The lead article on genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing was inspired by comments made by members of the Committee for Human Rights (CFHR) of the American Anthropological Association nearly a decade ago, with the present research – in the form of a literature and case-specific review – commencing in early 2006 and carrying through late 2008. While not conducted under the auspices of the current CFHR (of which the senior author is a member), the committee’s influence still has been significant. The research also was inspired by the AAA’s 2001 draft statement on ethnic cleansing. While not an official “statement of principles” of the CFHR, or of the Human Rights and Social Justice Committee of the Society for Applied Anthropology (which the senior author chairs), it is intended to represent key issues of concern to applied and cultural anthropologists. It is by no means all encompassing, but rather is exploratory and selectively representative of key themes.

Four of the five authors of the lead article were graduate students at the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies (now the Josef Korbel School of International Studies) when the work commenced in 2006. Their involvement was in response to a long-standing tradition of the High Plains Society for Applied Anthropology, namely, that qualified students be encouraged to publish their research in peer-reviewed journals and that they be assisted by senior society members in doing so. Continuing with this tradition, once the initial manuscript had been drafted, five additional students from the school also were recruited in 2008. All had been students of mine; all had demonstrated exemplary analytical skills in the classroom in the field of human rights and/or humanitarian assistance. Commentaries were solicited from each, building on points either extensively detailed or briefly noted in the lead article. As will become evident, these commentaries add a great deal to the discussion.

Roxolana Wynar addresses the still not-well-known genocide that emerged in her family’s homeland of Ukraine in the early 1930s. Under Stalin an artificial famine – the Holodomor – was induced, that led to the deaths and/or forcible displacements of several million people. Nicole Herrera addresses issues associated with the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted in 1948. Subsequent accountability and enforcement, including roles played by the United States, are of special concern. Barbara Bonner tackles the issue of humanitarian aid versus humanitarian intervention in times of extreme crisis examining the 1988 genocide of Kurds in northern Iraq. Josiah Marineau analyzes certain human rights implications of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 in which processes of victimization and initial denial are shown to have been complemented by emergent (but imperfect) processes of reconciliation under gacaca courts. Amy Bhalla writes about one of the newer themes in need of analysis in this field, that involving sex-selective mass killing and gendercide. Understandings of power, subordination, and inequality – in the broader context of social relations – are shown to be essential.
Genocide, Ethnocide, and Ethnic Cleansing: An Exploratory Review

Peter Van Arsdale, Mellissa Jessen, Nicole Hawthorne, Kellie Ramirez, and Cathy Smith

Abstract

This article is exploratory in nature. It takes a cross-cultural, case-based approach in outlining factors associated with the processes of genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing. The works of anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, human rights analysts, and others are cited. Within the category of genocide, the Iraq/Kurdistan and Rwanda cases are featured. Within the category of ethnocide, the Cambodian case is presented. Within the category of ethnic cleansing, the cases of Palestine/Israel and Bosnia are covered. Processes of particular interest to anthropologists, both cultural and applied, include intrusion, denial, bystanding, victimization, expulsion, intervention, and reconciliation. That of perpetration remains the most obvious. One assertion is that definitive theories of genocide are lacking; on the other hand, helpful analytic frameworks are shown to exist. “Warning signs,” “touchstones,” and “lessons learned” are highlighted. The role of the state is discussed. This article is not a “how to stop genocide” or “how to redefine genocide” treatise, but is intended to highlight five of the most important cases of the twentieth century and also to provide suggestions – explicit or implicit – as to how anthropologists can contribute to the field. [genocide, ethnocide, ethnic cleansing, human rights, humanitarian assistance, Kurdistan, Rwanda, Palestine, Bosnia, Cambodia]

I. Introduction

Genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing are perhaps the most horrific activities practiced by humans. Although the mass slaughter of neighboring groups also has been documented among chimpanzees (Judson 2007), no other advanced species systematically attempts to destroy complete groups of its own kind. It is the paradox of destruction envisioned within the broader scheme of survival that makes this issue so difficult to analyze.

This document is intended to summarize recent work on the topic, drawing attention to issues of special interest to anthropologists (especially those working in the area of human rights). As noted in the “Preface,” it was inspired by comments made by members of the AAA’s Committee for Human Rights (CFHR) nearly a decade ago. The literature review for the present article was initiated in 2006. Some of the authors’ own on-site work during the past decade also is incorporated.

A cross-cultural, case-based approach is employed, framed by an introduction that features some of the latest multidisciplinary thinking in the field and by a concluding section that features themes of particular interest to cultural anthropologists. Both intellectual and emotive points are raised. The literature reviewed leads to the assertion that deeper understandings of the processes of intrusion, denial, bystanding, victimization, expulsion, intervention, and reconciliation – in addition to perpetration – all can benefit substantially from anthropological insights. These processes are cross-referenced as the five primary cases are presented herein. However, although some suggestions are provided, this is not a “how to stop genocide” document. It also is not a “how to redefine the term genocide” document, despite the complementary analyses of the terms ethnocide and ethnic cleansing which are included.

As will be inferred, as the article’s conclusions are drawn, key opportunities present themselves regarding how better to advocate on behalf of those whose rights have been abused. Anthropologists are generally well-placed to engage an array of applied research skills and contact networks, including those involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), although generally less well-placed to engage transnationally important policy change mechanisms. Further contributions can be made by anthropologists in the context of genocide regarding, e.g., the secondary impacts on families of victims; in the context of ethnocide regarding, e.g., cultural and religious disappearance; and in the context of
ethnic cleansing regarding, e.g., bystanding as atrocities unfold. Basic ethnographic insights remain essential.

A number of resources have been consulted as this research has proceeded. Of particular importance have been Ben Kiernan’s new masterwork, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (2007), Samantha Power’s “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (2002), and Dinah Shelton’s edited work, Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (three volumes, 2005).

This document is intended to complement and expand upon the recent article by the present authors, “Death and Denial,” which appeared in the October 2007 edition of Anthropology News.

**Laying the Groundwork**

In this document, cases selected for inclusion involve Rwanda, Cambodia, Iraq/Kurdistan, Bosnia, and Palestine/Israel. These case studies allow consideration of genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing, while recognizing the overlap among these concepts. The authors wrestled with which cases to include and which to exclude. Consideration was given to the atrocities in Ukraine under Stalin, spanning over two decades, when several million people died through forcible displacement, starvation, and murder. The total number of persons who were sent to concentration camps and other arms of the Gulag numbered nearly 18 million, with some 4.5 million never returning. The decade of the 1930s was the pinnacle in terms of ominous activity, but 1952 the pinnacle in terms of numbers in camps (Applebaum 2003:92-93). Consideration also was given to the scorched earth campaigns in Guatemala. From 1960 to 1996, the country was engaged in a civil conflict involving the military and a disparate group of guerrilla fighters that killed as many as 200,000 people and resulted in the disappearances of as many as 45,000 more (Sanford 2003:34). The current situation in Darfur, termed by Gérard Prunier (2005) an “ambiguous genocide,” inspired much of the thought behind the current document, but the genocide there is not a focus of this article. (The senior author, who has worked there, still is analyzing data.) Ultimately, the reasons for including cases were based upon a combination of the authors’ previous secondary research, visits to, or first-hand work in, some of the areas, and the diversity of factors the cases represent.

The term genocide emerged in the 1940s as the Nazi regime proceeded with its war campaign. As Ben Kiernan (2007:10) notes, the Polish Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin coined the term, putting it into print in 1944 in his Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. The purposeful, planned nature of mass killings for political purposes was addressed. Other scholars and respondents have offered complementary definitions:

a. **Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn:**

Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator (1990:4).

b. **Allison Des Forges:**

At the start of genocide, there is a cause, a reason, and people who find it worthwhile. The cause does not drift around there by accident; it’s even fine-tuned by the intimidators: The desire to win the game for good [transcribed from a respondent in Rwanda] (1999:1).

c. **Article 2 of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:**

In 1948 (as entered into force in 1951), genocide was defined as action with the intent to “destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.” The actions specified:

1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
This is noteworthy timing-wise, as Robert Albro (2008) points out, in that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also was created in 1948. The two documents were drafted simultaneously and, to some extent, interactively. Members of each drafting committee were attuned to discussions being held by the other. While consideration was given to “national, ethnic, racial, or religious” groups by both committees, Lemkin’s original construct—which could well have accommodated “cultural genocide”—was weakened. Even today, “cultural disappearance” through forced assimilation, as likely has occurred among certain tribal groups, e.g., in Ethiopia, Burma, and Brazil, is not central to the discussion of genocide.

From these definitions, useful adaptations have evolved. For example, U.N. Security Council resolutions, such as No. 955 (adopted November 8 1994, with regard to the Rwandan crisis) built directly on Article 2. While reiterating points (a) through (e) and promulgating the decision to establish an international tribunal, it went on to note that punishable activities include genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide (Shelton 2005:1271).

Useful variations also have evolved from these definitions. For example, sociologist Leo Kuper refers to “genocidal massacres.” These comprise “shorter, limited episodes of killing directed at a specific local or regional community, targeted because of its membership in a larger group. Genocidal massacres often serve as object lessons for other members of the group” (Kiernan 2007:13), while for some perpetrators they serve as a kind of “test” to see how much they can get away with. Under the 1948 Convention, genocide itself may be partial, and usually is. The 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia would be an example. The Gujarat attacks of 2002 in India would be another.

As Albro (2008) stresses, the term “genocide” seemingly expands and contracts. Yet, the diverse definitions are useful as “platforms” for further analyses. Of particular importance are the analytic frameworks that subsequently have arisen. Although the term “theory” is used by some authors to encompass one or more of these, the opinion expressed herein is that definitive theories still are lacking. Four differing analytic frameworks have been selected; all are useful. None are contradictory, one to another.

1. Ben Kiernan (2007) integrates his expertise in history, politics, and sociology as he develops an eclectic yet useful analytic framework. He covers a remarkable number of events in space and time. For him, it is less about “event” and more about “process.” For example, he stresses that as many as twelve million indigenous people may have been killed, died of imported diseases, or been forcibly enslaved by the Spanish in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America in the brief half-century following the arrival of Columbus (2007:77).

2. Less well known, in Southeast Asia in 1470 as many as 60,000 Chams were killed by the Vietnamese (Dai Viet) army. Some 30,000 prisoners subsequently were taken. Other campaigns in the region included forced starvation (2007:109-110). In the 1580s, the English army in Ireland may have reduced the Irish population by as much as 30 percent, while laying waste to the land and destroying a number of towns. Much of the indigenous culture, in a process of ethnocide, was destroyed (2007:203). Reflecting certain patterns of the ancient world, Kiernan sees modern genocide demonstrating “four telltale characteristics...that regularly [have] occurred from the fifteenth century to the twenty-first: the preoccupation of perpetrators with race, antiquity, agriculture, and expansion” (2007:605). Utopianism, complemented by fetishes of purity and contamination, underpin many of the cases he illustrates.

2. Jane Springer (2006:41-43) suggests that, to the extent to which theories of genocide exist or tentatively can be identified, they fall under three broad headings. All attempt to address the question “Why?” The first type is resource-related. A government or other influential group wants its members, usually represented by settlers, to take over the land of the (usually indigenous) people already living there. This was seen in the “villagization” scheme of the Derg regime in Ethiopia during the 1980s. The second type is threat-related. As in the case of Rwanda, an ethnic threat was perceived by the Hutu population as they considered the Tutsi...
population. The threat often peaks as central control diminishes. The third type is utopian-related, a theme also prominent in Kiernan's work. As under Pol Pot in Cambodia, a "cleansing" is seen as necessary to bring about a desired future. Although leaders like Pol Pot and his colleague Nuon Chea indeed might be perceived as evil, Springer stresses that an "evil man" theory is not useful. Demonization yields few substantive results, on-site, for a population in turmoil. In contrast, perspectives involving the interplay of sociological, political, and economic conditions are useful. Her analytic framework for understanding genocide encompasses an operational definition, background and history, anatomy of the event, response to the event, and, based on a comparative synthesis, suggestions for preventing future events.

3. Samantha Power (2002) believes that the twentieth-century genocides that stand out most ominously are the Serbs' eradication of non-Serbs, the Ottoman slaughter of Armenians, the Nazi holocaust, the "killing fields" of Cambodia, Saddam Hussein's reign of terror against northern Iraq's Kurds, and the Hutu extermination of Tutsis. Her framework analyzes each event point/counterpoint to what outside actors, especially the U.S., did or (most often) did not do. In a sense, she presents a "knowledge - blame - inaction" paradigm, emphasizing the roles and responsibilities of external actors with power. "[All major] U.S. policy responses to genocide were astonishingly similar across time, geography, ideology, and geopolitical balance" (2002:xvi). Key actors in a genocidal situation are victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. While not referring to an "evil man" theory, Power does use the term evil in relation to genocide. She stresses that it takes imagination to wrestle with evil (2002:xvii).

4. Zach Dubinsky (2005), incorporating the work of Linda Melvern (2004), presents an analytic framework that suggests "lessons to be learned." Relying particularly upon Rwanda, he summarizes five. First, the world can ignore genocide. Second, sometimes there are no heroes. Third, the worst orgies are planned. Fourth, the hardest targets are soft targets. In Rwanda, much of the genocidal coordination was carried out over public radio. As many as 100,000 people, mostly civilians, conducted the killings using only machetes and other simple tools. Fifth, inhumane actions reflect the perpetrators' stereotyping of the targeted group (e.g., Tutsi as "cockroaches") and the bystanders' ideological rigidity (e.g., the U.S. awaiting "further confirming information").

**Warning Signs**

Three of the four authors just cited emphasize warning signs as they consider impending genocides, ethnocides, or ethnic cleansing. This is one of the most important and straight-forward analytic approaches, because it portends a chance to intervene and assist those at-risk. As John Heidenrich (2001) notes, one of the first to propose genocide-specific early warning systems – in the early 1980s – was Israel Charny. Although frequently ignored by outsiders, early warning signs can be obvious, as in the case of Rwanda, where NGO personnel had clear clues through public address announcements days before the killing began.

The U.N. Office of the Special Advisor is among those attempting to obtain information on warning signs. The office's "responsibility to protect" protocol indicates that efforts to obtain within-system signs must be complemented by extraordinary efforts to obtain warning signs of impending genocide from farther afield. Therefore, it is helpful when civil society organizations transmit to the office warning signs of growing ethnic unrest, displays of group hatred, discrimination, or the ethnic, racial, national or religious dimension of human rights violations. Although it is difficult to provide an exhaustive list of warning signs indicating the impending development of genocide, the elements listed are indicative of situations requiring careful monitoring. This list is drawn from, and inspired by, the existing literature on genocide activities and prevention, as well as from the practices of the Office of the Special Adviser in recent years.

**The existence of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group(s) at risk:** Warning signs can be (a) a pattern of discrimination with the purpose or effect of impairing the enjoyment of certain human rights; (b) exclusionary ideologies that
purport to justify discrimination; (c) specific identification of groups and their association with a specific political identity or opinion (including possible compulsory identification or registering of group membership in a way that could potentially lead to the group being targeted in the future); and (d) demonization of groups in political or social discourse.

**Violations of human rights and humanitarian law, which may become massive or serious:** These violations can include (a) armed conflict in which violations of international humanitarian law disproportionately affect a specific group (e.g., intentional massacre of unarmed civilians, civilian targeting during military campaigns, one-sided physical brutality); (b) violations of civil and political rights affecting a specific group (e.g., murder, particularly directed against community leaders; torture, mutilation, rape and sexual violence; abduction; forcible population movement/ethnic cleansing; expropriation, destruction of property, and looting; lack of freedom of speech/press/assembly/religious expression); (c) violations of economic, social and cultural rights (e.g., destruction of subsistence food supply, denial of water or medical attention, human-made famine, redirection of aid supplies); (d) instances of discrimination (e.g., access to work and resources, political marginalization, restricted movement, education); and (e) a climate of impunity in which these events unfold.

**Additional warning signs:** Also to be considered are (a) a lack of institutional framework for citizens to seek justice, redress and demand accountability; (b) concentration of power (economic/political) in one or a few groups to the detriment of others; (c) existence of and support to militias that could carry out attacks against groups by proxy; (d) perceived or real external support to groups that could become targets due to being seen as “collaborators” with external enemies; (e) withdrawal of rights associated with citizenship from specific groups; (f) hate speech, incitement to violence, or humiliation of a group in the media; and (g) forced relocations, segregation, isolation, or concentration of a group. Certain of these warning signs “overlap” with those listed earlier.

*A history of genocide or discrimination:* A history of violence against a group may presage renewed episodes of repression or countermovements against prior oppressors. Important elements that may indicate the weight of past experience are (a) a history of vilification or dehumanization of a group; (b) the use of symbols, flags or markings to conjure previous abuse; (c) denial of past atrocities and genocides; and (d) celebration of instances of perceived or actual abuse of a group.

This list of warning signs is by no means exhaustive. Taken independently, each of the warning signs noted above may be of concern, but not necessarily indicative of a genocidal situation. The predictive value of these factors is most often a function of their interplay and aggregate in a given situation. Nonetheless, when a number of these warning signs are present, the Special Adviser is alerted so as to monitor the situation and give consideration to specific preventive measures.

II. Genocide: Case Studies

**Iraq/Kurdistan.** Synthesizing from among the definitions and analytic frameworks presented in the preceding section, the atrocities that impacted the Kurds can best be termed genocide. The Kurdish genocide generally refers to the murderous campaigns, including chemical attacks, known as Anfal (“The Spoils of War”) that took place in Iraq between February 23 and September 6 1988, although the Ba’athist government targeted Kurdish villages long before this time (Jones 2004). Approximately 3,000 villages were destroyed and 180,000 persons killed, including a large proportion of civilians. Nearly 1.5 million Kurds became refugees (Yıldız 2004: 25). Much of this horror stemmed from a policy of “Arabization.” “Ethnic cleansing [also] was a central aspect of Saddam’s Anfal campaigns against the Kurds. Moving the Kurdish population out of the area around the oil fields and repopulating those areas with Sunni Arabs occurred relentlessly during this time frame” (Kelly 2007: 241). As will be detailed below, the genocide of the Kurds included chemical attacks against entire villages, killing mostly civilians, the concentration of men,
women and children in concentration camps and mass, execution-style killings of mostly men but also women, children, and the elderly. All of these constitute acts of genocide, as previously defined— they aimed to destroy the Kurds as a people. Among the processes of special interest to anthropologists, following comments in the introduction to this article, are denial and victimization.

Power describes what happened to the Kurds as an ethnic-based genocide under the cover of a counter-insurgency campaign (2002:172). Thus, it might also be termed an ethnocide. However, scholars like Shaw refute this differentiation, calling it “superfluous to use a special term for the destruction of ethnic groups, when these are one of the principal types understood as targets of genocide” (Shaw 2007:65). Human Rights Watch/Middle East Watch reports show how at times only military-aged men and boys were targeted for mass executions, leaning towards the term “gendericide;” however, during other parts of the Anfal campaigns women and children were also targeted (Jones 2002). For this term, Shaw also has a sharp response: “That genocide is gendered...is an important insight. However, through this violence, the perpetrators usually intend to destroy not gender groups, but ethnic, national, and other groups that they have defined as enemies” (Shaw 2007:69). It is clear that many “-cides” are relevant to the Kurdish case, but few dispute that the aim was to destroy any semblance of Kurdish life from the northern, Kurdish region of Iraq. Hussein was in fact ultimately charged with crimes of genocide for what happened to the Kurds. Research on the Kurdish genocide stresses the intertwining relationship between genocide and the backdrop of war, as in many other instances of ethnic cleansing and ethnocide. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians “informally allied with Iraqi Kurds in the north— handily providing Hussein the excuse he needed to eradicate the Kurds as traitors” (Kelly 2007:236). By labeling them traitors and saboteurs, Hussein tried to legitimate their killing. In order to prove genocide, intent must be weighed thoroughly, and the Kurds had to have been targeted as Kurds, not simply as political traitors (Yildiz 2004:236).

Unfortunately, as in most genocides, the rest of the world did little to help the Kurds while they were being attacked with poison gas and shot dead by the thousands. Nobody documents this tragic and dangerous silence as extensively as Power (2002). Because of the war between Iran and Iraq, sides were chosen and most of the Western world, most notably the United States, sided with Iraq, leaving little room for criticism. In fact, the U.S. was aiding Iraq in many ways, including economically. The late Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island tried to speak up and intervene, creating a sanctions package against Hussein’s government, but most of the administration saw the matter as an “internal affair” (p. 173) and denied its importance. Power stresses that the U.S. government was anything but ignorant of the situation. Quoting a State Department office director for Iran and Iraq: “We knew that something dreadful was going on. We knew [Ali Hassan] al-Majid was running the show. We had the satellite overhead that showed the villages razed...widespread destruction and bulldozing of Kurdish villages, mass forced displacement of Kurds...” (p. 186).

Not only did the United States know, it chose to do nothing, seemingly putting its political and economic interests above the lives of innocents. “[It] appears that U.S. and British intelligence agencies did indeed have a fairly clear idea of what was happening [but] clearly realized that forthright public condemnation would be bad for business and kept silent” (Yildiz 2004:32). Power comments extensively on the silence of the U.S. when reports— received via refugees in Turkey and other surrounding areas— concluded that Iraq was using chemical weapons on the Kurds. This inaction provided a carte blanche to those in power, knowing they could proceed with relative impunity, facing few consequences. Finally, when a refugee crisis began to unfold, with hundreds of thousands of Kurds fleeing across the borders to Turkey and other surrounding countries, the United States and its allies took initiative. On August 16, 1991, “Operation Provide Comfort” was launched. This was four years after the Anfal campaign, which opened up a “safe haven” for Kurds in northern Iraq (Power 2002:241). More as a response to the refugee problem than to genocide, it did allow many Kurds to regain some semblance of hope.
Recently, forensic anthropologists and archaeologists – building on the helpful work of Human Rights Watch and other investigative teams – have more systematically surveyed and begun excavating some of the mass graves associated with the Anfal campaigns. Susan Malin-Boyce and Sonny Trimble are but two of many dedicated analysts who have worked on this, in their case since 2005 in the Hajara Desert in Iraq’s Muthanna Province (Pringle 2009).

Before his execution, Saddam Hussein was on trial for genocide, among other war crimes and crimes against humanity, along with al-Majid, or “Chemical Ali,” under the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (Yildiz 2004:131). Many other members of the Ba’athist regime in charge during the Anfal campaign remain to be tried, but al-Majid and Hussein were the only two to be specifically targeted for crimes of genocide (Kelly 2007:237). Considering the current security situation in Iraq, coupled with an uneven judicial structure, the success of the trials remains questionable.

**Rwanda.** The Rwandan genocide of 1994 led to the deaths of over 800,000, primarily Tutsi, people. The killing was systematic and state-sponsored, or, state-condoned. Among the processes of special interest to anthropologists are denial and reconciliation. The former is illustrated in the initial inaction of the international community, including the United States; the latter (discussed in the accompanying commentary by Josiah Marineau) is illustrated in the community-based *gacaca* courts, which still are processing cases.

The Hutu powerbase established themselves as the most efficient genocidal killers in history while primarily using simple weapons. The main means of warfare involved the use of grenades, bows and arrows, and machetes. The government compiled lists of Tutsis to kill by taking advantage of their highly structured government system; radio broadcasts compelled people to act. Administratively, the country was divided into five provinces, which were in turn divided into thirty districts, which were in turn divided into *secteurs*, which were in turn divided into *Nyumbakumi*. In Swahili, Nyumbakumi translates literally to mean “ten houses,” the smallest level to which governmental oversight pertains. This provided the government with a well established and straightforward means of documenting the location of every Tutsi.

As one respondent said, “The message from the top was passed down to the local village chiefs, the *conseillers*. The conseillers had lists of Tutsis who should be killed. They simply organized their constituents...The leaders of the party and the leaders of the militia rounded up all the men in the village. We were told that we had a mission. We were given a list of people to kill. If we met someone on the list, they would be killed” (Berkeley 2001:3).

Genocides can be characterized – abstracted in a sense – by “touchstones.” These are events, often relatively small in scale but long remembered, indicative of the broader array of ominous happenings. In Rwanda, such a touchstone “unfolded” in Ntarama, a small village within the Nyamata district of Kigali province. In Ntarama there is a small church where roughly five thousand Tutsis gathered for protection. On April 15th, 1994, the *interahamwe* (i.e., *genocidaires*) gathered around the church building, smashed holes through the walls, and then launched grenades into the building, killing the majority of those inside. It is assumed, as was common, that the *interahamwe* then went through the church building with machetes making sure that no one was able to survive. Later, in order to mark the devastation, Rwandans decided to leave the bodies of all those who died in this church. Today, the skeletal remains have been rearranged, but the memorial remains, a site that one of the present authors visited. For the tenth anniversary of the massacre, in 2004, banners were hung which read, in Kinyarwanda (in rough translation), “If you had known me, and had truly known yourselves, you wouldn’t have killed me.”

**Lessons and Outcomes**

Many Rwandans thought that there was no one to help. The lesson of the bystander became painfully obvious.
It sometimes touched us painfully that they awaited death in silence. Evenings, we would ask over and over, “Why no protest from these people who are about to leave? Why do they not beg for mercy?” The organizers claimed that the Tutsis felt guilty for the sin of being Tutsi. Some interahamwe kept saying they felt responsible for the misfortunes they had brought upon us. Well, I knew that was not true. The Tutsis were not asking for anything in those fatal moments because they no longer believed in words. They had no more faith in crying out, like frightened animals, for example, howling to be heard above the mortal blows. An overpowering sorrow was carrying those people away. They felt so abandoned they did not even open their mouths (John Léopold quoted in Hatzfeld 2005:234).

Lessons learned, on the one hand, seem profound. Gripping books like that by Philip Gourevitch (1998) and Roméo Dallaire (2003) detail “process” as events transpired and “product” as the massacre concluded, respectively. On the other hand, the lessons seem to exist only in the abstract when the current situation in Darfur is considered. That Rwandan President Paul Kagame demonstrates subtle yet persuasive abilities to effect change, aided by former U.S. President Bill Clinton and other leaders, offers a positive outcome. A wide-ranging process of reconciliation (although yielding mixed results) is occurring through the community-run gacaca courts, and for some has enabled another positive outcome: reconciliation among perpetrators and their victims’ families.

III. Ethnic Cleansing: Case Studies

As Kiernan (2007:16) stresses, ethnic cleansing is a concept that overlaps with the concepts of genocide and genocidal massacre. Its applicability to particular settings and events is more widely debated, and more widely disputed, than is the concept of genocide. To view particular events as ethnic cleansing it is important to examine several definitions of the term. The term originated in the Balkans, likely Croatia or Bosnia (eiszenje, cleansing), as early as the immediate post-World War II period, and was couched in the language of the perpetrators directed against their perceived enemies—who needed to be cleansed from the territory (Van Arsdale 2006:72; Shaw 2007:49). In response to the events in the Balkans U.N. Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki suggested ethnic cleansing to be “the elimination by the ethnic group exerting control over a given territory of members of other ethnic groups” (Shaw 2007:50). A 1993 Committee of Experts described it as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force and intimidation to remove persons of a given group from the area” (Shaw 2007:50). The AAA’s Committee for Human Rights (2001) noted that ethnic cleansing likely is not what happens during the course of “normal” warfare where the conflict is not primarily ethnic or where enslavement (as opposed to elimination of the ethnic group or its culture) predominates. Forcible economic removal of a group also does not constitute ethnic cleansing. Ilan Pappe, an outspoken Israeli “new historian,” cites Drazen’s definition as “a well defined policy of a particular group of persons to systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin.... [It] involves violence and is very often connected with military operations...from discrimination to extermination, and entails violations of human rights and international humanitarian law....” (2006:1).

Palestine/Israel. Cases involving ethnic cleansing are among the most contentious being analyzed by academics and activists alike. None is more controversial than that involving Palestine and Israel. This is one reason this situation is included here. Processes of expulsion and intrusion, of special interest to anthropologists owing to their understandings of migration and forcible displacement, are identified briefly. “Very little is said about what Zionism entailed for non-Jews who happened to have encountered it...” (Said 2000:15). While the embers continue to spark in the Middle East and the modern state of Israel remains
undeniably at continuous risk, the question of ethnic cleansing here refers to the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, the resultant war, and the creation of a huge number of Palestinian refugees. Israeli historian Benny Morris, part of a growing cadre in Israel called the “new historians,” encapsulates the issue in very simple terms: How did hundreds of thousands of people become refugees in 1948 (Morris 2004:2)? From the Jewish perspective, a homeland was needed, especially after experiencing the worst form of anti-Semitism to take place in history during the Holocaust. But, as recognized by Said and many other Palestinians, “What we will discover is that everything positive from the Zionist standpoint looked absolutely negative from the perspective of the native Arab Palestinians” (Said 2000:31). One way of understanding the events that led to a Jewish state but a major Palestinian exodus is to view them, according to Pappe, within a paradigm of ethnic cleansing beyond just war. In fact, the Hebrew word for exodus, *tibir*, actually translates more closely to cleaning or purifying (Shaw 2007:59).

Evidence of ethnic cleansing in Palestine/Israel is suggested by the fact that within just a few months, in the benchmark year of 1948, after the State of Israel was proclaimed, the demographic profile of the land changed from being majority-dominated Palestinian to Jewish. In order to create a Jewish homeland, ruled by and populated by Jews, it was necessary in the eyes of early Zionist leaders to de-Arabize the land. Generations-old Palestinian villages were destroyed or re-named and re-populated by Jewish immigrants and refugees. Expulsions impacted thousands. What some have described as a genocidal massacre, aimed at ethnic cleansing, took place at Deir Yassin. Jewish forces killed several hundred men, women and children, most of whom were innocent civilians and non-combatants (Shipler 2002:20). It should be stressed that many historians claim it was an aberration of Jewish policy, committed by Jewish terrorist groups without the sanction of the Yishuv or Haganah, and thus was not indicative of policy. After an initial bout of random, indiscriminate shootings, several villagers were rounded up and shot execution style (Pappe 2006: 90). While Deir Yassin was not the only massacre by Jewish forces, including the Haganah, it was not the sole cause of Palestinian flight. As word got around many other villages evacuated in fear of similar atrocities (Morris 2004:125). In recent years, some official responsibility has been admitted by the Israeli government. The Palestinian narrative indicates a number of other “Deir Yassins” also occurred.

Beyond the expulsion and exodus of the Palestinians, there remained a second part to the possible ethnic cleansing within Palestine/Israel. Even before the war came to an end, many Palestinian refugees wished to return to their lands and homes, and thus, Israel began a strenuous effort to prevent this from happening. The homogenous Jewish state envisioned by Jewish leaders would not be undermined by the acceptance of refugee returns (Morris 2004:312). U.N. Resolution 194, which allowed Palestinian refugees the right of return or just compensation, was not adhered to by the Jewish state (Pappe 2006:188). At that time, while many Israeli Jews strongly emphasized that the cause of the refugee crisis was rooted in the war and Arab propaganda, they saw part of the solution to their unease in the existence of a large “pacified Arab minority,” implicitly countering substantial refugee returns. Certain guidelines were laid out to ensure this. These included destruction of property formerly inhabited by Arabs, prevention of land cultivation, large-scale Jewish settlement in the “empty” areas, and legislation explicitly prohibiting return (Morris 2004:313). These are forms of intrusion.

During the period November 1947 through July 1949, the main exodus of the Palestinians took place (Morris 2004:6). It was not just for reasons of war and generalized insecurity that many of these people fled, but rather for reasons also questioned by Said and Pappe: “How was the Zionist movement to turn Palestine into a ‘Jewish’ state if the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants were Arabs?” (Morris 2004:40). Morris argues that “the logic of a transfer solution to the ‘Arab problem’ remained
ineluctable; without some sort of massive displacement of Arabs from the area of the Jewish state-to-be, there could be no viable Jewish state” (Shaw 2007:58-59). Over 500 Arab villages were depopulated of Arabs and two-thirds of the Palestinian population (approximately 800,000) had been driven out by late 1948, a benchmark year as previously noted (Said 2004:345). Most “new historians” refer to Tichot Daled or Plan D, which evolved from a Haganah military strategy linked to a decision affecting the fate of the Palestinians. The rapid creation of hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs means, to some analysts, that ethnic cleansing was clearly underway.

**Bosnia.** Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia involved more than the extermination of a group of people (a form of genocide); it was an effort to eradicate members of a sub-culture through mass murder, forcible displacement, and subjugation. For example, a “touchstone” occurred as Serbs conquered the Muslim majority-populated town of Zvornik during the 1992–1995 war. Besides “cleansing” the area of Muslims, Serbs spoke of renaming the town “Zvonik,” the proper Serb name. Besides their renaming campaign, Serb forces managed to destroy hundreds of mosques, here and elsewhere. In the Krajina region alone, roughly nine hundred mosques had been demolished by the winter of 1994 (Rieff 1995:97). In the summer of 1992, Serb forces attempted to deport the entire Muslim community of Kozluk to Hungary. Eighteen hundred Muslims spent four days on an eighteen-car train, but were denied entrance into Hungary upon arrival at the border. They were later sent to Palic, a camp for Muslims.

According to a spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Serb forces commonly utilized deportation tactics against Muslim communities (Gutman 1993:20). Many Muslims, also known as Bosniacs, were deported from northwest Bosnia to the central part of the state. It is suggested that the Muslim population in northwest Bosnia – where they had comprised 90 percent of the population – temporarily ceased to exist (Gutman 1993:36). One victim from Prijedor recalls being crammed into a bus for transfer:

“We had to lie down on top of each other. We were forbidden to sit on the seats... Some detainees were ill and unable either to go to the toilets or to control their bowels. Then the guards turned on the heating in the bus and closed the doors and windows. As you can imagine, the heat in early August was unbearable” (Wesselingh and Vaulerin 2005:25).

Victimization is a process of special interest to anthropologists; since World War II numerous ethnographic studies have been made of victims and survivors of civil wars, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks. Concentration camps were the destination for many Bosnians. There, soldiers carried out their gruesome orders because of the effective infiltration of propaganda. For example, it is estimated that during a six-week period during May and June 1992, Serb forces killed some 3,000 civilians in the Brcko concentration camp and surrounding villages. Those killed often faced brutal atrocities before their death such as bodily mutilation, rape, and castration (Gutman 1993:50-51; Van Arsdale 2006:73-77). Impregnation by rape was a systematic tactic of the Bosnian war. As a form of psychological warfare, some women were forced to carry the offspring of their enemy. When a raped woman conceived a “Serbian” child, she lost a part of her ethnic and cultural identity. The woman was left to deal with the shame, and in many cases her husband or family had to deal with the guilt of being unable to seek retribution. In addition, during house raids and in detention camps, troops forced family members to sexually abuse each other. Between 1992-1995, it is estimated that 20,000 women were sexually assaulted or raped (Farr 2005:174).

“Too have been raped as part of the policy of genocidal rape, and to be allowed to survive, is meant to represent a destiny scarcely referable to that of being killed after the rapes; it is tantamount to having been marked so thoroughly – on body and mind – by one’s victimization” (Vetlesen 2005:197).

The conditions at concentration camps were unbearable and inhumane. People were allotted one meal a day, which was often
infested with worms. Many suffered from dysentery because of the lack of potable water. It is recorded that some detainees lost up to 50 kilograms during their detention. In the Omarska camp, southeast of Prijedor, prisoners were divided into three groups: the elite, which included doctors, businessmen, teachers, lawyers, clergy, et al.; prisoners of war; and prisoners classified as harmless to the Serb population. There were two torture and execution chambers at Omarska, the white house and the red house. Torture methods including flogging with pick-handles and iron bars, often aiming at the head, spine, kidneys, and genitals (Wesselingh 2005:53). Torture is ubiquitous to the experiences of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and ethnocide.

Raphael Lemkin, the scholar whose work was noted earlier, indicated that genocide has two distinctive phases. The first phase includes the “destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group” and the second phase, “the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” (Vetlesen 2005:155). By the summer of 1992, many areas throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina were under siege by the Yugoslav/Serbian army (Lovrenovic 2001:196). Their forces bombarded cities and towns throughout Bosnia, terrorizing the population. The occupying army controlled civilian life: Food was scarce; people had little, if any, money to buy necessities; and if fortunate enough, electricity, water and gas were rationed. In cities such as Sarajevo and Mostar, innocent civilians were confined to their apartments by daily shelling and patrolling snipers. Degrading captivity and imprisonment became widespread warfare tactics until the occupying soldiers mandated measures for the disposal and exile of some members of opposing ethnic groups.

During a typical siege, those who remained in bombarded towns were left with scarce and meager supplies, which eventually ran out. As one survivor recalls: “We were at the edge of our endurance, pushing back limits that the day before we had considered as final. We woke up miserable, in cold rooms with window-panes made out of plastic bags in windows covered by split logs protecting us against shell shrapnel. We woke up exhausted and lice-ridden, without the desire and most often without even the strength to move, without families, alone and abandoned, humiliated, our past violated and our future slaughtered, our present defeated and defeating” (Suljagic 2005: 87).

Intervention is a process of more recent interest to anthropologists, especially in light of post-1990 instances of military-civilian cooperation as aid is being delivered to displaced populations. The case of Bosnia suggests that intervention sometimes best can be understood as its obverse, non-intervention, is considered. The July 1995 massacre of Muslims at Srebrenica correlates with the non-intervention of U.N.-sponsored Dutch peacekeepers who were based in this so-called “safe haven.” Some analysts believe that a forceful response to early Serb provocations might have averted the tragedy. Useful discussions of humanitarian intervention subsequently ensued (Van Arsdale 2006), helping shape present considerations of military roles in such crises.

**Lessons and Outcomes**

**Palestine/Israel.** One lesson of the Palestine/Israeli case is the importance of narrative considered in the context of denial. There is the Palestinian narrative and the Israeli narrative (each with variations). As more military documents are unveiled it is becoming apparent that, perhaps, the Palestinian narrative is relatively accurate. From an administrative viewpoint, Israel functions in part through denial. The “new historians,” like Benny Morris, have introduced a shift in the traditional Israeli creation narrative. This shift ranges from acceptance that the creation of Israel caused a great deal of suffering for the Palestinians, to a view illuminated by Ilan Pappe, that there was a designed plan of ethnic cleansing on the part of some early Israeli leaders. Until the mid-1990s this topic was considered taboo – off limits – for re-evaluation. Now that additional military documents are available for public scrutiny, however, academics have taken the opportunity to “go back to 1948”
and deconstruct certain claims. Some have advocated for the insertion of the term “Al Nakhba” (“The Catastrophe”) into Israeli secondary school textbooks. Although their viewpoints and theses vary, the “new historians” all share one perspective in common: Israel is responsible for much of the Palestinian suffering and the refugee problem.

**Bosnia.** As bystanders to the atrocities in Bosnia, the international community accepted the genocidal notion of “collective identity counts for everything and individual identity for nothing,” as outlined by Arne Johan Vetlesen, author of *Evil and Human Agency* (2005:155). Despite limited economic interest, the United States had no immediate *casus belli*. Furthermore, the U.S. was hesitant to intervene in what was seemingly an ethnic war, particularly in light of the Rwandan failure. A failure to examine the root causes of the conflict led Western powers to respond with ineffectual solutions. For example, an arms embargo mandated by the United Nations in September of 1991 was never lifted, which restricted the Bosnian Croat defense. This left the well-equipped Serbian forces to easily overwhelm the country (Malcolm 1994:242-243). The rising concerns over genocide prompted the West to send in United Nations peacekeeping officers; however, due to their limited mandate, U.N. forces were powerless to prevent the genocide, serving merely as witnesses to the continuing violence. In fact, some were eventually taken as hostages by the Serb army to ward off air strikes (Soeters 2005).

Regardless of the Western governments’ increased role during the concluding months of combat, their intervention strategies lacked substance. The tactics developed by the West to halt further carnage were inadequate. Furthermore, several policies actually exacerbated the situation for the participating republics. In order to control the genocidal violence, international representatives moved Bosnian refugees to camps outside of Bosnia and created safe havens for Muslim communities remaining in the country.

As noted above for Srebrenica, U.N. peacekeeping forces were charged with guarding the designated areas. However, their rules of engagement strictly mandated counterforce only when the U.N. forces themselves were attacked, not those under their protection. These ineffectual steps did little to mitigate the ongoing violence and, in fact, the situation escalated. The strategic placement of U.N. peacekeepers did not impede the Serb military agenda. The majority of peacekeepers were placed in areas designated and controlled by Croats and Bosniacs. Consequently, heavily armed conflict was elevated to high levels of brutality (Malcolm 1994:241-247).

When international communities acknowledged the emergence of separate sovereign states, particularly Croatia and Slovenia, the intrastate conflict escalated into interstate war. Moreover, the recognition of new states and the open discussion of ethnic groups’ needs by the international community contributed to a divisive discourse. During the final stages of the war, international forces did intervene effectively, but only after violence again had peaked (Lobell and Mauceri 2004).

**IV. Ethnocide: Case Study**

According to the Northwest Center for Holocaust, Genocide, and Ethnocide Education at Western Washington University, the term ethnocide was first used by Raphael Lemkin in the book noted earlier, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944), as an alternative to the term genocide to “refer to the physical, biological, and cultural dimensions of genocide.” However, it was the French ethnographer Pierre Clastres who defined ethnocide as “the systematic destruction of the thought and way of life of people different from those which carry out the destruction” (Northwest Center 2007:1). According to Clastres’ definition, ethnocide can occur without the intent to completely destroy a specific group of people. Ethnocide and genocide can take place concurrently. Although the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not mention the term ethnocide, two genocidal measures – imposing practices intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring
children to another group – can also be present in ethnocide, since both contribute to the destruction of a particular way of life by severing the bonds of family.

Cambodia. Events in Cambodia at the hands of the communist Khmer Rouge regime serve as an example of planned ethnocide being implemented along with genocide. Expulsion, intrusion, and reconciliation are three processes of importance to anthropologists that briefly are illustrated.

In April of 1975 the Khmer Rouge invaded the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh after defeating the Lon Nol government (backed by the United States) in a protracted five-year civil war. After years of violence stemming from the civil war and the presence of U.S. military (due to its war with Vietnam), the new Communist regime was welcome. One Cambodian survivor, Teeda Butt Mam, who was fifteen when the Khmer Rouge came to power remembers that she was “overwhelmed with joy” that the war had finally ended and that it did not matter who the victor was (between the Khmer Rouge revolutionaries and the Lon Nol government) just so long as peace was reinstated in her homeland (Pran 1997). Little did she know, that what was to follow would prove to be a horrific and terrifying reign of genocide and ethnocide. During the course of the Khmer Rouge reign, an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians would die by execution, malnutrition, or overwork (Tully 2005). Post 1979, the name Cambodia would become synonymous with mass death as evidence of the infamous “killing fields” (so named by the late Dith Pran) and “re-education” centers were uncovered.

Pol Pot’s vision for Cambodia was to create a “utopian” society with one culture. In order to create this utopia, those cultural values and traditions which threatened his vision were to be eradicated. The shift to a new society began immediately upon his takeover. Among the actions with “ethnocidal intent” were expulsion and evacuation of most people from all larger towns; abolition of markets; defrocking all Buddhist monks; and establishing high-level cooperatives throughout the country, with communal eating featured (Tully 2005; Kiernan 2007). Each one of these actions contributed to ethnocide as the perpetrators forcibly shifted the Cambodian population from one way of life to another.

Details on the systematic murder and re-education of the educated and artistic population further exemplify ethnocide. (It should be noted that re-education is a type of intrusion.) These individuals serve as culture bearers in a given community. Teachers share the collective history; artists share the collective cultural aesthetic. Sophiline Cheam Shapiro, a child survivor of the Cambodian horror who was forced into labor, recalls being taught special songs of the Khmer Rouge. Filled with propaganda favoring the communist regime, these songs were to replace any others previously celebrated by the Cambodian community. Shapiro remembers that the music sung by the Khmer Rouge celebrated the countryside and hard labor while denigrating the value of passion. One song, Angka Dar Qotdam (The Great Angka; Angka is the name given to the Khmer Rouge politburo) demonstrated how the Khmer Rouge regime intruded a new way of life in which a child’s family was no longer their mother and father, but rather, the Great Angka. Lyrics included, “We children love Angka limitless... Before the revolution, children were poor and lived like animals... Now Angka brings us good health, strength.” However, a true survivor, Sophiline returned to Phnom Penh in 1979 and enrolled in the reopened School of Fine Arts, where she later joined the faculty. In this way, she contributed to reconciliation. She moved to the United States and continued to teach Cambodian classical dance (Pran 1997).

Members of the opposition as well as the academic community were rounded up and either sent to prisons for “reeducation” or killed on the spot. Children were separated from their families and instructed to now consider Angka their family while forced into hard labor (Pran 1997). One survivor, Ouk Villa, tells of how his father was sent to be “reeducated,” his mother was sent to dig canals, and his sisters were sent to the mobile youth group. Ouk Villa was forced into a child group center where he was made to carry manure to the rice fields. He noted that children were kicked and pulled by the unit leaders, never receiving a substantive education (Pran 1997).
Lessons and Outcomes

Since the Holocaust and the births of the terms genocide, ethnocide, and ethnic cleansing, the world has had a track record of being slow to react. The genocide and ethnocide in Cambodia is no exception. In her book, *A Problem from Hell* (2002), Samantha Power addresses the lack of action by the United States when faced with the tragedies of Cambodians. Preliminary information was available to the Western world as early as June 1973, when Kenneth Quinn, a U.S. Foreign Service officer, reported on the systematic burning of Cambodian villages. Quinn then conducted further firsthand research into the situation. In February 1974 he submitted a report to Washington comparing the mounting Khmer Rouge programs with the Nazi regime (Power 2002). This type of comparison would prove to be a common tactic by American activists who sought intervention in Cambodia. The U.S. chose not to become involved until President Jimmy Carter finally made a plea to Amnesty International to conduct an investigation of human rights abuses there. Many scholars and activists believed the American government had a responsibility to respond to the atrocities in Cambodia, especially in light of the role it had played in creating an environment conducive to the rise of the totalitarian Khmer Rouge regime.

Through 2007, surviving Khmer Rouge, including Nuon Chea (“brother number two”), continued to deny any wrongdoing in the mass murder and ethnocide in Cambodia (Van Arsdale et al. 2007). While this comes as no surprise, the long-term denial of the existence of genocide in Cambodia by western superpowers presented a particular problem to those promoting long-term assistance in post-genocide healing. It was not until July, 1990, that the United States implemented a new policy to vote against the Khmer Rouge coalition at the United Nations (Power 2002). Despite the scale of regime-perpetrated death, the U.S. opposed the use of the term genocide in describing the situation in Cambodia during the 1991 Paris peace accords negotiation (which had the intention of bringing peace between Viet Nam and the Khmer Rouge coalition). At the time of the accords, Cambodia was no longer isolated to the international community, and in fact many visitors had already seen the aftermath of the genocide at places like the brutal Tuol Sleng (S-21) prison and in the “killing fields” directly.

V. The State’s Role

The highest authorities corrupted a war based on grudges piled up since the Tutsi kings and turned it into a genocide. We were overwhelmed. We found ourselves faced with a done deal we had to get done, if I may put it that way. When the [Rwandan] genocide came from Kigali, taking us by surprise, I never flinched. I thought, If the authorities opted for this choice, there’s no reason to sidestep the issue. (Joseph-Désiré Bitàro quoted in Hatzfeld 2005: 177).

State actors played significant roles in the implementation of genocide, ethnocide and ethnic cleansing as illustrated in these five cases. One major theme that encompasses each case is the overwhelming power and control of totalitarian (and often corrupt) regimes to ignite and execute plans that forced thousands to flee, suffer in their homelands, or become victims of massive atrocities.

“New People” vs. “Old People” and Forced Migration. A strategy of the Khmer Rouge in eradicating a specific way of life was to “reorganize” the Cambodian population into categories of “new” and “old” people. New people were those not living in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas prior to April 1975. Old people were those who had been living in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas during the civil war. Others who were defined as new were those who were regarded as the enemy: members of the old regime, the educated, Vietnamese, Muslim, Cham, Buddhist monks, and other “bourgeois elements” (Hinton 2005). Many new people were living in the urban areas of Cambodia, which were considered hotbeds of counterrevolutionary forces (Tully 2005). Thus the forced migration of city dwellers from Phnom Penh was seen as necessary to preventing resistance as well as part of the
process for changing Cambodian lifeways.

The “new” people had fewer rights than the “old” people and were stripped of their humanity. Survivor Teeda Butt Mam stresses that after being subjected to horrid conditions of forced labor and inadequate food, clothing, and medical care, as well as the constant fear of being disappeared or sent to be “re-educated,” she lost her sense of self. She recalls, “We not only lost our identities, but we lost our pride, our senses, our religion, our loved ones, our souls, ourselves” (Pran, 1997). This same sentiment is echoed by Hinton in his book, Why Did They Kill? He notes that new people were considered less than human and were treated as such. Long work hours, starvation rations, and lack of freedom erased their humanity (Hinton 2005). The dehumanization of a specific group by the state is a typical tactic in genocide to lessen the perceived moral implications of mass murder for the perpetrators. In the case of Cambodia, the dehumanization tactic was also useful in forcing the eradication of particular cultural practices, contributing to ethnocide.

The Ram Plan. The so-called 1991 Ram Plan reflected a strategy utilized by Serbian authorities to carry out an ethnic cleansing of Bosniacs in Yugoslavia. Created under General Blagoje Adzic and executed by President Slobodan Milosevic, the Ram Plan stated:

Our analysis of the behavior of the Muslim communities demonstrates that the morale, will and bellicose nature of their groups can be undermined only if we aim our action at the point where the religious and social structure is most fragile. We refer to the women, especially adolescents, and to the children... we have determined that the coordination between decisive interventions and a well-planned information campaign can provoke the spontaneous flight of many communities (Vetlesen 2005:189).

In addition to the Ram Plan, that same year Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman met in Karadordevo to discuss the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They concluded that Bosnia needed to be divided in order to prevent further warfare in the region (Glenny 1992:149).

State-sponsored propaganda played a vital role in supporting ethnic bigotry. Incentives were offered to solicit national support. Those who did not comply with national authority were threatened with the possibility of a draft. During the early stages of the war, propaganda promoted economic nationalism; however, within months, this was transformed into political nationalism, and in turn, ethnic cleansing. The Serbian media propagated the term ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian war to enhance the development of “Greater Serbia.” The term “had militaristic connotations that were expedient for nationalist efforts to claim territory within a society made increasingly paranoid by propaganda that equated ethnic difference with potential violence” (Flint 2005:182). According to Michael Sells, author of The Bridge Betrayed, “the charge of genocide became a signal to begin genocide” (Vetlesen 2005:151). Concurrent with an imminent Serbian-led massacre, the media would broadcast new accusations of anti-Serb activities by Muslims and Croats. This justified the premeditated aggression of Serbian forces as retaliatory self-defense.

The struggle for power following the fall of nationalism in the Balkans exacerbated ethnic cleansing in the region. Serbian elites sought to demobilize the population and expel those who were calling for reform in government. In addition, Serbia sought ultimate supremacy with a new state centralized around Belgrade, the capital. Milosevic convinced the general public they were fighting evil enemies: Muslim fundamentalists and Croatian Ustasha fighters, the latter of whom “had served under Hitler.” This tactic fostered fear as well as utilized “Serbophobia” in order to depict Serbs as victims, not aggressors (Vetlesen 2005:178).

In the case of Croatia, the ruling elite wanted to maintain autonomy and avoid any radical movement toward democracy. As a result, a gruesome attempt to maintain absolute power in the hands of the extremists and conservative elites in Croatia and Serbia began. Franjo Tudjman ordered attacks on regions of ethnically diverse Croats and Muslims in order to clear areas for “homogenous Croats” in Herzegovina. The ultimate goal was to separate Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly, Serbian guerrillas were
sent into multi-ethnic areas to execute massive killings for the creation of a homogenous Serbian republic in Bosnia.

**Decree No. 160 - Revolutionary Command Council.** Unlike Cambodia, Rwanda, or Bosnia, the genocide of the Kurds was not characterized by a “neighbor-against-neighbor” scenario. The attempt to destroy Kurdish life and culture was directed from the very top echelons of the Iraqi government. It was Ali Hassan al-Majid who was given free reign by his cousin Saddam Hussein over the Northern Bureau administrative region (which included Iraqi Kurdistan) by Decree No. 160 of the “Revolutionary Command Council” in 1987 (Yildiz 2004:25). The primary goal was to “solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs” (Power 2002:171). The Iraqi army, under the command of Hussein and al-Majid, was responsible for the major destruction of the Kurdish areas. Middle East Watch does note that the government had received cooperation from many regional and local units, including pro-Iraq Kurdish forces (Genocide Watch 1988). There was little public incitement against the Kurds and few average, unarmed Iraqis played a role in the killings.

Middle East Watch notes the clear path to destruction by the state by using an illustration of ethnic cleansing/genocide produced by Hilberg, in which the following steps are taken: Definition, concentration and annihilation (Middle East Watch 1993:8). The Ba'athist regime carried out each step in perfect sequence. The Kurds were first defined as traitors and then prohibited from remaining in their villages.

"[All] those who still lived and farmed in the Kurdish mountains would be considered as active enemies of the state by virtue of nothing more than their ethnicity and physical presence in their ancestral homeland“ (1993:50). The next step-concentration—was soon to follow. The presence of concentration camps such as Topwaza and the conditions described inside, dispel any notion that Anfal was just a counter-insurgency campaign (1993:209). Middle East Watch describes the brutal imagery:

Men and women were segregated on the spot as soon as the trucks had rolled to a halt in the base's large central courtyard or parade ground. The process was brutal ... A little later, the men were further divided by age, small children were kept with their mothers, and the elderly and infirm were shunted off to separate quarters. Men and teenage boys considered to be of an age to use a weapon were herded together (1993:209).

Other camps, such as Tikrit, Dibs (the women's camp), and Nugra Salman (for the elderly), manifested similar horrors:

In all camps, prisoners of both sexes and all ages were regularly beaten and rations were pitiful to the extent that some, especially the elderly and the young, died of starvation. Mothers were separated from children. Many were taken away, blindfolded and handcuffed, never to be seen by their relatives again (Yildiz 2004:29).

The final step, destruction, included mass murders and chemical attacks. Recent forensic investigations both before and after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq have unearthed several mass graves containing the bodies of victims demonstrating “firing squad-type” killing (Kelly 2007:240). Middle East Watch has several documented cases of mass executions, not only of men and boys but of women and children too, particularly in the area of German, a portion of Iraqi Kurdistan (Yildiz 2004:29; Jones 2004). Estimates from mass grave discoveries made in 2003 suggest about 300,000 victims from 263 mass graves, with one grave alone containing approximately 2,000 bodies (Yildiz 2004:131).

Most notable about the Kurdish genocide, a point often cited, is the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi government on its own citizens. Although Hussein also targeted other groups, the Kurds were particularly targeted. The most infamous case (out of at least 40), itself often viewed as separate from the Anfal campaigns, is the attack on the town of Halabja, known as the Kurdish Hiroshima (Power 2002:189). Eyewitness reports mention unspeakable horrors of bodies being incinerated, eyes changing color, people dropping dead in hysterical fits. An estimated 4,000 to 7,000 people were killed (Yildiz 2004:28). All of the chemical attacks on Kurdish villages were committed under the
command and support of Hussein and al-Majid, who (as previously noted) became known as “Chemical Ali” (Human Rights Watch 2006).

Plan D. The main bodies that oversaw the military and political activities of Israel early on were the Yishuv (Jewish government or “agency”) and the Haganah (Israeli army branch). There is ongoing debate over whether the Yishuv pre-planned the massive depopulation of Arabs from the new state. Most of the research on the major evacuations and expulsions of the Palestinians focuses on Plan D. Referring to this plan, Pappe describes the clear guidelines for Haganah military operations, which went beyond mere defensive strategies:

These operations can be carried out in the following manner: either by destroying villages (by setting fire to them, by blowing them up, and by planting mines in their debris) and especially of those population centers which are difficult to control continuously; or by mounting combing and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the villages, conducting a search inside them. In the case of resistance, the armed forces must be wiped out and the population expelled outside the borders of the state (Pappe 2006:39).

Morris (2004) concludes in his research on the Palestinian refugee crisis that there was no clear-cut consensus on expulsion or “ethnic cleansing,” and that even Plan D did not outline a strategy for this. Rather, “transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism – because it sought to transform a land which was ‘Arab’ into a ‘Jewish’ state and a Jewish state could not have arisen without a major displacement of the Arab population” (Shaw 2007:59). From this perspective, threats by the surrounding Arab countries and the outbreak of war proved the “perfect alibi” for clearing space for more Jews.

Pappe is more critical of the actions of the Haganah and the various results of the war, arguing:

There may well be a master plan, but most of the troops engaged in ethnic cleansing do not need direct orders: they know beforehand what is expected of them. Massacres accompany the operations, but where they occur they are not part of a genocidal plan: they are a key tactic to accelerate the flight of the population earmarked for expulsion. Later on, the expelled are then erased from the country’s official and popular history and excised from its collective memory (Pappe 2006:3).

Pappe explicitly lays the responsibility at the feet of David Ben-Gurion and Yosef Weitz, a member of the settlement committee (Pappe 2006:23). In behind-the-scene meetings and discussions, many Jewish leaders supported – in some manifestation – the expulsion or transfer of the Palestinians. Ben-Gurion stated, “I support compulsory transfer. I don’t see in it anything immoral” (Morris 2004:50). It was not until after key battles in April, according to Morris, that he then “explicitly sanctioned the expulsion of Arabs from a whole area of Palestine...” (Morris 2004:240).

Avraham Ussishkin, who spoke at the Twentieth Zionist Congress, argued that: “We cannot start the Jewish state with...half the population being Arab.... Such a state cannot survive even half an hour. It [i.e., transfer] is the most moral thing to do.... I am ready to come and defend...it before the Almighty” (Morris 2004:50). Many leaders supported the idea that Arabs should move voluntarily and be assisted by the Yishuv in doing so, but if resistance arose, they should be compelled or even forced to leave (Morris 2004:47). Transfer was seen by many as a humane response and participants in the Peel Commission, which established guidelines for a Jewish state, referred to the precedent of the Greco-Turkish transfers during the 1920s, which they deemed successful (Morris 2004:47). Yosef Weitz listed specific numbers for the ideal solution: “The Jewish state would not be able to exist with a large Arab minority. It must not amount to more than 12-15 percent of the total population.” He envisioned large-scale Jewish immigration as a way to ensure this ethnic landscape (Morris 2004:69). Further, some Jewish leaders favored “economically strangulating” the urban Arabs by destroying their infrastructure and livelihoods, including roads and ports (Morris 2004:67).
VI. Individual and Aggregate Responses: Victims, Survivors, Bystanders

Iraq/Kurdistan. "By the time the genocidal frenzy ended, 90% of Kurdish villages, and over twenty small towns and cities, had been wiped off the map. The countryside was riddled with fifteen million landmines, intended to make agriculture and husbandry impossible. A million and a half Kurdish peasants had been interned in camps.... About 10% of the total Kurdish population of Iraq had perished" (Jones 2004:325). The numbers of Anfal victims (including Halabja) were, at minimum, in the tens of thousands. Most sources mention the particular targeting of male Kurds and even go as far to say that the main purpose of the Anfal campaigns was to kill all military-age men in the Kurdish region (Jones 2004:321), a kind of gendercide. However, given the destruction caused by indiscriminate chemical attacks, concentration camps, mass killings of women and children, and forced depopulation, it also can be surmised that the purpose was to eliminate Kurdish life and culture totally. For the survivors, even after the campaigns were completed, an amnesty was granted, and refugees were allowed to return to certain areas in Iraqi Kurdistan (Yildiz 2004:30), the genocide cannot be forgotten. Thousands of women still have no knowledge of the whereabouts of their husbands, sons, or fathers. Issues of closure and proper burial according to Kurdish cultural norms are still being dealt with, almost twenty years later. The Special Rapporteur on Iraq stated: "The Anfal Operations constituted genocide type activities which did in fact result in the extermination of a part of this population and which continue to have an impact on the lives of the people as a whole" (Yildiz 2004:135).

Palestine/Israel. During the war of 1948, many Jews also died as a result of military operations and massacres. However, as Edward Said (2004, 2000) points out, the greatest injustice was done to the Palestinians for they lost most of their land and became refugees or IDPs, many remaining as such to this day. The creation of the state of Israel was tragic for the Palestinians. To say this is not to diminish the importance of having a homeland for the Jews. It means that the foundational stories and myths of Israel, as with many nations, must be reconciled with the victims of its glory, the victims of its creation. When understanding the great loss of the Palestinians it makes little sense to only listen to the political rhetoric of Israeli leaders but to also listen to the narratives of the victims. The "new historians," such as Morris and Pappe, although differing in their approaches and levels of criticism, all seek to deconstruct history and undo certain myths. While the official story in Israeli text books describes the Arabs as fleeing on their own accord, it is becoming more apparent and even acceptable in mainstream Israel that many were indeed expelled by force (Pappe 2006:xv).

As genocide scholar Naimark says: "People do not leave their homes on their own...they resist" (Shaw 2007:53). Some claim that "the whole world was a bystander," but within the region itself, many Palestinians themselves argue that other Arab countries did very little to help. Initially, most Jews within the region did not speak out because they were refugees themselves, fleeing pogroms, the Holocaust, or anti-Semitism in other Middle Eastern and European countries; their own sense of victimization was substantial. Many, who might have been sympathetic, knew little of the Palestinians plight until the 1970s or 1980s. The Yishuv initially had overwhelming support from the Western world, while by contrast the Palestinians had little support from the Western or Arab worlds; several Arab countries were hoping to claim certain areas for themselves (Morris 2004:34). Still reeling from the horrors of the Holocaust, much of the world saw no problem with the creation of a homeland for the Jews.

Rwanda. For many global citizens, the Rwandan genocide has become the international bellwether of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The tension between internal participation and external response largely defined this. Allison Des Forges presents a narrative dealing with the issue of popular participation in the Rwandan crisis:
But the people [genocide] tempts are the ones that just happen to live there. And I was there, at home, when the temptation came calling. I'm not saying I was forced by Satan and the like. Through greed and obedience I found the cause worthwhile, and I ran down to the marshes.... Simple people cannot resist a temptation like that, not without biblical rescue, not on the hills, anyway. Why? Because of the beautiful words of complete success. They win you over. Afterward the temptation cannot go to prison, so they imprison the people. And the temptation can certainly show up just as dreadful further along (1999:1).

Bill Berkeley quotes a person named Isadore, who had stared at him with tired, quizzical eyes: "I was very much surprised," he said. "Looking at my neighbors, I thought they were friends. I was very much surprised that they were among the people who came to try to kill us" (Berkeley 2001:3).

**Bosnia.** In the case of Bosnia, perpetrators and victims were never strangers, but rather, neighbors, classmates, and comrades; there was a certain sense of "physical as well as psychic proximity" (Vetlesen 2005:190). In ethnically mixed towns and villages, Serb forces would enter, attack, and retreat to a Serb house. They would force the male of the house to shoot his Muslim neighbor. If he refused, they would kill him. They would repeat this tactic until a Serbian man carried out the act. This powerful strategy left empty flats, cars and other useful appliances to the remaining Serbian residents. Focused on their newly acquired goods, some Bosnian Serbs saw ethnic cleansing as beneficial, or at least were able to ignore the brutality with which these goods had been acquired (Vetlesen 2005:192-193).

**VII. A Moral Imperative**

The existence of a moral imperative, mandating action on behalf of the marginalized and abused, has been covered in detail by Van Arsdale (2006:182-190). Some would argue that there is a "moral imperative to continue the struggle against the denial of the crime" of genocide, ethnic, or ethnic cleansing (Pappe 2006:xv). In the case of Palestine/Israel, the birth of the State of Israel carries with it two competing narratives: that of the winners, the Israelis, and that of the losers, the Palestinians. It is often said that the winners of wars are those who write the history books, and in Israel this has been the reality for many decades. Until recently, the idea that hundreds of thousands of people became stateless and homeless due to the acts of the early Jewish government and the Haganah was denied, suppressed, or ignored.

This now is changing. In the introductory chapter to his book, Pappe stresses the necessity of understanding these foundational myths and listening to the narrative of "the Other" in order to resolve the current combustible crisis in the Middle East. Edward Said suggests the following:

Might it not make sense for a group of respected historians and intellectuals, composed equally of Palestinians and Israelis, to hold a series of meetings to try to agree to a modicum of truth about this conflict, to see whether the known sources can guide the two sides to agree on a body of facts – who took what from whom, who did what to whom, and so on – which in turn might reveal a way out of the present impasse? (2004:349).

Usually, even after genocide is identified, as previously with Bosnia or currently with Darfur, a moral imperative to intervene is initially disregarded by the international community. Carl Dahlman, who has conducted research on Bosnia related to refugee return and reconstruction, commented on the insufficient response of the international community: "If genocide, clearly identified, is insufficient to trigger a humanitarian intervention, then all 'lesser' wrongs, including crimes against humanity, will never be met with substantive force, and this will signal to those regimes that make a policy of atrocities that no one will stop them" (Flint 2005:192). The international community could have prevented the conflict’s escalation had it been willing to respond sooner to undeniable atrocities. The horrors of Srebrenica that left nearly
8,000 Muslim men and boys dead likely could have been averted had warning signs been acted upon.

David Rieff, a journalist and author of Slaughterhouse (1995), claims: “Bosnia was and always will be a just cause. It should have been the West’s cause. To have intervened on the side of Bosnia would have been self-defense, not charity” (Rieff 2005:10). Bosnia represented a true multi-cultural state with a blending of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Prior to the war, Bosnian Serbs lived scattered across 95 percent of the land, Bosniacs 94.5 percent of the land, and Bosnian Croats 70 percent (Mahmutcehajic 2003:78).

The international community must be willing to take action when genocide and crimes against humanity are indisputable. If not, as Dahlman emphasizes above, human-kind is justifying the unlawful acts of malicious regimes. Under the tenet of “never again,” Bosnians, Kurds, Rwandans, Cambodians, and Palestinians deserved a rapid response from the international community, either in the form of humanitarian aid or humanitarian intervention.

The Politics of Genocide

Congressman Hank Johnson (D – Georgia) was interviewed on National Public Radio on October 17 2007. His remarks provide as much insight into the conundrum that is genocide as any journal article, authoritative book, or video documentary. He originally had supported a U.S. House resolution formally condemning the indisputable Armenian genocide at the hands of the Turks some 90 years ago, but – along with a number of other congressmen – had changed his mind and decided to withdraw his support. His reasons had little to do with the factual circumstances of this particular genocide, which he believes did take place, but a great deal to do with politics. In his comments he emphasized security concerns. He stressed the need to extricate American military personnel safely from Iraq, linking this with U.S. security in the Middle East/S.W. Asian region, linking this in turn with the support being demonstrated by Turkey (a key ally). He cited communications he recently had had with Americans of Turkish decent who live in his district (while admitting to not having had any with Americans of Armenian decent). His tones were measured, his thoughtfulness apparent.

Also on October 17th, the Turkish parliament voted to authorize cross-border military attacks in northern Iraq against Kurdish separatist rebels. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also supportive of this resolution, pledged not to order immediate strikes. Parliamentarians expressed frustration that the United States and Iraq had not fulfilled promises to curb the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (the PKK), which some have classified as a terrorist organization.

A few days earlier, the U.S. House had begun debating a non-binding measure introduced by the House Foreign Relations Committee. It had voted to condemn as genocide the mass killings of Armenians in Turkey during World War I. (A similar stance had previously been taken by some French parliamentarians.) However, by October 18th, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi had come under increasing pressure from members of her Democratic caucus not to bring the resolution to a vote. While the resolution’s original supporters were not ready to concede defeat, the measure gradually lost momentum. The specter of realpolitik had emerged. In a sense, “the indisputable” had become “the disputable.”

VIII. The Role of Culture

It is dangerous and inaccurate to say that one particular culture is more prone to engaging in genocide, or that one particular culture bears the markers of genocidal tendencies. What is significant in looking at the role of culture in genocide is how members of that culture might change “the look” of the genocide or the specifics of how it is implemented. In the case of Cambodia, particular cultural practices and beliefs might have contributed to the way in which the genocide was carried out. Anthropologist Alexander Laban Hinton wrestles with these ideas in his book, Why Did They Kill? (2005) One instance includes the practice of disproportionate revenge, or “A head for an eye” in Cambodia. In short, this is a practice of exacting revenge on someone for a
wrong doing that does not match the wrongdoing committed. An example can be found in the manner in which the Khmer Rouge used class warfare and the Cambodian understanding of disproportionate revenge to indoctrinate Khmer youth into their movement. The use of propaganda found in songs and such sayings as, “To dig up grass, one must also dig up the roots” and the use of reclassification of individuals into new and old people (read “us vs. them,” creating “the Other”) contributed to the Khmer Rouge’s success at using “everyday, average” Cambodians to commit genocide (Hinton 2005).

An example of the practice of disproportionate revenge being used by the Khmer Rouge is told in the story of Neari, a survivor of the Cambodian genocide interviewed by Hinton. Neari’s father, mother, and three siblings were killed by the Khmer Rouge. Neari retold the story of her father’s death. He had been a teacher prior to the revolution who was “very strict…and would frequently hit his students in order to make them learn.” One particular student, Hean, was “lazy and disobedient and was beaten often.” Neari later learned that this same student executed her father, saying: “When you were my teacher, you beat me and made me hurt. Now, I will repay your ‘good’ deed in turn. I will kill and discard you, so that you can no longer be such a mean teacher” (Hinton 2005). The Khmer Rouge used the cultural practice of disproportionate revenge to encourage those like Hean, who felt they had been wronged, to carry out the genocide.

Are there cultures that are more disposed to commit genocide or genocidal acts? A less critical reading of the work of Daniel Goldhagen, author of Hitler’s Willing Executioners (1996), would suggest that there are. The role that everyday Germans played in the Holocaust is considered as a correlate of German culture. He implies that a kind of cultural determinism may exist. A convergence of perceived past or present injustice, disadvantageous resource access, discriminatory attitudes, and a leader’s supremacist ideology - reflecting “a culture” - therefore yields a targeted response: Genocide.

A more critical reading of Goldhagen’s work, considered in point-counterpoint fashion with that of Hinton (2005) and Power (2002), would suggest something very different. What, in fact, are central to the explanation are institutional factors shaped by dysfunctional state systems. Perceived threat by “the Other” is transformed through emergent policy into state-sanctioned, brutal action. Individual leaders (the arbiters/perpetrators of genocide) play to their opponents’ weaknesses and to their own desires to enhance oppressive power. Therefore, in the broadest sense, genocidal activity is about dysfunctional state systems, imbalanced power relationships, and oppressive institutions. It is not “about culture” or “about evil leaders.”

If culture can be defined as a group’s shared imagery of its past, present, and future; a shared (and often idealized) set of values; and a commonly accepted set of clustered behaviors, then “cultural interpretations” of genocide are possible: reflecting on a desired future, refining values contributing to social integrity, and altering unacceptable behaviors. The reification of “culture” is therefore avoided through careful anthropological analysis. Similarly, the reification of “genocide,” by the media and everyday public, is overcome by careful anthropological analysis. Demagogic ideologies and inaccurately portrayed histories can be dispelled; the charge of genocide need not equate with the act of genocide. This is where the discipline can make one of its strongest contributions.

The issue of “cultural disappearance” was noted early in this document. It is another arena where anthropologists can make substantial and innovative contributions as both researchers and advocates. State-sponsored programs of forced assimilation, as have occurred historically in the U.S. with Native Americans, or forced “villagization,” as have occurred more recently in Ethiopia with non-Amharic peoples, can result in the disappearance of core cultures. Systematic empirical documentation of these processes based upon on-site fieldwork and subsequent advocacy based upon the data obtained, build upon anthropology’s strengths.

The preoccupation of perpetrators of genocide with race, antiquity, agriculture, and expansion (following Kiernan 2007) was noted in the introduction, but not explored herein.
Despite criticisms leveled against these categories by the historian William McNeill (2008), they clearly also provide fertile ground for cultural anthropologists. For example, Liisa Malkki’s (1995) work on Hutu refugees in Tanzania probed the first two. Van Arsdale’s current work on Darfur is probing the second two, agriculture and expansion.

As the AAA’s draft statement on ethnic cleansing (2001) affirmed, a well-rounded concern with “things cultural” is beneficial as these issues are considered. Situating them cross-culturally is essential. Differing values can be debated, diversity in light of factionalization can be considered, and causes of ominous and horrific practices can be addressed. The legacies of colonialism, impacts of globalization, and roles of the military (especially in interaction with civilians) are central. Anthropologists are increasingly well-positioned to analyze human rights abuses and to advocate on behalf of those whose rights have been violated. As the AAA statement notes, there is no “magic theory.” There is, simply, an opportunity to contribute to a pragmatic humanitarianism.

“The cure and prevention of the crime of genocide must lie, at least in part, in the diagnosis of its recurring causes and symptoms”
(Kiernan 2007:606).

Notes

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2. Peter Van Arsdale is Senior Lecturer at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He chairs the board of the Center for Cultural Dynamics based in Centennial, Colorado, and (in a consulting capacity) works as Senior Researcher with the firm eCrossCulture based in Boulder, Colorado. He earned his Ph.D. in Applied Cultural Anthropology from the University of Colorado at Boulder in 1975. He can be reached by mail at 7321 East Long Avenue, Centennial, CO 80121, by e-mail at pvanards@du.edu, and by telephone at 303-770-1612.

3. Mellissa Jessen is Assistant Director of the Jan and Bud Richter Center for Community Engagement and Service-Learning at California State University, Fresno. She holds an M.A. in International Human Rights from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (2007). She can be reached by mail at 2555 E. San Ramon Avenue M/S SB 120, Fresno, CA 93740-8034, by e-mail at mjessen@csufresno.edu, and by telephone at 559-278-6986.

4. Nicole Hawthorne is an Associate at R&I Strategies and Research, a political consulting firm in Denver, Colorado. She holds an M.A. in International Human Rights with a Specialization in Security from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (2009). She can be reached by mail at 1900 Grant Street, Suite 1170, Denver, CO 80203, by e-mail at nikirbistrategies.com, and by telephone at 303-832-2444.

5. Kellie Ramirez is a part-time Assistant Education Coordinator for Lutheran Family Services of Colorado’s Refugee and Asylee Programs, based in Denver. She holds an M.A. in International Human Rights with a Certificate in Humanitarian Assistance from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (2008). She can be reached by mail at 3470 South Poplar Street #210, Denver, CO 80224, by e-mail at la_queli@hotmail.com, and by telephone at 402-730-2358.

6. Kathy Smith holds an M.A. in International Human Rights with a Certificate in Humanitarian Assistance from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (2008). During the summer of 2007, she directed field research addressing human rights violations committed by Israeli security forces against Palestinian political detainees while interning with Wi’am: Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center in the West Bank. She can be reached by mail at 221 Adrian Court, Lansdale, PA 19446, by e-mail at cathyleesmith@gmail.com, and by telephone at 215-429-9867.
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