is an M.A. candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Her primary fields of study are human rights and refugee issues. Nicole also works full-time as the Enrollment Services Coordinator in the Office of Admissions at the Morgridge College of Education at the University of Denver. She can be reached by e-mail at niki.herrera@du.edu.

References Cited

Ishay, Micheline R., editor

Johnson, James Turner

Power, Samantha

Scharf, Michael P. and Brianne M. Draffin

Van Arsdale, Peter, Mellissa Jessen, Nicole Hawthorne, Kellie Ramirez, and Cathy Smith
Whitaker, B.

Wikipedia
Humanitarian Aid versus Humanitarian Intervention
Barbara Bonner

As stated in the lead article by Van Arsdale et al., the United States was aware of the 1988 genocide of the Kurds in the northern regions of Iraq, yet chose to do nothing in order to accommodate political and economic interests. If action had been taken, would the political and economic interests of the United States have determined which method of aid was offered? In the face of indisputable crimes against humanity, which is more beneficial – humanitarian aid or humanitarian intervention? What are some of the key differences between these two types of humanitarian assistance? What are some of the factors determining which path to take? These questions are addressed briefly in this commentary, in an effort to shed light on the political nature of human rights in the context of humanitarianism. By better addressing differences between humanitarian aid and humanitarian intervention, what it means for the state under duress and what it means for the state charged with responsibility to take action, perhaps the international community can better move forward to hold those involved accountable and form a more cohesive policy toward humanitarian assistance.

Complicating decisions as to when and where to act in terms of humanitarian assistance, there is no universal operational definition of humanitarian aid and intervention, and there is no singular humanitarian regime. These activities are highly contextual and open to interpretation. The International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship has loosely defined humanitarian action as “guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity... impartiality...neutrality...and independence” (UNOCHA 2004). In addition, a definition of humanitarian action must include “the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods” (UNOCHA 2004).

Tangible human rights policies, linked to viable protocols, did not exist until after the decimation of the Jewish population and thousands of others in World War II.

The Role of the United Nations

In December of 1948, following the Second World War, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations as the universal international handbook on human rights (United Nations 2009). At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, over 150 countries again reaffirmed their commitment to the UDHR, as exposited in the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (Gleeson n.d.). Each member of the U.N. nominally recognizes the UDHR today; however, the rights inscribed in its pages are not always upheld.

Early on, international law regarding humanitarian intervention, as interpreted by the United Nations, emphasized peacekeeping and the rejection of an armed format; this was seen as inappropriately invasive. The United Nations stance, in brief, was summarized as: “Peacekeeping is a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace” (United Nations Peacekeeping 2009). While peacekeeping personnel comprise soldiers, police, and civilians, armed intervention was not viewed as a legitimate option. This stance has changed; the inability to exert “usable force” has become a security issue, and it has now been deemed a viable aspect of certain peacekeeping operations. This is to ensure the safety of the citizens whom the peacekeepers were sent to protect, as well as the peacekeepers themselves; however, it is to be used only as a last resort.

The mandate of contemporary U.N. peacekeeping operations is to “monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist conflicting parties to implement the peace agreement they have signed” (United Nations Peacekeeping 2009). These operations are not always employed post-
conflict; they may be employed during conflict in an attempt to facilitate the attainment of peaceful accords between conflicting parties. As such, the U.N. Security Council determines which missions peacekeepers will pursue as well as the course of action. The nations involved decide the number of troops to be deployed as well as the duration of their mission. Should such involvement be deemed unnecessary by the U.N. Security Council, authorization is given to “regional and other international organizations such as the European Union, African Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Economic Community of West African States, or ‘coalitions of willing countries’ to implement certain peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions” (United Nations Peacekeeping 2009).

One particularly large loophole of this system involves the process used to vote upon which operations are approved and which are denied. There are five permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Should one of them vote against intervention the proposed operation is shut down. Unfortunately, this is where politics can come into play. Since each of the five is a leading nation in the international community, each has significant economic, political, and/or social ties to many states. These circumstances may cause a member to vote against a mission that would put a bilateral or multilateral relationship in peril, thus disallowing the deployment.

The Complexity of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and Aid

It is possible for a nation to move forward on its own, as some tentatively considered as events in Kurdistan were unfolding. This is a complicated, as well as politically and economically dangerous, path to choose. As with the current crisis in Darfur, the United States has considered intervening in cases of crimes against humanity, but in idiosyncratic fashion. However, President Clinton’s seeming disregard for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 highlights the transnational circumstances that often prevent intervention, as well as (or in spite of) pressures placed by the public. While Clinton and the American public deemed the action in Kosovo a success, the deaths of U.S. soldiers and general impact of the operation in Somalia caused a backlash that subsequently prevented action being taken in Rwanda. Despite Clinton’s proclamation of a desire to intervene in cases of racial, ethnic, or religious decimation (Congressional Quarterly Weekly 2000), the reality was far different.

Under the umbrella of an overarching international committee that has weighed the pros and cons of intervention, intervention is more likely to be seen as a justifiable action in the context of international humanitarian law. By contrast, when working alone, a state must provide further proof of the viability of its plan, not only for the international organization but also for its own citizens. The argument is made that “warfare destroys lives, property, infrastructure, and environment,” whereas “economic and diplomatic pressures do not” (Coady 2002). Thus many nations, the United States included, promulgate a general policy of intervening unilaterally only when their own national security is at risk.

At the risk of sounding cynical, in the world of humanitarian affairs, what a country says and what a country does often do not align. The failed humanitarian missions that the United States has engaged in have sullied the prospects of future interventions in the eyes of the public; Congress has brushed aside some meaningful debates in its effort to avoid internal conflict. While the American public in general seems supportive of humanitarian intervention, writ large, the implementation of such and the holding accountable of Congress often does not occur (Pevehouse 2008:2). The disconnect between the public’s desire for humanitarian intervention and pressure on Congress to follow through, also speaks to the fear of the intervention becoming a gateway to using force “for the purpose of regime change” (Pevehouse 2008:4). As such, the American public historically has supported restraint, in concert with a wariness regarding any on-site implementation. Beginning with the high death toll and associated opposition to the war in Vietnam, internal criticism of the United States becoming involved in conflicts that do not directly affect its security or core economic
interests has been building. This has been further exacerbated by the current war in the Middle East engaged under the guise of democracy and development.

One theory of international development suggests that promising socio-economic development in a nation will ensure an increase in human rights and the effective recognition of violations thereof. The rights-based argument for development counters that, while socio-economic development may enhance political stability, without specific legislation on human rights (and associated enforcement mechanisms) it is possible that human rights will be abused as faster development is pursued and that development may be used as a curtain to hide the human rights abuses. Developed nations are less likely to be under public scrutiny concerning such abuses.

An additional barrier to the enforcement of human rights is the argument of state sovereignty. While not a main theme of this commentary it is an important topic in the field of human rights and must briefly be noted. Stated simply, other factors being equal, sovereignty trumps humanitarian intervention. While state sovereignty is to be respected and not abused in any sense of the word, an ongoing balance must be assessed between sovereign nations addressing their internal affairs, and the international community holding regimes responsible for atrocities they commit. Whereas upholding state sovereignty may be a valid reason to not become involved initially, in severe circumstances it is not a valid reason to prevent viable humanitarian intervention. For example, the current conflict and genocide in Sudan, which has caused an estimated 300,000-400,000 deaths and 2.5 million refugees and internally displaced persons, indicates an obligation to intervene and help those in need (Save Darfur Coalition 2008).

The arguments listed above against humanitarian intervention provide further support for those critics who support humanitarian aid instead. Humanitarian aid is a less invasive, and almost always less violent, way to offer help to an at-risk or suffering population. Many internal conflicts are linked to ethnic, religious, or political fractionalization. Some – as could be argued in the 1980s regarding Kurdistan – may stem from a desire for complete annihilation of a group or its culture, while others may simply be the result of limited resources or dissatisfied civilians involved in new social movements. In cases such as this, humanitarians can engage efforts to alleviate the stresses associated with these limitations through the delivery of supplies and supportive services, such as mental health counseling. This might even make it easier for the conflicting sides to reach an accord.

Humanitarian assistance can also be a more viable option in terms of political and economic costs, since a nation is more likely to garner internal support for assistance rather than intervention. It is not perceived as an “invasion” but rather “help for those who are in the midst of conflict.” This also can be more economically sustainable for the external agents of change, as certain forms of assistance are less costly and time consuming than the training, deployment, and support of troops to the area in question. There is also the possibility that diplomats will be more supportive – political diplomacy and human rights advocacy can be partnered. To put these propositions to a brief test, this analysis comes full circle back to the case of the Kurdish population in the northern regions of Iraq.

**Kurdish Genocide in Northern Iraq**

The Kurdish genocide in northern Iraq in 1988 saw the death of approximately 180,000 Kurds and the displacement of 1.5 million more, as Van Arsdale et al. have noted. Saddam Hussein and his regime were able to inflict this genocide on the Kurdish people due, in part, to their informal alliance with the Iranians, as this gave them a shield of political motivation – the Kurds were then deemed enemies. While Saddam Hussein used this as an excuse to attack the Kurds in an effort to annihilate substantial portions of this ethnic group, the rest of the world conversely used this same alliance to justify their inaction. As stated previously, politics were involved in this debacle as at the time the United States was supporting Iraq economically.

It became increasingly apparent that the world was well aware of the situation in northern
Iraq. Unfortunately, it had not been declared genocide, so nations with the capacities to do so were not “obligated” to intervene. During this period, the situation became increasingly dire. As the Kurds began to flee their towns and villages in an attempt to escape Hussein’s troops, neighboring countries began to take note. The international community spoke up slowly and not forcefully until nearly four years after the Anfal campaign had begun. This avoidance of moral obligation in the face of economic and political barriers contributed directly to the deaths of thousands.

Eventually the United States set up a humanitarian aid effort to assist a small number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), but this was done in part to appease neighboring countries. While this operation did lead to improvement in living conditions, it was too little too late. Had humanitarian aid been supplied much earlier, the casualties likely would have been much fewer. Respect for Iraq’s state sovereignty was among the issues cited as a reason for delaying international action. Had state sovereignty not finally been pulled as a barrier, perhaps humanitarian intervention would have occurred, although this is merely speculation.

Conclusion

No one can say whether humanitarian intervention would have prevented the genocide of Kurds in Iraq, but the numbers of innocent civilians killed certainly would have been reduced. Some critics argue that external, transnational wars started over internal humanitarian crises inevitably lead to further deaths, as well as political and economic complications. Others argue that the moral obligation to recognize the systematic destruction of an ethnic group – and to prevent or stop it – far outweighs the potential economic and political complications.

The timing of humanitarian intervention is critical. In Iraq, such intervention, once engaged, could then have been preempted by humanitarian aid, if viable diplomatic channels truly were available and utilized. If humanitarian intervention were never an option, humanitarian aid should have been aggressively pursued early on, using all available diplomatic means so that economic and political considerations would have been sustained. The much earlier use of humanitarian aid – if the regime had allowed it in – likely would have made a difference in number of persons killed. If the numbers killed were not minimized, this course of action likely would have forced the international community to uphold its obligation to take action against Hussein.

Unfortunately, this is all too often the outcome in cases of genocide: the world is aware of the situation, but sets barriers that effectively let it dodge its obligation to assist. Recognition of cultural and political factors, as well as notions of sovereignty and obligation – all covered in “Genocide, Ethnocide, and Ethnic Cleansing: An Exploratory Review” – is essential to better understand the roles of both internal and external actors concerning genocide and its aftermath. Until the international community binds together more effectively to enforce the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as was touted again worldwide as recently as 1993, the world will continue to allow such atrocities to happen. Perhaps we eventually will learn, but if the situations currently happening worldwide are any indication, that lesson will not be learned any time soon.

Notes

1. Barbara Bonner is an M.A. candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Her primary fields of study are international development, environmental sustainability, human rights, and refugee issues. She is a graduate intern at the Institute for Environmental Solutions, a Denver-based non-profit that supports environmentally sustainable urban development in the Front Range region of Colorado. She can be reached by e-mail at barbara.bonner@du.edu.

References Cited

Coady, C.A.J.
Gleeson, Kim  

Pevehouse, Jon, Timothy Hildenbrandt, Courtney Hillenbrecht, and Peter Holm  

Save Darfur Coalition  

United Nations  

United Nations Peacekeeping  

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
Introduction

This commentary builds on an argument made in the lead article by Van Arsdale et al. in this issue where it is claimed, “in the broadest sense, genocidal activity is about dysfunctional state systems, imbalanced power relationships, and oppressive institutions.” In short, the state is seen as playing a key role in the perpetuation of genocide. In seeking to understand the causes of genocide, one should examine the relationship between the state and the society it dominates. Yet this raises the question of what role the state plays in dealing with the aftermath of the genocide. How have states attempted to foster reconciliation in such environments? This commentary attempts to answer that question by looking at the situation in Rwanda, and the attempts the state has made to further the process of reconciliation.

The state is the primary actor in fostering reconciliation in Rwanda. The state, dominated by members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), has invented several mechanisms by which to promote reconciliation, such as the ingando camps and memorial services on the anniversary of the genocide. The most prominent of these mechanisms are the gacaca courts. The gacaca courts are based on a traditional dispute resolution mechanism that attempts to promote reconciliation through the participation of the victim, the community, and the alleged perpetrator in the court proceedings. Despite the initial high aspirations of what the gacaca courts would accomplish, the evaluation of scholars, human rights workers, and ordinary Rwandans on the effect of gacaca on reconciliation in the country is at best mixed, and, in some cases, primarily negative. This exploratory analysis targets the role of the state in pursuing reconciliation in Rwanda by focusing on the gacaca courts and processes of reconciliation, denial, and victimization. The purpose is not to point out and offer corrections for the difficulties faced by gacaca, but to understand the role of the state in crafting an institutionalized response in the context of the period following genocide.

The Response to Genocide: The Gacaca Courts

The genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 claimed over 800,000 lives. If not for the successful invasion of the country by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in July of 1994, the genocidaires, the name used to refer to perpetrators of the genocide, may have succeeded in eliminating all Tutsi living in Rwanda. Between July of 1994 and 1996, the RPF arrested over 100,000 alleged genocidaires. The RPF decided to hold every perpetrator individually responsible for his or her actions during the genocide in order to end the culture of impunity and provide justice for the victims (Reyntjens and Vandeginste 2005:102). However, the justice system was decimated by the genocide. The physical infrastructure of the judicial system was nearly destroyed, and almost all of the judges and lawyers still alive after the genocide had fled the country (Des Forges and Longman 2004:58). The government nevertheless pushed ahead with conventional trials for the alleged genocidaires. From 1996 to 2002, out of over 100,000 in detention, only 8,597 trials were held. At that pace, the trials of alleged genocidaires would last decades. In order to speed up the trials, assemble a historical record of the genocide, and reconcile the Rwandan people, the gacaca courts were established by Organic Law no. 40/2000 in January of 2001 (Fierens 2005:901). Over 11,000 gacaca jurisdictions were created throughout the country for the purposes of trying crimes against humanity and genocide. Implementation was slow: while the pilot phase first began in 751 jurisdictions in 2002, nation-wide implementation was delayed until 2006. As of April 2009, the gacaca courts have completed over 1.1 million cases with 3,000 pending. While originally set to finish by December 2007, the trials are now supposed to be completed in 2009.

The gacaca courts created by the government in 2001 are significantly different than traditional gacaca in four ways. First, traditional gacaca dealt with relatively minor disputes such as brawls or slander, and not genocide and
crimes against humanity. Second, as the goal of traditional gacaca was social harmony, the process of reaching a verdict was flexible and never involved a jail sentence. The judges of the gacaca courts could sentence time in jail, and the goal of social harmony was combined with achieving retribution for the victim. Third, the traditional judges who presided over gacaca, called Inyan-gamungayo, were typically village elders, while the new courts were presided over by persons of integrity who were elected from the community. Finally, the source of legitimacy for traditional gacaca was the voluntary participation of the community. The new gacaca courts, however, are “state-sanctioned criminal tribunals created by statute, whose legitimacy is derived from their status as governmental institutions” (Le Mon 2007:16). While the gacaca courts are participatory in that they rely on the community to act as witnesses for the alleged crimes, nonattendance at the weekly gacaca courts can result in criminal sanctions.

Processes of Reconciliation

Reconciliation is an ambiguous and complex concept (Weinstein and Stover 2004:13). David Crocker posits a scale of different definitions for reconciliation, ranging from “thin” to “thick” definitions (2000:108). The concept of “thin” reconciliation is simple coexistence – reconciliation as the absence of hostilities. The second definition holds reconciliation as the situation in which former adversaries recognize each other as fellow citizens. Former adversaries engage each other in dialogue, speak to their mutual interests, and compromise to reach conclusions that all can abide by. The “thick” notion sees reconciliation as “a shared comprehensive vision, mutual healing and restoration, or mutual forgiveness” (Crocker 2000:108). Further, reconciliation can take place on individual and collective levels (Gloppen 2005:20). Individual reconciliation takes place on an interpersonal level; collective reconciliation occurs between groups at both the regional and national levels.

As there are many definitions for reconciliation, there are several possible ways to achieve it. Siri Gloppen describes how the goals of truth, justice, restitution, and reform, and the respective strategies employed to obtain them, are used, whether individually or in combination, to achieve a sense of reconciliation (2005:17-50). The strategies can include truth commissions, legal reform, and trials, to name a few. The Rwandan government ultimately combined the goals of truth, justice, and restitution in order to achieve reconciliation; reform, however, is conspicuously absent from the government’s goals. The gacaca courts are supposed to establish a historical record of the genocide through eyewitnesses sharing their testimony. The justice that the courts seek to achieve is both retributive, in that victims receive satisfaction through the knowledge that their perpetrators have been punished, and also restorative, by reintegrating offenders into society by performing restitution that benefit the public good.

Initially, the RPF-dominated state was not interested in pursuing reconciliation, for two main reasons (Reyntjens and Vandeginste 2005:102). First, the survivors of the genocide perceived reconciliation as leading to amnesty and used their considerable political influence to lobby against it. When the influence of the survivors waned, one source of hesitancy to pursuing reconciliation was removed. Second, the state viewed reconciliation as leading to power sharing and democratization. By the end of 1998, the threat of a unified Hutu opposition was diminished, so the state began to work toward reconciliation through the creation of the gacaca courts.

Yet the goals of retributive and restorative justice have proven to be difficult to implement coherently. Balint has argued that emphasizing the punishment of members of the community may actually undermine the process of reconciliation:

An approach which locates responsibility purely at the local individual level will freeze identities. In the context of Rwanda, the Hutu will remain killer and the Tutsi victim. In the Rwandan national legal proceedings, there is no process at the official level which might allow for an explanation other than the Hutu perpetration of violence against Tutsi victims. There is no room for an expla-
nation of the political dimension to the
genocide or its parameters (Karekezi et al.
2004:75).

In sum, the attempt to overcome divisive
ethnic identities has been undermined through
the sole identification of Hutus as perpetrators
and Tutsis as victims. Paradoxically, by
attempting to overcome the legacy of the
genocide through legal proceedings, the state is
potentially creating the conditions for the
occurrence of future violence in the country.

Processes of Denial: Ethnicity and
Collective Guilt

The government has attempted to rewrite the
ethnicity of Rwandans on two fronts: through
the propagation of a Rwandan nationalism
(Zorbas 2004:53), and through the imposition of
officially sanctioned categories of political and
social identification (Hintjens 2008:14). The
state has created the categories of survivor,
perpetrator, old caseload refugee and new
caseload refugee to, in effect, replace the ethic
identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa (Hintjens
2008:14). Outside of the official discourse,
discussion of ethnicity has been outlawed, and
attempts to foster an independent discussion of
ethnicity can result in the charge of
“divisionism.” Rwandan nationalism is taught to
participants of ingando, the state-run
reeducation camps that many students, former
genocidaires, demobilizing rebel soldiers, and
others have attended. Ingando is another
mechanism employed by the government to
promote reconciliation, although the camps are
criticized as serving to inculcate RPF-sanctioned
ideology (Mgbako 2005:201-224).

The substitution of a created national
identity and politically correct categories for the
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa identities is untenable.
Simply denying the salience of ethnicity and
creating a national identity by decree will not
wipe away the memories of ethnicity, which the
categories of survivor and perpetrator actually
reinforce. “Survivor” merely becomes a
euphemism for Tutsi and “perpetrator” for Hutu.
As Lars Waldorf has argued, “...it would be
difficult to talk about the Rwandan genocide
without mentioning the targeted Tutsi ethnicity,
but what is problematic is the tendency to
conflate all Tutsi with victims and all Hutu with
perpetrators” (Waldorf 2009:295). In other
words, all Hutu are labeled as collectively guilty
for the genocide, victimizing the Hutu who are
labeled innocent.

The gacaca courts reinforce the charge of
collective guilt through the one-sided
prosecution of Hutus. Despite allegations that
the RPF, upon fighting its way to the capital,
massed between 25-45,000 Hutus, and that
several hundred thousand Hutu refugees staying
in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
were murdered when the RPF forcibly closed the
camps, only charges against suspected
perpetrators of genocide and crimes against
humanity committed against Tutsi are heard at
gacaca. The state’s denial of the massacres
committed by the RPF undermines its credibility
to prosecute the perpetrators of the genocide.

Processes of Victimization

Along with achieving justice, gacaca is
supposed to allow healing to occur at the group
level by the survivor sharing his or her story with
the community. In turn, telling the truth of what
happened is assumed to have a healing effect on
the survivor (Brouneus 2008:57). However, two
factors are inhibiting whatever cathartic effect
truth telling might have in gacaca: the lack of
security for survivors, and the lack of public
participation in the proceedings. In the second
half of 2006, over forty survivors were killed (Le
Mon 2007:17); as of September of 2008,
seventeen survivors had been murdered since the
year began. Brouneus reports how, after
testifying at gacaca, survivors have had windows
broken in their homes, rocks thrown at their
doors, and even have been attacked with
machetes (Brouneus 2008:67-68).

Secondly, the quantity and quality of public
participation has declined since gacaca first
began. In one of the first empirical evaluations of
a gacaca court proceeding, the average rate of
attendance of the adult population was between
41 and 74 percent in three jurisdictions (Karekezi
et al. 2004:78). More problematic is the lack of
quality participation by the community in the
proceedings. Survivors have encountered the
solidarity shown by the alleged perpetrators and
their families during gacaca (African Rights and REDRESS 2008:51). As one survivor noted,

All crimes committed during the genocide were attributed either to a few well-known prominent killers, with Kajelijeli [the bourgmestre] at the top, or to those who had already died....I noticed a sort of tacit agreement between them to place the blame for all the Tutsis who died either on Kajelijeli on his own, or the militia of Kajelijeli, or on refugees from other prefectures and communes, or on someone from Mikingo who had already died. As a result, you find that there are no perpetrators, co-perpetrators or accomplices on the spot (African Rights and REDRESS 2008:41).

By the lack of security for survivors, and by the lack of meaningful participation in many court proceedings, gacaca has contributed to the continued victimization of the survivors.

Conclusion

This commentary has built off a statement by Van Arsdale et al. that genocide is largely caused by dysfunctional, imbalanced, and oppressive state systems. It has done so by examining how the Rwandan state has attempted to foster reconciliation in the post-genocide period via the gacaca courts. As has been shown, the reconciliation process has been problematic. While the gacaca courts represent a novel response by the state in the aftermath of genocide, the process of reconciliation has been hindered by divergent goals of justice and the state’s denial of ethnic identity. The impunity of crimes committed by the RPF has implicitly reinforced the ethnic identities while undermining the credibility of the government to promote reconciliation. Finally, the lack of security of survivors and the participation of the wider community has undermined what healing may have been possible through truth telling, and has resulted in a further victimization of survivors. As the role of the state is of primary importance in the commission of genocide, so should the role of the state be considered in the aftermath of genocide. One only hopes that the Rwandan state achieves the level of reconciliation necessary to avoid another tragedy in “the land of a thousand hills.”

Notes

1. Josiah Marineau is an M.A. candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. His research interests include post-conflict reconciliation, refugee reintegration, and the relationship between religion and politics. He currently works as a research assistant for the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures and as an intern for a Denver-based nongovernmental organization, Project C.U.R.E. He can be reached at jmarine@du.edu.

References Cited

African Rights and REDRESS

Brouneuns, Karen

Crocker, David

Des Forges, Alison, and Timothy Longman

Fierens, Jacques

Gloppen, Siri
Hintjens, Helen  
2008  “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda.”  
Ethnicities 8(5):5-41.

Karekezi, Urusaro, Alphonse Nshimiyimana, and Beth Mutamba  

Le Mon, Christopher  
2007  “Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts.”  

Longman, Timothy and Theoneste Rutagengwa  
2004  “Memory, Identity, and Community in Rwanda.”  

Mgbako, Chi  
2005  “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda.”  

Reyntjens, Filip and Stef Vandeghinste  
2005  “Rwanda: An Atypical Transition.”  

Waldorf, Lars  

Weinstein, Harvey M. and Eric Stover  
2004  “Introduction: Conflict, Justice, and Reclamation.”  

Zorbas, Eugenia  
2004  “Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda.”  
Gendercide: A Critical Examination of Gender and Sex-Selective Mass Killing

Amy D. Bhalla

Introduction

As Van Arsdale et al. note in the lead article, atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein and his regime against the Kurds during the so-called Anfal campaign can best be termed genocide. In examining this 1988 tragedy, where indeed most of the violence was directed towards military-aged men and boys, it also is clear that gender can play a significant role in targeted violence and mass killing. For some scholars, targeted violence and mass killing on the basis of gender (as a cultural term) and/or sex (as a biological term) warrants specialized classification; hence the concept gendercide has been developed, conceptualized, and theorized in describing such events. However, for some theorists, use of the term gendercide has problematic aspects and implications that do not allow for thorough analysis of the interplay of gender and sex in directed violence and mass killing. This commentary examines the development of gendercide, as a concept with strong theoretical implications, while also providing an overview of the major scholars working on the topic. A discussion of the key points of controversy regarding gendercide also is central to this commentary.

Defining Gendercide

Central to the development of the concept of gendercide is the work of Mary Anne Warren titled Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection (1985). Although Warren's work focuses on sex selection, which adversely and disproportionately affects women in society, the definitions she provides are instrumental to understanding gendercide whether males or females are targeted. She begins, “many of the moral issues raised by the prospect of sex selection may usefully be posed through an analogy between the concept of genocide and what I call gendercide, “by analogy, gendercide would be the deliberate extermination of persons of a particular sex (or gender)” (Warren 1985:22). Essential to Warren's definition is that gendercide “is a sex-neutral term, in that victims may be either male or female.” For Warren, there is a need for sex-neutral terminology, and “the term also calls to attention the fact that gender roles have often had lethal consequences.” Here, Warren highlights an important aspect of gendercide, which is that gender roles and norms can fuel directed violence, and often deadly, attacks.

Warren furthers her argument that genocide and gendercide are closely related, “if ‘genocide’ means the wrongfully killing or otherwise reducing the relative number of persons of a particular race, then ‘gendercide’ means the same thing, except that ‘sex’ is substituted for ‘race’” (Warren 1985:24). Importantly, “like genocide, gendercide need not involve outright murder, although the paradigm examples of it do,” and, “like genocide, gendercide involves actions which are morally objectionable for reasons apart from the mere fact that they may cause an alteration in the numerical ratios between certain groups.” Again, Warren significantly links genocide and gendercide, with sex as the distinctive difference.

Another important scholar who has contributed to the development of gendercide as a concept is Adam Jones. Jones, and his website Gendercide Watch, has made gendercide, and issues around gender and sex-targeted violence and mass killing, more widely known. Jones theorizes that “gendercide—inclusively defined as gender-selective mass killing—is a frequent and often defining feature of human conflict, and perhaps human social organization, extending back to antiquity” (Jones 2002:2). Moreover, in addition to pointing out the historical/cultural nature of gendercide, Jones notes that “gender can be defined primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of biology.” For him, “sex” can be substituted for “gender” in many such arguments.

As in the illustrative case of targeted mass executions of military-aged men and boys in the Anfal campaign, Jones similarly focuses his study on the targeted violence and killing of non-combatant men, whom he argues have been absent from conventional discourses around
gender-selective atrocities. According to Jones, “to ignore or dismiss mass atrocities against men because the perpetrators are generally ‘other men’ is [as] an argument—actually, a bigoted and dangerous assumption” (Jones 2002:28). Thus for Jones, although gendercide can be historically located, non-combatant males have typically not been included in examinations of gender-selective mass killing, and in order to accurately assess the role of gender in targeted violence and mass killing, male and female victims must both be recognized.

R. Charli Carpenter furthers the discourse surrounding gendercide as a concept by emphasizing the problematic aspects of the work of both Warren and Jones. For Carpenter, the conceptions and definitions of gendercide provided by Warren and Jones are limited because “the criteria for the definition is the biological sex of the dead, rather than the beliefs about gender that generate those outcomes,” and, “besides producing some conceptual inconsistency in the literature, this definition excludes sex-inclusive targeting for reasons that are gender related” (2002:231). Despite what to some are obvious differences between the two root terms—sex as biological, and gender as socially constructed—as Carpenter writes, there is a need to differentiate between gender and sex within the definition of gendercide in order to account for a more thorough analysis of their complexities — which (when played out) may lead to targeted mass killing.

Furthermore, Carpenter asserts that “recalling the sex/gender distinction enables us to establish cases where gender is a cause and sex-specific outcomes an effect. But it also helps us distinguish between different gendered causes of sex-specific outcomes” (Carpenter 2002:236). Carpenter’s point reveals that problems can arise in conceptualizing gendercide when individuals do not fit conventional gender norms, such as those who may be homosexual, hermaphroditic, or transgendered. In addition to accenting the need to distinguish between the two terms in conceptualizing gendercide, Carpenter also questions the linkage of the latter term to genocide. Specifically, Carpenter illustrates that not all forms of directed gender or sex-selective violence and killing may qualify as mass killing in the same manner as

race is targeted in genocide (2002:239). Carpenter’s criticisms highlight the need for clear and accurate definitions of the elements that comprise gendercide that account for both gender and sex-selective violence and mass killing. Therefore, Carpenter’s work poses necessary questions that are essential to conceptualizing and applying the term gendercide in specific instances.

Other Forms of Gender- and Sex-Based Atrocities

In a recent study by the United Nations Secretary General, instances of femicide are reported to be one of the most pressing areas of concern as humanitarians work toward ending violence against women (United Nations 2006:48, 79). According to feminist scholars, “femicide is the misogynous killing of women by men,” and is a form of sexual violence (Radford 1992:3). Femicide is also thought of as “the killing of females because they are females,” and more specifically, “femicide [being] the murder of women by men motivated by hatred, contempt, pleasure, or a sense of ownership of women” (Russell 2001:13, 14). It is important to note what might appear obvious, i.e., that research on femicide is restricted to the directed violence and mass killing solely of women. Another significant term is gynocide, which can be defined as “intentional measures of effecting the destruction of women as a specific population” (Russell 1992:21). Although useful for discussions of violence against women, the limitations of the terms femicide and gynocide – as the targeting of males also is considered – suggests the need for still other expansions in definition-oriented research, as suggested by Jones.

Society and Power in Considerations of Gendercide

An important corollary of gendercide, as many instances of gender- and sex-based mass killing are considered, is targeted sexual violence (such as rape and forced impregnation). A comprehensive examination of social relations and conceptions of power that have an egregious and lasting effect on society, and more specifically shape the forms of violence experienced by both females and males, is crucial. Importantly, in her work on sexual violence during genocide,
Catherine MacKinnon suggests that “sexual subordination, outside of war and genocide, also contributes to creating women as a subordinated group under conditions of sex inequality” (MacKinnon 2006:226). Subordination and inequality also have important implications for gendercide, thus “a theory of gendercide cannot address gender in isolation, but must highlight the gender relations that also exist[,] A main point is the way in which gender conflict contributes to other forms of conflicts, and is present within them” (Holter 2002:63).

In order to better comprehend gender- and sex-selective mass killings, it is essential to examine the cultural and social underpinnings within societies that speak to the larger and more extensive power dynamics that lead to gender- and sex-specific violence. Carpenter clarifies this point in her discussion of the need to distinguish between gender and sex in gendercide, stressing that “gender can operate indirectly, as a cultural schema that channels men and women into separate spaces where they are at risk for different types of harm; or directly, as a conscious ideology of actors who may use sex as a proxy variable for socially constructed attributes” (2002:236). Without a thorough analysis of cultural norms and social relations regarding sex and gender, theoretical understanding will continue to be hampered.

Conclusion

This commentary has provided an overview of the term gendercide, both developmentally and conceptually. The work of several of the most prominent scholars and theorists working on the topic has been highlighted. Two other forms of gender- and sex-based atrocities, femicide and gynocide, also have been noted. The need for careful social analysis of these terms – as concepts and ultimately theories are further developed – is of particular importance. The ominous 1988 Anfal campaign against military-aged Kurdish men and boys illustrates how sensitivity to circumstances involving both males and females must be maintained. As the authors of the lead article suggest, and as this commentary affirms, the critical consideration of genocide must be complemented by a critical consideration of gendercide.

Notes

1. Amy D. Bhalla is an M.A. candidate in International Human Rights at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Her research focuses on women’s human rights. She also works as an editor at Human Rights & Human Welfare and is a staff member at the Center On Rights Development. She can be reached by e-mail at amy.bhalla@du.edu.

References Cited

Carpenter, R. Charli

Holter, Øystein Gullvåg

Jones, Adam

MacKinnon, Catherine

Radford, Jill

Russell, Diana E.H.

United Nations Study of the Secretary General

Warren, Mary Anne